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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS: THE INFLUENCE OF TEMPORARY SPENDING RESTRICTIONS 
ON MONTHLY EXPENDITURE PATTERNS OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 
 
 
 The federal fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30, and many federal 
agencies rely on annual appropriations to fund activities and programs.  Nonetheless, 
the federal government often enters a new fiscal year without a fully approved budget, 
which actuates the requirement for a temporary means of funding government 
operations.  Congress and the president provide provisional resources by way of 
continuing resolutions which enable the operation of government programs until 
regular appropriations are enacted.  However, continuing resolutions are restrictive by 
design and may have unintended effects on government spending behavior beyond the 
timeframe to which the resolutions apply. 
   
This study explores the relationship between the uncertainty generated by the 
implementation of continuing appropriations and the modification of expenditure 
behavior in federal agencies.  After a summary of the federal budget process and a 
survey of the literature related to continuing resolutions, a model of agency spending is 
presented.  The associated theory explores suppositions related to ex ante and ex post 
reactions of agency officials to: (1) a one-time occurrence of continuing resolutions, and 
(2) an environment of regularly occurring continuing resolutions.  Afterward, event 
study methods are applied to a subset of federal monthly obligation data to reveal 
patterns of spending which are suggestive of: (1) a saving-dissaving approach to 
compensate for the restrictive nature of continuing resolutions, and (2) the presence of 
signaling mechanisms between higher echelons of the federal government and 
subordinate agencies.  A second quantitative chapter builds on the idea that federal 
agencies engage in expense shifting in anticipation of the enactment of continuing 
resolutions.  An agenda setting framework is used to demonstrate how agencies 
monitor particular sources of the federal budget process to gain insight to the likelihood 
of continuing appropriations being enacted.  Findings show that decision-makers may be 
able to determine the relevancy of particular budgetary signals within the congressional 
budgetary scheme. 
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
 
 The federal fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30, and many federal 
agencies rely on annual appropriations to fund activities and programs.  Nonetheless, 
the federal government often enters a new fiscal year without a fully approved budget, 
which actuates the requirement for a temporary means of funding government 
operations.  Congress and the president provide provisional resources by way of 
continuing appropriations which enable the operation of government programs until 
regular appropriations are enacted. 
 However, continuing resolutions, as these legislative stopgap measures are also 
known, are restrictive by design and may have unintended effects on government 
spending behavior beyond the timeframe to which the resolutions apply.  Government 
agencies routinely formulate budgets and devise spending plans toward 
accomplishment of organizational missions under the assumption that full funding will 
be available at the outset of the coming fiscal year.  Yet, these stopgap measures arise in 
the absence of an approved federal budget and are intended to suppress organizational 
spending until the budget impasse is resolved.  Continuing resolutions place limits on 
operational activities and may result in interim levels of funding that tend to be lower 
than those for which the agency originally planned.  As a result, continuing 
appropriations may disrupt obligation plans thereby causing organizations to adopt 
measures of execution that will increase the probability of achieving budgetary spending 
goals. 
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 How then do continuing resolutions affect the spending patterns of federal 
agencies?  Dating back more than a century, these stopgap measures have become a 
mainstay of the federal budget process and most academic work pertains to higher-level 
interactions.  At the government-wide level, scholarly work is plentiful and tends to 
focus on continuing resolutions as: (1) a legislative instrument which may tip the scales 
between the legislature and the executive during budget negotiations, (2) an apple of 
discord between authorizers and appropriators, and (3) a reluctant and temporary 
solution to budgetary stalemate.  At the agency level, empirical findings are the result of 
case studies but the majority of research is conducted by practitioners.  Consequently, 
the bulk of the evidence at the agency level tends to be anecdotal because agencies do 
not specifically track the effects of spending restrictions. 
 At present, the field of federal budgeting is nearly devoid of theoretical 
frameworks and quantitative analyses regarding the effect of continuing resolutions on 
the expenditure behavior of federal agencies.  Instead, academic budgeting literature is 
focused generally on budget preparation while budget execution, which is the stage at 
which spending takes place, is largely the domain of practitioners (McCaffery & Mutty, 
1999).  Indeed, budgeting remains a practice-oriented discipline (Bartle, 2001) and 
interactions between academics and practitioners, in the broader field of public 
administration, continue to dwindle due, in part, to of barriers of mobility between the 
two sectors (Posner, 2009). 
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Fortunately, the presence of this void does not mean that budget execution has 
been overlooked by scholars.  Academics in the field of management accounting have 
explored the financial management aspect of budgeting where cost controls, cash flow 
management, and capital expenditures take place (Balakrishnan & Sprinkle, 2002).  With 
regard to the study at hand, a framework of unused capacity from the field of Activity-
Based Costing and economic theories in budget maximization and budget uncertainty 
may provide points of debarkation for a theory of bureaucratic expenditure behavior. 
Purpose of the dissertation 
This research seeks to explore the relationship between the uncertainty generated 
by continuing resolutions and modifications in expenditure behavior of managers in 
federal agencies.  In an attempt to foster a comprehensive understanding of continuing 
resolutions on several fronts, the research seeks to answer the following questions: 
(1) What research has been conducted on continuing appropriations acts? 
(2) With regard to the obligation of allocated funding, how might an agency of the 
federal government modify expenditure behavior while under the spending 
constraints of a continuing resolution? 
(3) What factors might account for these modifications in organizational expenditure 
behavior as agency officials compensate for restrictions on federal spending? 
(4) Which econometric methods might one use to reveal the expenditure behavior of 
agency officials under said spending constraints? 
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Summary of chapters 
Chapter two provides an overview of the federal budget process and serves as a 
touchstone for terms and concepts used throughout the dissertation.  This institutional 
chapter opens with a brief summary of the evolution of the federal budget process, and 
then guides the reader through the essential phases of budget formulation at the 
federal level.  The purpose of this overview is to offer a general understanding of the 
federal budget process while preparing the reader for the examination of continuing 
resolutions that follows in subsequent chapters. 
Chapter three surveys the existing research on continuing appropriations acts 
and segues to the theoretical exposition.  The chapter opens with essential background 
information such as the constitutional and statutory basis for continuing resolutions, the 
types of stopgap measures, and the number of continuing resolutions employed over a 
period of three decades.  The discussion moves-on to a summary of the literature as it 
relates to the institutions of the president and the Congress, while a synthesis of the 
research dedicated to the effects of continuing resolutions at the agency-specific level 
follows.  The discussion then begins to dovetail with the theoretical material through 
the notion of re-categorizing the effects of continuing appropriations on agency-specific 
organizations and re-approaching the issue by way of a standardized accounting 
classification system.  The final segment of the literature review considers the current 
state of the field. 
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Chapter four contains a framework of agency spending and suggested research 
hypotheses.  The theoretical examination of how agency officials might budget 
organizational resources in the face of spending restrictions begins with the base 
assumptions under which the model will operate.  The analysis proceeds with an 
arithmetic model of unrestricted agency spending across three fiscal years and then 
transitions to an environment of continuing resolutions.  The three fiscal year setting 
provides a manner of exploring suppositions related to ex ante and ex post reactions of 
agency officials to: (1) a one-time occurrence of continuing resolutions, and (2) an 
environment of regularly occurring continuing resolutions.  Afterward, relaxation of 
certain base assumptions enables a discussion of the limitations of the model in a line-
item budget setting and under a multi-year lump-sum appropriation.   
Chapter five explores the influence of continuing resolutions on federal spending 
patterns on a high frequency basis.  Event study methods are applied to a subset of 
federal monthly obligation data to show how federal agency officials adjust 
organizational expenditure behavior to compensate for spending restrictions.  Analysis 
finds that when stopgap measures are on the horizon for the upcoming fiscal year, 
agency personnel purchase additional contract services and supplies three months prior 
to the end of the terminating fiscal year.  While spending restrictions are in effect, 
agencies do not deviate from normal monthly expenditure patterns.  After restrictions 
are lifted, however, obligation rates dip below normal levels for a brief period of time.  
Taken together, these patterns of spending are suggestive of: (1) a saving-dissaving 
approach to compensate for the restrictive nature of continuing resolutions, and (2) the 
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presence of signaling mechanisms between higher echelons of the federal government 
and subordinate agencies.  In addition, the findings raise concerns about expense 
shifting vis-à-vis federal appropriations law and the bona fide needs rule.  
Chapter six builds on the idea that federal agencies engage in expense shifting in 
anticipation of the enactment of continuing resolutions.  By examining budgetary 
signaling mechanisms between the president, Congress, and executive agencies, this 
chapter explores the concept of organizational learning as it relates to the federal 
bureaucracy.  A theoretical framework of agenda setting is used to demonstrate how 
agencies monitor particular sources of the federal budget process to gain insight 
regarding the likelihood of continuing appropriations being enacted.  Findings also show 
that decision-makers may be able to determine the relevance of particular budgetary 
signals within the congressional budgetary scheme. 
Chapter seven, the final chapter in this dissertation, offers a discussion of the 
policy implications of these findings and presents future avenues of research. 
 
 
Copyright © Thomas Alexander Jacobs 2014 
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Chapter Two 
The Federal Budget Process 
 
Evolution of the federal budget process 
The federal budget process that existed prior to 1974 was not the same as the 
one by which Congress and the president abide currently.  Early in the nation’s history, 
balanced budgets were the norm.  Federal expenditures outpaced revenues during only 
one-third of the fiscal years between 1789 and 1916, mostly on account of wars.  
Because the Federal Government was small and its needs were modest, Congress was 
able to maintain the nation’s financial stability despite the lack of a comprehensive 
budgeting system to coordinate revenues and expenditures (Schick, 2007). 
Over time, however, fragmented obligation authority in Congress, uncoordinated 
budgeting and spending by federal agencies, and the First World War (WWI) contributed 
to an environment of persistent peacetime deficits.  By the latter part of the 19th 
century, some members of Congress had grown dissatisfied with the appropriations 
committees’ efforts to control government expenditures.  For instance, many southern 
Representatives wanted to increase spending in their districts but were unable to do so 
because of the requirement of a formal authorization prior to appropriation of funding.  
Between 1877 and 1895, the House and the Senate stripped the appropriations 
committees of jurisdiction over a majority of the appropriations bills and referred the 
measures instead to the related legislative committees.  Decentralization of 
responsibility for appropriations enabled legislators to circumvent fiscal controls 
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instituted by the committees on appropriations and made it possible for authorizers to 
craft legislation that permitted certain entities to obligate funding ahead of 
appropriations.  At the same time, many federal agencies routinely bypassed 
presidential review of spending requests by submitting directly to congressional 
committees.  While the Treasury Department compiled agency budget requests in an 
annual Book of Estimates, there was no coordination among agencies to ensure that 
spending efforts were in accord with national policies1.  Circumstances such as these, 
together with obligations incurred during WWI, caused federal spending to increase 
from $726 million in 1914 to $19 billion in 1919 and public debt to grow from $1 billion 
to $26 billion (109th Congress, 2005; 111th Congress, 2010; Lee, Johnson, & Joyce, 
2008; Schick, 2007).   
Two years later, Congress began to reshape budget procedures by establishing 
an executive budget system.  The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established the 
statutory basis for a formal executive budget process by requiring the president to 
submit to Congress annually a proposed budget for the Federal Government.  The Act 
created the Bureau of the Budget and the General Accounting Office (GAO).  The former 
was tasked with overseeing preparation of the federal budget and was reorganized as 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970.  The latter was instituted to assist 
Congress as the principal auditing agency of the federal government and was renamed 
1 The First Congress assigned the Secretary of the Treasury the responsibility of compiling and reporting 
estimates of the public revenues and expenditures, but did not afford the Secretary the authority to 
review expenditure estimates and to oversee use of appropriations (109th Congress, 2005). 
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the Government Accountability Office in 2004 (Committee on the Budget: U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2013a; Lee, et al., 2008). 
While the 1921 Act instilled a sense of order to the executive facet of budget 
preparation, Congress still lacked a centralized mechanism for determining budgetary 
priorities and for coordinating congressional actions on the budget.  Instead, 
congressional budget procedures were organized around the committee system.  Once 
Congress received the president’s budget request, component parts were parceled out 
to and considered in isolation by specialist committees in each chamber.  To wit, each 
committee attended to those matters within its jurisdiction: proposed appropriations 
were considered by the respective subcommittees of the appropriations committees; 
the relevant authorizing committee in each house examined proposed authorizations; 
and tax committees evaluated revenue proposals (Hartman, 1982; Hogan, 1985). 
Thus, the congressional budget was a product of piecemeal decision making that 
facilitated backdoor spending and a growth in deficits.  Because revenue, authorizing, 
and appropriations committees decided separately on matters within their defined 
areas of responsibility, substantive committees were able to create legislation that 
permitted agencies to incur obligations outside of the annual appropriations process.  
Hence, irrespective of appropriations committees’ efforts to control spending, certain 
agencies were authorized to borrow from the treasury and to enter into binding 
contracts that would legally commit the government to future outlays.  When coupled 
with the advent and growth of entitlement programs, such as Social Security, Medicare, 
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and Medicaid, such fiscal practices resulted in unplanned growth in public expenditures 
and further increases in the federal deficit during the 1960s and 1970s (109th Congress, 
2005; Hartman, 1982; Hogan, 1985; Lee, et al., 2008; Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007). 
The perception that the congressional budget process was out of control and a 
presidential challenge to congressional power of the purse led Congress to legislate 
further budgetary reform.  By the early 1970s, many Americans had come to regard the 
growth in federal spending and deficit as a congressional show of fiscal irresponsibility.  
At the same time, President Nixon, a fiscal conservative, was at odds with Congress over 
budget priorities and reductions in spending.  The president attempted to control 
spending by vetoing appropriation bills and by seeking, unsuccessfully, the discretionary 
authority to impose a spending ceiling for fiscal year 1973.  Nixon’s eventual 
employment of an impoundment strategy, in which he refused to spend appropriations, 
finally prompted Congress to draft the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974 (Dumbrell, 1980; Hogan, 1985; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007). 
With enactment of the 1974 Act, Congress sought to regain control over the 
budget process.  The legislation was designed to: (1) enable Congress to reassert its 
power in matters of the nation’s purse, (2) temper the growth of both federal spending 
and the federal deficit, (3) enable Congress to complete work on the annual budget by 
the beginning of the fiscal year, and (4) help Congress manage conflicts related to the 
federal budget (Ellwood, 1983; Hogan, 1985; Lee, et al., 2008).  To accomplish those 
objectives, legislators: (a) revised the congressional budgetary timetable and established 
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key steps in the congressional budget process; (b) formed the House and Senate Budget 
Committees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO); (c) required more budgetary 
information from the executive; and (d) strengthened both anti-impoundment laws and 
the role of the GAO.  Thus, the 1974 Act established a more comprehensive and 
coordinated budget process and gave Congress the tools necessary to exert greater 
control over fiscal matters, while curtailing the president’s authority to withhold 
appropriations (Dumbrell, 1980; Finley, 1975; GAO, 2005a; Hogan, 1985; Lee, et al., 
2008; Schick, 2007) 
Currently, the federal budget process is a multi-layered cyclical fiscal system.  
The activities associated with any single fiscal year’s budget, from formulation to 
execution, will span multiple fiscal years.  For this reason, the federal government is 
typically engaged with at least three fiscal years at any one point in time: (1) the current 
year, (2) the budget year, and (3) the first out-year.  The current year is the 12-month 
fiscal period that began on October 1st, is already under way, and will terminate on 
September 30th.  The budget year is the fiscal year that Congress is deliberating 
currently; it is the 12-month fiscal period that will begin this upcoming October 1st.  
Finally, the first out-year is that 12-month fiscal period that follows the budget year 
(Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007). 
Excluding the audit and evaluation of federal expenditures, the federal budget 
process for any one fiscal year can be broken down into three phases: (1) The executive 
budget formulation phase during which the executive branch prepares the President’s 
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Budget request; (2) The congressional budget phase that begins with the receipt of the 
President’s Budget and during which Congress formulates a budgetary framework of its 
own for taxing, spending, and borrowing; and (3) The budget execution and control 
phase that begins once OMB apportions to federal agencies those funds which Congress 
has appropriated and which the president has enacted into law (GAO, 2005a; Office of 
Management and Budget, 2013).  Table 2.1 below provides a timetable for a typical 
fiscal budget cycle (Schick, 2007).  Since the federal budget process is a cyclical and 
iterative exercise, a logical place to begin explaining budget operations might be with 
the formulation phase. 
 
This space was left blank intentionally. 
Table 2.1 follows on the next page.
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Table 2.1: Timetable for a Typical Fiscal Budget Cycle 
Annual calendar Activities 
20X1 
  March – June - Formulation period for budget guidelines and preliminary 
policies.  Agency budget offices request budget estimates 
from operating units. 
  July – September - Agencies formulate detailed requests and submit to OMB. 
  October – December - OMB reviews agency requests.  Agencies revise budget 
requests based on OMB feedback (this is known as 
“passback”).  Agencies may appeal to OMB and/or the 
president for final disposition. 
20X2 
  January - CBO releases ten-year Budget and Economic Outlook for 
fiscal years 20X3 – 20X3(+10). 
  January/February - President submits FY 20X3 budget request to Congress 
between first Monday in January and First Monday in 
February. 
  March 15 - Congressional committees submit “views and estimates” 
on the budget to budget committees. 
  April 15 - Target adoption date for congressional budget resolution 
for FY 20X3 budget. 
  May 15 - If budget resolution has not yet been adopted, 
appropriations may be considered in the House. 
  June – August - Full House and Senate act on regular appropriation bills for 
FY 20X3; OMB and CBO release new revenue and 
expenditure projections for FY 20X3. 
  September - Conference reports and enactment of regular 
appropriations. 
  October 1 - FY 20X3 begins.  Congress passes continuing resolution(s) if 
regular appropriations have not yet been enacted into law. 
  October 20X2 – 
September 20X3 
- Congress may enact supplemental appropriations for FY 
20X3. 
20X3 
  February - New revenue and expenditure projections for FY 20X3 are 
included in the FY 20X4 budget. 
  September 30 - FY 20X3 ends. 
  October  - December - Agencies, Treasury, and OMB close the books FY 20X3. 
20X4  
  January – December 
and beyond 
- Agencies prepare financial statements, and post-audits and 
evaluations are conducted. 
  February - Actual revenue and expenditure data for FY 20X3 are 
included in the FY 20X5 budget. 
Source: adapted from The Federal Budget Process: Politics, Policy, Process, Table 4-1, p. 54 (Schick, 2007) 
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Phase One: Executive Budget Formulation 
The main participants in the executive budget formulation phase are: (1) federal 
agencies and individual organizational units, which review current operations and 
program objectives and request funding to discharge authorized programs and 
activities; (2) OMB, which supervises the consolidated budget submission by reviewing 
agency requests, compiling the budget for the president, monitoring congressional 
action, and providing oversight of agency implementation of the budget; and (3) the 
president, who establishes the revenue, expenditure, and borrowing policies set forth in 
the budget (Committee on the Budget: U.S. House of Representatives, 2013a, 2013b; 
GAO, 2005a; Office of Management and Budget, 2013; Schick, 2007). 
By law, the president is required to submit to Congress a comprehensive budget 
for the federal government for the upcoming fiscal year.  The window for submission of 
the budget opens on the first Monday in January and extends to the first Monday in 
February (Keith, 2008b).  On occasion, the timing of the budget submission changes to 
accommodate circumstances such as the transition between administrations, but on 
balance, most administrations submit the budget to Congress on or before the statutory 
deadline (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2011; Committee on the Budget: U.S. 
House of Representatives, 2013a; Keith, 2008b; Library of Congress. Congressional 
Research, McMurtry, & Saturno; Schick, 2007). 
Because of the complexity of the process and the number of participants 
involved, preparation and review of the federal budget requires a significant amount of 
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lead time.  Shortly after the February submission of the budget to Congress, the OMB 
Director begins the process anew by issuing an allowance letter to the head of each 
federal agency.  This initial step in the process occurs approximately nine months prior 
to the president’s budget submission, or almost 18 months ahead of the fiscal year to 
which the budget pertains.  Allowance letters contain budgetary policy and planning 
guidance regarding agency budget requests.  Once agencies receive their respective 
allowance letters, they begin the work of formulating the budget that the president will 
submit to Congress (GAO, 2005a; Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007). 
Over the course of the spring and summer, OMB works to establish policy for the 
upcoming budget request.  To do so, OMB officials must confer with agency personnel 
to identify significant budgetary issues; to formulate options related to spending and 
program requests; and to plan for the analysis of issues that may require future 
decisions.  The resulting policy, OMB Circular No. A-11, provides detailed guidance and 
instruction to executive departments regarding the preparation of the budget requests 
and submission of related data and materials.  The Circular, which is currently almost 
800-pages in length, is an expansive temporal document that provides guidance for the 
upcoming fiscal year as well as for the nine subsequent fiscal years (GAO, 2005a; Office 
of Management and Budget, 2012). 
From September to October, all federal agencies submit initial budget requests 
to OMB.  The president’s budget request includes agency information from all three 
branches of the federal government.  Those agencies which are subject to executive 
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branch review, and the District of Columbia, must submit their budget requests to OMB 
by the first Monday after Labor Day.  Agencies which are not subject to executive 
review, such as the Federal Reserve Board and the legislative and judicial branches, are 
required to submit preliminary budget requests to OMB by October (GAO, 2005a; Office 
of Management and Budget, 2013). 
Between October and early January, OMB reviews the budget proposals and 
then informs agencies of preliminary budget decisions. After receipt of agency budget 
estimates, “fall review” takes place during which OMB examiners and agency 
representatives meet to consider the agency proposals in relation to presidential 
priorities, program performance, and budget constraints.  Once the review has taken 
place and after the OMB Director has briefed the president on the budget proposals, the 
president makes broad policy decisions (GAO, 2005a; Office of Management and 
Budget, 2013).  Agencies are notified of the president’s budget decisions in late 
November during “passback.”  For federal agencies, the president’s broad budget 
policies manifest in the form of adjustments to their proposed budgets.  OMB notifies 
the agencies of the president’s decisions and passes-back to agencies the responsibility 
for making changes to their respective budgets.  Agency officials may appeal these 
decisions, but whatever the disposition, agencies have until early January to revise their 
budgets and to enter data into OMB’s budget database (GAO, 2005a; Office of 
Management and Budget, 2013). 
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In January, agencies prepare and OMB reviews congressional budget justification 
materials and this first phase culminates with the submission of the budget to Congress.  
Agencies spend the month of January assembling detailed budget justification materials 
to account for and to explain their requests for funding.  The end product, the 
president’s budget, details the actual receipts and spending levels for the fiscal year just 
completed.  In addition, estimated receipts and spending for the current fiscal year, for 
the upcoming fiscal year, and for the nine subsequent fiscal years are also included.  In 
accordance with the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, these budget justification books 
are transmitted to Congress “on or before the first Monday in January but not later than 
the first Monday in February of each year” and then distributed to the responsible 
congressional entities (GAO, 2005a; Keith, 2008b; Office of Management and Budget, 
2013).  Table 2.2 lists the major steps in the in the executive budget formulation phase. 
 
This space was left blank intentionally. 
Table 2.2 follows on the next page.
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Table 2.2: Major Steps in the Executive Budget Formulation Phase 
Timeframe Activities 
Spring 
(Approximately 9 
months prior to the 
submission of the 
president’s budget 
to Congress; circa 
March or April) 
- OMB issues spring planning guidance to Executive Branch 
agencies for the upcoming budget.  The OMB Director issues 
a letter to the head of each agency providing policy guidance 
for the agency’s budget request.  Absent more specific 
guidance, outyear estimates included in the previous budget 
serve as the starting point for the next budget.  This step 
marks the beginning of the process of formulating the budget 
the president will submit the following February. 
Spring and Summer - OMB and Executive Branch agencies discuss budget issues 
and options.  OMB works with agencies to: 
(1) Identify major issues for the upcoming budget 
(2) Develop and analyze options for the upcoming fall review  
(3) Plan for analysis of issues that will require future 
decisions 
July - OMB issues Circular No. A-11 to federal agencies.  A-11 
provides detailed instructions for submitting budget data and 
materials. 
September * - Executive Branch agencies, except those not subject to 
Executive Branch review, make budget submissions. 
October 1 - Fiscal year begins.  The formulation cycle (i.e., the previous 9 
months) focused on this emerging fiscal year.  The upcoming 
12 months (October 1 – September 30), which was the 
“budget year” now becomes the “current year.” 
October – 
November 
- OMB conducts fall review.  OMB staff analyzes agency 
budget proposals in light of presidential priorities, program 
performance, and budget constraints.  The staff raises issues 
and presents options to OMB director and other OMB policy 
officials for their decisions. 
Late November - OMB briefs the president and senior advisors on proposed 
budget policies.  OMB Director recommends budget 
proposals to the president after OMB has reviewed agency 
requests and considered overall budget priorities. 
 - [Budget] Passback.  OMB informs simultaneously all 
Executive Branch agencies of decisions pertaining to 
respective budget requests. 
Late November – 
early January * 
- Immediately after passback, all agencies, to include 
Legislative and Judicial Branch agencies, enter data into the 
OMB budget database and submit print materials.  This 
process continues until OMB locks agencies out of the budget 
database in order to meet the deadline associated with 
printing the budget. 
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Table 2.2: Continued 
Timeframe Activities 
December * - Executive Branch agencies may appeal to OMB and the 
president.  Agency heads may ask OMB to reverse or modify 
certain budget decisions.  In most cases, OMB and agency 
heads resolve such issues; if not, they work together to 
present them to the president for a decision. 
January - Agencies prepare and OMB reviews congressional budget 
justification materials, which explain budget requests to the 
responsible congressional subcommittees. 
First Monday in 
February 
- The president transmits the budget to the Congress. 
* OMB provides specific deadlines for this activity 
Source: Adapted from Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11, section 10, p. 3-4. 
 
Phase Two: The Congressional Budget Process 
Participants 
Even though the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 mandates that presidents 
submit budget proposals to Congress, the constitutional power of the purse is entrusted 
solely to Congress.  Therefore, the president’s submission is only a request and Congress 
may choose to adopt, modify, or ignore the president’s budget proposal when adopting 
a budget resolution, appropriations, and other laws (GAO, 2005a).   
The congressional phase of the federal budget process begins once Congress 
receives the president’s budget request.  Upon receipt, the president’s submission is 
parceled out to four sets of committees: (1) the Budget Committees, (2) the 
Appropriations Committees, (3) the Authorization Committees, and (4) the Revenue 
Committees.  These committees are assisted by the CBO, the GAO, and the 
Congressional Research Service.  Each of these entities coordinates with each other to 
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transition federal agencies from one fiscal year to the next via the formulation of the 
congressional budget resolution, consideration of surplus or debt, authorization of 
programs, drafting of revenue legislation, and the appropriation of funds (Hogan, 1985; 
Schick, 2007).  
Budget committees 
The principal duties of the House and Senate Budget Committees are to develop 
a congressional budget resolution, and to shepherd the resolution through their 
respective chambers by coordinating it among the various congressional components.  
The budget committees were established to: (1) exercise jurisdiction over the 
development of the budget resolution, and (2) ensure that legislation did not vary 
substantially from the resolution.  Toward the first objective, the budget committees 
monitor budget development year-round and advise Congress on the budgetary effect 
of legislation.  They also allocate new budget authority, outlays, and other aggregates to 
associated committees; in other words, the budget committees set budget targets 
which guide the efforts of other committees.  With regard to the second objective, 
material variance between current laws and the policies set forth in the resolution will 
prompt the budget committees to draft reconciliation instructions directing attendant 
committees to adjust legislation.  Afterward, the budget committees compile the 
reconciliation bill for consideration and approval of the full Congress (Lee, et al., 2008; 
Schick, 2007). 
20 
 
Revenue committees 
As a complement to the actions of the budget committees, the revenue 
committees bear the responsibility of writing and modifying revenue legislation.  If 
Congress needs to raise or lower tax rates, modify the distribution of the tax burden, 
adjust the statutory limit on the public debt, or if the president recommends changes in 
revenue policy, the members of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate 
Finance Committee are called upon to draft such legislation.  These tax writing 
committees are also responsible for reporting legislation on entitlements and social 
insurance programs, such as Social Security and Medicare, and for submitting their 
views and estimates to the budget committees (Committee on Finance, 2013; 
Committee on Ways and Means, 2013; Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007). 
As a procedural matter, all revenue measures originate in the House of 
Representatives as per constitutional decree.  On occasion, however, the Senate 
circumvents this requirement by stripping a minor House bill of all but the enacting 
clause and then substituting Senate-drafted revenue provisions; such an instance 
occurred  with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).   
Authorization and appropriation committees 
Congress establishes and funds federal entities using either authorizing 
legislation drafted by the authorizing committees or appropriations measures written by 
the appropriations committees.  Authorizing legislation establishes the legal basis for 
federal agencies and programs, while appropriations legislation enables agencies to 
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incur obligations and expenditures (Schick, 2007).  Before discussing the roles of the 
authorizing and appropriations committees, it is important to draw distinctions between 
the paired concepts of substantive legislation and authorization of appropriations, and 
between direct spending and discretionary authorizations.   
First, the two basic components of an authorization act are: (1) the enabling or 
organic legislation that establishes a program or prescribes the terms and conditions 
under which an entity may operate; and (2) the appropriation legislation, which 
authorizes the making of appropriations for the agency or program.  The first 
component, the organic legislation, is further comprised of language which (a) 
establishes the agency or program and (b) specifies the duties and functions of the 
entity.  Elements (a) and (b) are known as substantive provisions or substantive 
legislation.  Authorization acts also contain an authorization of appropriations section, 
enumerated as component (2) above, which sets forth the amounts available to the 
federal entity for expenditure (Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007).  
Second, with respect to authorizing legislation, there are two types: (1) 
discretionary and (2) non-discretionary (also called direct spending legislation).  While 
both types of legislation contain substantive provisions, the difference between the two 
lies in the appropriation-obligation sequence.  Discretionary authorizations provide the 
authority for the House and Senate to appropriate funds for an agency, after which the 
agency must obligate funding in accordance with the related appropriations act.  
Accordingly, the appropriations committees control discretionary spending.  Direct 
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spending legislation, on the other hand, provides the authority to obligate ahead of 
appropriations (i.e., before Congress makes appropriations)2.  This distinction means 
that non-discretionary funds may be obligated in accordance with the authorizing 
legislation, thereby enabling authorizing committees, not appropriating committees, to 
control non-discretionary spending (Heniff, 2010; Schick, 2007).  For Fiscal Year 2012, 
discretionary and direct spending comprised approximately 36 and 57 percent of federal 
expenditures, respectively (Congressional Budget Office, 2013b).  
Thus, the authorizing and appropriations committees also complement the work 
of the budget committees, while serving different roles in the congressional budgeting 
process.  In addition to establishing account structures, discretionary expenditure 
guidance, and reprogramming rules for federal agencies, appropriations committees 
report regular and supplemental appropriations bills, review proposed rescissions and 
deferrals, and subdivide budget authority and outlays among their respective 
subcommittees.  Authorizing committees generate authorizing and direct spending 
legislation, and exercise oversight of executive agencies.  Both committees submit views 
and estimates to the budget committees (Heniff, 2010; Schick, 2007).  
2 Lee and colleagues provide an illustrative example:  With regard to mandatory spending programs, 
authorizations provide for direct spending.  When major entitlement programs, such as Social Security, 
are authorized, appropriations are provided simultaneously.  Thus, direct spending programs are 
established by an authorization and the authorization itself creates the obligation for the federal 
government to spend money that goes to program beneficiaries (Lee, et al., 2008).  Congress must then 
appropriate funding to cover those obligations. 
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Formulating the congressional budget 
Table 2.3 lists the major milestones of the congressional budget phase and the 
schedule of events generally assumes Congress will complete the budget and 
appropriations process before the start of the fiscal year (Mikesell, 2007; Office of 
Management and Budget, 2013).  Be that as it may, the table is not all-inclusive and its 
brevity belies the level of complexity and the amount of coordination inherent in the 
congressional budget process. 
Table 2.3: Major Steps in the Congressional Budget Phase 
Timeframe Activities 
January - Congressional Budget Office provides congressional budget 
committees a report of the budgetary and economic outlook 
February - CBO re-estimates the President’s Budget using internal economic 
and technical assumptions 
Within 6 weeks 
of budget 
transmittal 
- Congressional committees convey preferences on budgetary 
matters pertaining to the programs and activities for which they 
are responsible via “views and estimates” reports to Budget 
Committees 
April 15 - Congress completes action on concurrent resolution on the 
budget   
May 15 - House may begin considering annual appropriations bills, even if 
action on budget resolution has not been completed 
June 10 - House Appropriations Committee reports last annual 
appropriations bill 
June 15 - House completes action on reconciliation bill (if reconciliation is 
required by budget resolution) 
June 30 - House completes action on annual appropriations bill 
September 30 - Congress completes action on appropriations bills for upcoming 
fiscal year or passes continuing resolutions to ensure sustained 
operation of the federal government. 
Source: Adapted from Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11, section 10, p. 4; and from 
Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Applications for the Public Sector, Table 3-4, p. 89 (Mikesell, 2007). 
 
To prepare the congressional budget committees for receipt of the president’s 
budget request, the CBO assembles a comparison of baseline budgetary projections to 
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proposed policy changes.  In late January, CBO prepares The Budget and Economic 
Outlook.  This annual baseline report, which contains a ten-year projection of federal 
revenue and spending, is based on current economic forecasts and the assumption that 
existing laws and policies will remain unchanged.  (Congressional Budget Office, 2013a; 
GAO, 2005a; Office of Management and Budget, 2013).  The CBO then analyzes the 
president’s budgetary proposal and estimates the amounts by which proposed 
legislation would change revenue and spending projections.  This process of 
comparison, known as legislative scoring, quantifies the budgetary effect of policy 
changes in terms of variance from the baseline (GAO, 2005a; Office of Management and 
Budget, 2013; Schick, 2007).  
Incidentally, OMB also produces baseline budget estimates called current 
services estimates (GAO, 2005a; Schick, 2007).  The OMB estimates, which accompany 
the president’s budget, cover a five-year timeframe and show the cost of continuing 
federal services at the current level of effort (GAO, 2005a; Schick, 2007; Wildavsky & 
Caiden, 2004).  Both the CBO and OMB baseline estimates assume fixed current policies, 
and both sets of estimates include inflationary and workload adjustments (Schick, 2007). 
Within six weeks of budget transmittal, each House and Senate committee with 
legislative jurisdiction over federal programs relays to the budget committees “views 
and estimates” on revenue and spending levels for corresponding programs and 
activities (GAO, 2005a; Office of Management and Budget, 2013; Schick, 2007).  Section 
301(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 includes provisions regarding the 
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submission of views and estimates, but the reports are not restricted to a standard 
practice or format; instead, they often take the form of a letter to the chair and ranking 
member of the budget committee.  The main purpose of the reports is to focus on major 
legislation scheduled for reauthorization in the coming session and to offer discussions, 
preferences, and recommendations regarding presidential budget proposals (GAO, 
2005a; Heniff & Murray, 2013; Schick, 2007).   
In conjunction with the views and estimates, the Joint Economic Committee, 
which is responsible for reviewing economic conditions and for recommending 
improvements to economic policy, submits fiscal policy recommendations to the 
congressional budget committees.  The budget committees use these reports to develop 
the revenue and spending estimates contained in the concurrent budget resolution 
(GAO, 2005a; Joint Economic Commitee, 2013; Office of Management and Budget, 
2013). 
The Congressional Budget Resolution 
The budget resolution is a concurrent resolution which may originate in either 
the House or the Senate.  While it is considered a formal reply to the president’s budget 
request (Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004), the resolution does not have a statutory effect 
because it does not go before the president for signature or veto (Keith & Heniff, 2005; 
Schick, 2007).  In accordance with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the temporal 
scope of the resolution must include at least five fiscal years, but the time horizon often 
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expands and contracts to accommodate the prevailing Democratic or Republican 
budgetary agenda (Schick, 2007). 
Stated succinctly, the resolution is a comprehensive budget plan for Congress.  
As the steward of the nation’s purse, Congress must consider not only the amount of 
money the federal government spends each year, but also the amount of revenue 
collected and the amount of debt accumulated.  The budget resolution serves as a 
framework which links revenues and expenditures, thereby enabling Congress to set 
revenue floors and spending ceilings, and to evaluate the efficacy of attendant revenue- 
and appropriations measures and debt policies (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
2011; Schick, 2007).   
Accordingly, the resolution establishes appropriate levels for four main 
aggregate amounts: (1) totals of new budget authority and outlays, (2) total federal 
revenues, (3) the surplus/deficit in the budget, and (4) the public debt.  These 
aggregated budget targets are known as 302(a) allocations after the section in the 1974 
Congressional Budget Act that pertains to them.  Spending capacity is then allocated 
among the 20 budget functions listed in Table 2.4 through a process known as 302(b) 
allocations.  Consequently, these functional allocations must add-up to the budget 
aggregates and, ideally, subsequent revenues and expenditures will correspond to the 
levels specified in the resolution (GAO, 2005a; Heniff & Murray, 2013; Lee, et al., 2008; 
Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007). 
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Table 2.4: Functions in the Budget Resolution 
Code Function 
050 National Defense 
150 International Affairs 
250 General Science, Space, and Technology 
270 Energy 
300 Natural Resources and Environment 
350 Agriculture 
370 Commerce and Housing Credit 
400 Transportation 
450 Community and Regional Development 
500 Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services 
550 Health 
570 Medicare 
600 Income Security 
650 Social Security 
700 Veterans’ Benefits and Services 
750 Administration of Justice 
800 General Government 
900 Net Interest 
920 Allowances 
950 Undistributed Offsetting Receipts 
Source: Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2006 (conference report to accompany H. 
Con. Res. 95), H. Rept. 109-62, 109th Cong., 1st sess., April 28, 2005, pp. 4-11. 
 
Beginning in March, the budget committees hear testimony from agency officials 
regarding agency budget justifications.  After hearings have concluded, committee 
chairs convene their respective committees to mark-up (i.e., debate, amend, and 
rewrite) the individual versions of the resolution.  In crafting preliminary renderings of 
the resolution, the budget committees rely on the substance of the CBO reports; views 
and estimates from the Authorizing, Appropriations, and Revenue Committees; JEC 
recommendations; congressional hearings with agency officials; and informal 
communications with other members of Congress.  Once the draft versions of the 
budget resolution are complete, each budget committee reports to its respective 
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chamber for the consideration of the full House and Senate, and for floor voting (GAO, 
2005a; Office of Management and Budget, 2013; Schick, 2007).  
As it was originally enacted, the Congressional Budget Act required the adoption 
of two budget resolutions each year, the first by May 15 and the second by September 
15.  The May 15 resolution was intended as an advisory measure that set target levels 
for budget authority, revenues, outlays, the corresponding fiscal year’s deficit or 
surplus, and the attendant public debt.  The first resolution would then be revised 
before the start of the fiscal year to account for budget and economic changes, while 
the second measure served as the binding resolution.  In 1985, Congress passed the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act and eliminated the requirement 
(effective in 1987) for a second budget resolution.  Currently, April 15 is the date by 
which Congress is expected to pass a concurrent budget resolution (Heniff & Murray, 
2013; Schick, 2007; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004).  
Since the inception of the congressional budget process in 1975, Congress has 
attempted to adopt at least one budget resolution for each corresponding fiscal year.  
More often than not, however, the resolution does not pass in a timely manner, and on 
six occasions to date, Congress did not complete action on an annual budget resolution:  
(1) in 1998 for Fiscal Year (FY) 1999; (2) in 2002 for FY2003; (3) in 2004 for FY2005; (4) in 
2006 for FY2007; (5) in 2010 for FY2011; and (6) in 2011 for FY2012 (Heniff & Murray, 
2013).  Table 2.5 lists adoption dates for the budget resolution from 1976 to 2010.   
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When this failure of adoption occurs the federal budgetary gears do not grind to 
a halt.  If the April 15 deadline passes without a resolution, Congress can still 
appropriate funding and federal agencies can still continue to operate (Schick, 2007).  
Budgetary operations are allowed to continue, in this case, because the budget 
resolution is a multi-year projection; therefore, if Congress fails to pass a concurrent 
resolution, the previous year’s resolution simply remains in effect (Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities, 2011).  What is more, if legislators do not need to bring existing 
revenue and direct spending laws into conformity with the budget resolution via a 
process known as reconciliation (discussed further below), there may be little urgency, 
in the short term, to adopt a concurrent budget resolution (Schick, 2007). 
 To address the issue of non-adoption in an ad hoc manner, Congress may rely 
on a deeming resolution.  While the term deeming resolution does not have an official 
definition or any specific rule which governs its use, members of Congress use the 
legislation as an annual budget resolution to establish enforceable budget levels for a 
budget cycle.  In addition to providing revised spending allocations to the appropriations 
committees, deeming resolutions may also adjust aggregate budget levels and spending 
allocations to other House and Senate committees (Lynch, 2010).  Deeming resolutions 
will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
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Table 2.5: Budget Resolution Adoption Dates, Fiscal Years 1976 – 2010 
Fiscal Year Date adopted Days after deadline 
 (Target date: 15 May)  
1976 14 – May – 1975 0 
1977 13 – May – 1976 0 
1978 17 – May – 1977 2 
1979 17 – May – 1978 2 
1980 24 – May – 1979 9 
1981 12 – Jun – 1980 28 
1982 21 – May – 1981 6 
1983 23 – Jun – 1982 39 
1984 23 – Jun – 1983 39 
1985 1 – Oct – 1984 139 
1986 1 – Aug – 1985 78 
 (Target date: 15 April)3  
1987 27 – Jun – 1986 73 
1988 24 – Jun – 1987 70 
1989 6 – Jun – 1988 52 
1990 18 – May – 1989 33 
1991 9 – Oct – 1990 176 
1992 22 – May – 1991 37 
1993 21 – May – 1992 36 
1994 1 – Apr – 1993 0 
1995 12 – May – 1994 27 
1996 29 – Jun – 1995 75 
1997 13 – Jun – 1996 59 
1998 5 – Jun – 1997 51 
1999 Not adopted - 
2000 15 – Apr – 1999 0 
2001 13 – Apr – 2000 0 
2002 10 – May – 2001 25 
2003 Not adopted - 
2004 11 – Apr – 2003 0 
2005 Not adopted - 
2006 28 – Apr – 2005 13 
2007 Not adopted - 
2008 17 – May – 2007 32 
2009 5 – Jun – 2008 51 
2010 29 – Apr – 2009 14 
Source: Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical Information, CRS 
Report RL30297, Table 12, p. 28-29. 
 
3 As originally enacted, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 required that Congress adopt two budget 
resolutions each year: (1) an advisory resolution by May 15 and (2) and a binding resolution by September 
15.  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 eliminated the requirement for a 
second resolution and set April 15 as the target adoption date (Heniff & Murray, 2008). 
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The appropriations process 
Ideally, Congress will complete action on the budget resolution by April 15 and 
consideration of appropriations can begin in earnest.  Still, even if Congress does not 
pass a budget resolution by mid-April, the House may begin consideration of annual 
appropriations on May 15 with a target date of June 30 for completion of all annual 
appropriation bills.  Between February and April, the House appropriations 
subcommittees will hold appropriations hearings.  From May to July, subcommittees 
receive 302(b) allocations from the appropriations committees, the subcommittees 
mark-up their respective appropriations bills, and then pass the measures on to the full 
appropriations committee.  After the full committee incorporates its changes, each bill is 
considered individually by the full House (GAO, 2005a; Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007). 
The Senate follows a similar appropriations schedule, but by virtue of a 
precedent set by the First Congress, appropriations bills must always originate in the 
House (Schick, 2007). During the July/August timeframe, the Senate will amend the 
House-passed appropriations by inserting changes made in the upper chamber.  If the 
Senate does initiate an appropriations bill, the Senate-numbered bill will be 
incorporated into the House bill upon final passage.  During the month of September, 
conference committees work to resolve differences in the measures passed by the 
House and Senate.  After Congress passes an appropriations bill, the bill is passed-on to 
the president for enactment.  For those bills that are not signed into law by first day of 
the fiscal year, Congress will pass a continuing appropriations act (Lee, et al., 2008; 
Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007), which will allow federal agencies to continue operating 
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until regular appropriations are enacted.  Continuing resolutions are addressed in depth 
in the next chapter. 
Budget reconciliation 
The discussion in the previous section was based largely on the assumption that 
members of Congress are able to pass appropriations in a timely manner, which, as the 
reader will see in subsequent chapters, is a very optimistic supposition.  Likewise, the 
discussion on the congressional budget resolution assumes that prevailing revenue and 
spending laws and debt-limit levels are in accord with the policies set forth in the 
budget resolution.  This is also a rather sanguine assumption as Congress has needed to 
change current laws to fit the parameters of the budget resolution 21 times over the 
past 37 years (Heniff & Murray, 2013; Keith & Heniff, 2005).   
When revenue and direct spending laws are not in-line with the parameters of 
the budget resolution, the budget committees will include directives instructing revenue 
and authorization committees to modify existing laws. The majority of tax revenue 
collected and the non-discretionary spending that takes place each year are the result of 
permanent laws previously enacted; therefore, a predetermined level of taxing and 
spending will occur annually without correction from legislators.  To ensure a sufficient 
level of revenue generation, an adequate level of spending, and a manageable level of 
debt, legislators may have to adjust existing taxing and spending laws from time to time.  
While the budget resolution is the means by which Congress enforces its budget, the 
budget committees are not permitted to change laws.  For this reason, Congress uses a 
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process known as reconciliation to harmonize revenue and spending laws with 
budgetary plans (Keith & Heniff, 2005; Lee, et al., 2008; Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007).   
In essence, reconciliation is a legislative effort designed to foster the 
implementation of budget resolution policies.  It is an optional two-step procedure first 
used in 1980 via the Omnibus Resolution Reconciliation Act, which required committees 
to change legislation to meet spending reductions or tax increases called for in the 
budget resolution.  The practice is used most often when there are major changes to 
budget policy and the procedure requires: (1) the issuance of reconciliation directives to 
designated committees instructing them to change existing laws that govern revenue 
generation, non-discretionary spending, and debt-limit levels, and (2) the enactment of 
a reconciliation bill(s) incorporating those legislative changes (Heniff & Murray, 2013; 
Keith & Heniff, 2005; Schick, 2007).   
Procedurally, the promulgation of reconciliation directives by House and Senate 
budget committees to their respective finance and authorization committees is done in 
such a way as to maintain the legislative division of labor.  The changes stipulated in the 
reconciliation instructions are based on the amounts by which taxing, spending, and 
authorizing legislation are to be adjusted from the CBO baseline levels stated in the 
Budget and Economic Outlook.  Since budget committees do not have legislative 
jurisdiction, however, reconciliation directives specify neither how the changes are to be 
made nor which programs are to be affected.  Such details are left to the discretion of 
the committees identified by name in the reconciliation directives, thereby ensuring 
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that budget committees cannot control both money and programs.  Finally, not all 
committees take part in reconciliation while others seem to have a fixed presence.  The 
revenue committees’ jurisdiction over taxes and entitlements means that finance 
committees will almost always be among those designated to take part in reconciliation.  
On the other hand, appropriation committees and authorizing committees whose 
jurisdiction is limited to discretionary programs are not issued reconciliation instructions 
(GAO, 2005a; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007). 
After receiving the legislative recommendations of the instructed committees, 
the budget committees package the recommended legislation into an omnibus measure 
and report the legislation to the full House and Senate without making any substantive 
revisions4,5.  Consideration of reconciliation bills in the House takes place under a 
special rule that indicates which amendments can be considered.  The Senate considers 
reconciliation bills under sections of the Congressional Budget Act that restrict both the 
amount of debate that can take place and the types of amendments that may be 
considered6.  Incidentally, both chambers require revenue neutrality in reconciliation 
amendments, which is to say that changes which reduce revenue or increase spending 
must also be accompanied by offsets.  Once differences in the House and Senate 
versions of the legislation have been resolved in conference, the bill is submitted to the 
4 An omnibus measure is one that contains several bills (Streeter, 2008a). 
5 The Congressional Budget Act prohibits the budget committees from making substantive revisions to the 
legislation that the committees of jurisdiction report, even when the proposed legislation does not abide 
by the dollar targets stipulated in the reconciliation instructions.  However, budget committees may make 
technical corrections at the request of the instructed committees and they may offer amendments to the 
legislation during floor consideration  (Schick, 2007). 
6 The Senate allows only 20 hours of debate on the reconciliation bill (Schick, 2007). 
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president for signature (Committee on the Budget: U.S. House of Representatives, 
2013b; Keith & Heniff, 2005; Schick, 2007). 
 
Phase Three: Budget Execution and Control 
The federal fiscal cycle begins anew on the first of October each year.  On 
October 1, approximately 18 months after the OMB Director transmits allowance letters 
to agency heads, the federal fiscal year begins.  The term budget execution and control 
refers both to the period during which budget authority made available by 
appropriations remains available for obligation, and to the applicable fiscal statutes and 
administrative controls that govern agency spending.  Throughout this new fiscal year, 
the body of enacted laws that provides appropriations will function as the overarching 
financial plan for the federal government, while the Antideficiency Act (ADA) serves as 
the mechanism which enforces the spirit of the applicable appropriations. 
Table 2.6 lists the major steps in the budget execution and control phase.  OMB 
apportions appropriations among federal agencies, which then sub-divide the funding 
among organizational sub-units for measured obligation throughout the fiscal year.  In 
the course of spending appropriations, agencies must abide by the precepts of the 
Antideficiency Act, administrative controls, and obligation rules, each of which is 
discussed in more detail below. 
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Table 2.6: Major Steps in the Budget Execution and Control Phase 
Timeframe Activities 
October 1 - Federal fiscal year begins 
September 10 
(or within 30 
days after 
approval of a 
spending bill) 
- OMB apportions funds made available in the annual 
appropriations process.  Agencies submit apportionment requests 
to OMB for each budget account by August 21 or within 10 
calendar days after the approval of the appropriation, whichever is 
later.  OMB approves or modifies the apportionment specifying 
the amount of funds agencies may use by time period, program, 
project, or activity. 
Throughout 
the fiscal year 
- Agencies incur obligations and make outlays to carry out the 
funded programs, projects, and activities.  Agencies record 
obligations and outlays pursuant to administrative control of funds 
procedures, report to Treasury, and prepare financial statements. 
September 30 - Federal fiscal year ends 
Source: Adapted from Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11, section 10, p. 4. 
 
The Antideficiency Act 
The primary fiscal statute for the federal government is the Antideficiency Act, 
which Hopkins and Nutt (1978) refer to as “the cornerstone of Congressional efforts to 
bind the Executive branch of government to the limits on expenditure of appropriated 
funds.”  The statute evolved over time to prevent expenditures in excess of amounts 
appropriated and to preclude “coercive deficiencies (L. Fisher, 1975).”  The latter term 
refers to the shrewd practice of continuing to incur obligations after exhausting an 
entire appropriation during the opening months the fiscal year, and then pressing 
members of Congress for additional funds to survive the remainder of the year (GAO, 
2004e).  The Act is currently the only fiscal statute that includes both civil and criminal 
penalties for violation (GAO, 2004e)7.   
7 A violation of the ADA occurs upon: (1) overobligation or overexpenditure of an appropriation or fund 
account; (2) entering into a contract or making an obligation in advance of an appropriation, unless 
specifically authorized by law; (3) acceptance of voluntary services, unless authorized by law; and (4) 
37 
 
                                                     
The Antideficiency Act is a funds control and financial management statute that 
achieves control by way of apportionment, allotment, and allocation of appropriations 
(GAO, 2005a).  The Act mandates that the executive branch apportion appropriations in 
such a manner that funds lasts for the full period for which they were intended by 
Congress ("Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power," 
1973).  Accordingly, OMB apportions amounts to executive branch agencies, which 
subdivide the apportionments among organizational subunits.  Those subunits then 
obligate funding within the parameters of the Act.  From a managerial standpoint, the 
Antideficiency Act requires agency heads to prescribe a series of administrative controls 
which provide for the effective obligation of appropriations (GAO, 2004e, 2005a; Schick, 
2007). 
Apportionment 
After appropriations are enacted into law, OMB must apportion the 
appropriations to executive agencies before execution of funding can begin.  The GAO 
(2005a) defines apportionments, in part, as the action by which the OMB distributes 
amounts available for obligation.  This process marks the last point at which OMB can 
formally control agency spending, and the intention behind apportionment is (1) to 
prevent obligation practices that would require the enactment of deficiency or 
overobligation or overexpenditure of (a) an apportionment or reapportionment or (b) amounts permitted 
by the administrative control of funds regulations (GAO, 2005a). 
38 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
supplemental appropriations8 and (2) to achieve the most effective and economic use of 
funds (GAO, 2004e, 2005a; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007).   
Procedurally, agencies submit apportionment requests to OMB for each budget 
account by August 21 or within 10 calendar days after approval of the appropriation, 
whichever occurs later.  In turn, OMB exercises the discretion to apportion 
appropriations by specific time periods (usually fiscal quarters), activities, projects, 
objects, or by any combination thereof.  From there, apportionments can be further 
subdivided by an agency into allotments, sub-allotments, and allocations (GAO, 2005a; 
Lee, et al., 2008; Mikesell, 2007; Office of Management and Budget, 2013; Schick, 2007). 
Allotment 
After agencies receive apportionments from OMB, program managers are 
notified, by way of allotments, of the actual resources available for the fiscal year.  
Allotments are distributions of budget authority among organizational subunits, such as 
bureaus, divisions, and field offices, and they are a manifestation of the agency’s system 
of administrative control of funds whose purpose is to prevent obligations and 
expenditures from exceeding apportionments.  An agency head or an authorized 
designee distributes allotments, on a monthly or quarterly basis, pursuant to procedures 
mandated in OMB Circular No. A-11.  Using the allotments, program managers execute 
funding according to spending plans formulated during the executive budget 
8 Supplemental appropriations are funds appropriated in addition to those already enacted in an annual 
appropriation act.  Such appropriations provide additional budget authority in cases of urgent need.  By 
comparison, a deficiency appropriation is made to pay obligations for which sufficient funds are not 
available and they often result from violation of the ADA.  Incidentally, Congress has stopped passing 
separate deficiency appropriations and the term has fallen into disuse (GAO, 2005a). 
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formulation phase.  Examples of such spending include the hiring of personnel; the 
purchase of contract services, supplies, and equipment; and the fulfillment of official 
agency travel (GAO, 2005a; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007). 
Obligations 
Once funds are allotted, managers may begin executing the funds or making 
obligations on the government’s behalf.  Obligations are an agency’s binding 
commitment to another party, or a legal liability of the U.S. government with regard to 
goods or services to be provided, or amounts to be paid.  Funding may be obligated only 
during the period for which the appropriation is available; beyond that period, funds 
lapse and the authority to obligate expires.  Funds must be used to meet a public need 
and expenditures must be related to the purpose for which appropriations were made.  
Agencies incur obligations upon placing an order, signing a contract, purchasing a 
service, or engaging in any activity which requires the government to make payments to 
the public or from one government account to another.  These payments may be made 
immediately or at some point in the future (GAO, 2004e, 2005a; Schick, 2007).  
Successful obligation requires a style of financial management that some may 
interpret as wasteful, but is actually the result of cautious behavior.  For appropriated 
monies, the managerial objective is to obligate 100 percent of allotted funding by the 
end of the fiscal year.  Prima facie, spending all of the agency’s money may seem simple 
enough.  However, agencies that overobligate (i.e., exceed appropriation, 
apportionment, or allotment) risk violating the Antideficiency Act, while those that 
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underobligate risk future budget cuts by appropriators or senior officials who may view 
the agency as being awash in funding.  To guard against overexpenditure, program 
managers often set aside funding for unforeseen events.  As the fiscal year winds down, 
managers spend-down these contingency funds to ensure full execution.  This practice 
results in a spike in expenditure rates which many see as profligate government 
spending; in actuality, it is often the result of prudent management of limited financial 
resources (Schick, 2007). 
The idea of putting aside funding for contingencies is not a practice that is 
exclusive to the arena of federal budgeting; in fact, that sort of convention is more 
generally known as organizational or budgetary slack.  Budgetary slack is the residual 
between “the total resources available to a firm and the total necessary to maintain the 
organization coalition (Cyert & March, 1963),” or the excess of the amount budgeted 
over that which is necessary (Merchant, 1985).  While budgetary slack is often referred 
to in a pejorative light (Merchant, 1985), it behooves rational economic individuals to 
create slack (Lowe & Shaw, 1968), and its true value depends on the manner by which it 
is utilized.  In essence, organizational slack offers alternative funding methods that may 
not otherwise be available or sanctioned because of scarcity of resources (Onsi, 1973). 
The propensity for creating budgetary slack is greater in certain financial or 
accounting systems, and the practice is made possible through imperfections in the 
organizational process of resource allocation (Onsi, 1973).  In systems where there is an 
emphasis on achieving budgetary targets; a centralized, top-down, “authoritarian (Onsi, 
1973)” perspective on budget implementation; or an intermittent requirement for 
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strategic recourse to avoid shortfalls and overruns, managers will feel compelled to 
generate organizational slack (Merchant, 1985; Onsi, 1973).  Since slack becomes 
practically undetectable at aggregate levels, departmental heads often rely on division 
controllers/comptrollers to institute budgetary slack by way of errors in estimation or 
changes in levels of efficiency (Lal, Dunk, & Smith, 1996; Merchant, 1985; Onsi, 1973).  
While budgetary slack is not a formal part of the federal budget process, it is an 
intrinsic exercise of the resource management profession.  Organizational slack in the 
form of contingency funding is addressed here because it is an integral part of the 
analysis in chapters four and five. 
Deferrals and rescissions 
A discussion of the execution and control of the federal budget would not be 
complete without acknowledgement of the topic of impoundment.  The GAO (2005a) 
defines impoundment as any action or inaction by an officer of the federal government 
which prevents the obligation or expenditure of budget authority.  More simply stated, 
impoundments are a refusal to spend all or part of the funds appropriated by Congress 
(Schick, 2007; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004).  By virtue of its domain over the nation’s 
purse, appropriations are a signal of congressional intent and refusal to obligate 
appropriations is a violation of that intent (Schick, 2007). 
Beginning with Thomas Jefferson, most presidents have made use of 
impoundment, but on the heels of President Nixon’s controversial application of the 
authority, Congress passed the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Hogan, 1985; Lee, et 
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al., 2008; Schick, 2007)9.  The Act categorizes impoundment into: (1) deferrals, which 
postpone the obligation of budget authority, and (2) rescissions, which cancel budget 
authority previously enacted by Congress (GAO, 2005a). 
Budget authority cannot be deferred for policy reasons; instead, it may only be 
deferred for reasons permitted by the Antideficiency Act: (1) to provide for 
contingencies, (2) to achieve savings in governmental operations, or (3) as provided by 
law.  Agencies may propose deferrals but the president must transmit a special message 
to Congress detailing (a) the amount to be deferred, (b) the program and account 
affected, and (c) the length of time the funds are to be deferred.  Deferrals become 
effective unless either the House or Senate disapproves them; however, once the 
deferral is disapproved the associated budget authority must be made available for 
obligation immediately.  In addition, deferrals cannot extend beyond the end of the 
fiscal year to which the budget authority pertains, and agencies must release all other 
deferred budget authority with sufficient time remaining in the fiscal year to allow for 
prudent obligation (GAO, 2005a; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007).  
By comparison, rescissions may be proposed for policy reasons, and the 1974 Act 
includes provisions for the president to request a rescission of budget authority.  If the 
president deems all or part of any budget authority unnecessary for realization of 
program objectives, the president may propose rescission by way of a special message 
that details: (a) the amount to be rescinded, (b) the reasons for rescission, (c) the 
9 The Impoundment Control Act was enacted in the same measure as the Congressional Budget Act, and 
together they are known as the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Schick, 
2007) 
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accounts and programs affected, and (d) the estimated budgetary and program impacts.  
After receipt of the special message, Congress has no less than 45 days of continuous 
session to consider the rescission proposal.  That is to say rescissions do not take effect 
unless approved by Congress.  If both chambers have not completed action on the 
rescission bill within the 45 day timeframe, any funds withheld must be released for 
obligation.  What is more, Congress may also initiate rescissions for reasons such as 
program terminations, excessive unobligated balances, and a change of priorities (GAO, 
2005a; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007)10. 
 
In summary 
 Over time, the federal budget process in the United States has evolved from a 
committee-centric arrangement suited to meet the modest needs of a small 
government into a highly-coordinated and comprehensive fiscal system capable of 
supporting what is currently the largest economy in the world.  In the existing process, 
the federal government spends nine months building a budget from the bottom up 
using top-down guidance, and another nine months adjudicating the efficacy of that 
budget.  If everything goes according to script, it will take approximately 18 months to 
plan for 12 months of spending.  To the casual observer the federal budget process may 
seem terribly inefficient.  However, considering the amount of communication, 
feedback, coordination, adjustment, and protocol required to ensure that the 
10 The GAO draws a distinction between rescissions and reallocated budget authority.  When making 
appropriations, if Congress “rescinds” funds from one account and immediately “appropriates” an 
identical amount to a different account, the GAO considers the transaction as reallocated budget 
authority and not a formal rescission (GAO, 2009c) 
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government’s fiscal house remains in order and that all participants are equally 
dissatisfied, it is a marvel that budgets are passed at all. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide a very brief overview of the federal 
budget process to prepare the reader for the upcoming examination of continuing 
resolutions.  In truth, the process is far more intricate and involved than what has been 
portrayed in the preceding pages.  The acquisitive reader seeking a more detailed 
account of federal budgeting may benefit from reading The Federal Budget: Politics, 
Policy, and Process by Allen Schick; Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Applications in 
the Public Sector by John Mikesell; and Public Budgeting Systems by Lee and colleagues, 
as these works provide analysis and different perspectives of the same phenomenon.   
From here, the discussion will turn to the subject of stopgap measures that are 
employed in light of budgetary discord and the absence of annual appropriations.  While 
mentioned only tangentially in this chapter, continuing resolutions are the main focus of 
this study.  The next chapter offers background information on continuing 
appropriations acts, a summary of the literature as it relates the institutions of the 
president and Congress, and a synthesis of the research regarding the effects of 
spending restrictions on agency-level spending.  Likewise, the analyses in chapters four, 
five, and six also pertain to continuing resolutions, so it is hoped that chapter two will 
function as a touchstone for terms and concepts referred to throughout this evaluation. 
 
Copyright © Thomas Alexander Jacobs 2014 
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Chapter Three 
Continuing Resolutions: A Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction  
As mentioned previously, the Federal government’s fiscal year begins on October 
1.  To ensure continuity of operations for federal agencies from one year to the next, 
appropriations acts must be enacted by the first day of the fiscal year.  Congress 
provides funding by way of annual appropriations acts which enable agencies to 
obligate and expend money from the U.S. Treasury11.  Agency officials then spend their 
respective allotments and allocations over the course of the fiscal year, in accordance 
with budgetary execution plans, to ensure that all appropriations are fully spent by 
September 30, the final day of the fiscal year.  The execution process begins anew with 
the advent of the next fiscal year. 
To complicate matters, the federal government often enters a new fiscal year 
without a fully approved budget, which means the government may operate in a 
constrained and uncertain environment.  If Congress and the president do not enact 
appropriations by the first day of the fiscal year, a funding gap ensues and the 
government must shutdown.  To prevent a cessation of operations, Congress will, most 
often, provide temporary funding by way of continuing appropriations acts, which are 
also known as continuing resolutions or continuing appropriations.  These measures are 
11 Congress funds federal agencies by way of several regular appropriations acts which can vary in 
number from year to year.  From fiscal years 1968 – 2005, the number of regular appropriations acts 
remained steady at 13. The number reduced to 11 during the 109th Congress, and increased to 12 during 
the 110th Congress (Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b). 
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the legislative mechanism that enables the operation of government programs until 
Congress and the president agree on regular appropriations.     
However, the restrictive nature of continuing resolutions may have unintended 
effects (Hartman, 1982) on government spending beyond the timeframe to which the 
resolutions apply.  Government agencies routinely formulate budgets and devise 
spending plans toward accomplishment of organizational missions under the 
assumption that full funding will be available at the outset of the coming fiscal year.  
Continuing resolutions place limits on operational activities and may result in interim 
levels of funding that tend to be lower than those for which the agency originally 
planned.  As a result, continuing resolutions may disrupt obligation plans thereby 
causing organizations to adopt measures of execution that will increase the probability 
of achieving budgetary spending goals.   
What, then, is the effect of continuing resolutions on the spending patterns of 
federal agencies?  Dating back more than a century, these stopgap measures have 
become a mainstay of the federal budget process, yet quantitative analyses of effects 
are hard to come by.  At the government-wide level, scholarly work tends to focus on 
continuing resolutions (1) as a legislative instrument which may tip the scales between 
the legislature and the executive during budget negotiations, (2) as an apple of discord 
between authorizers and appropriators, and (3) as a reluctant and temporary solution to 
budgetary stalemate.  At the agency-level, both scholars and practitioners generate 
empirical findings by way of case studies; however, the majority of research is 
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conducted by practitioners and tends to be anecdotal because agencies do not 
specifically track the effects of spending restrictions.   
As it stands, the field of federal budgeting is, by and large, devoid of studies that 
isolate and quantify the effects of continuing resolutions on agency spending patterns.  
This dynamic is partly due to a practitioner-heavy attribute, but also because other 
disciplines have shown more interest in the aspect of budget execution.  Bartle (2001) 
submits that budgeting research is largely practice-oriented, while McCaffery and Mutty 
(1999) add that academic budgeting literature is focused on budget preparation, while 
budget execution, the stage at which spending takes place, is customarily the domain of 
practitioners.  That does not mean, however, that budget execution has gone unnoticed 
by scholars.  In the context of this study, academics in the field of management 
accounting are concerned with the financial management aspect of budgeting where 
cost control, cash flow management, and capital expenditures take place (Balakrishnan 
& Sprinkle, 2002), and Cooper and Kaplan (1992) offers an Activity-Based Costing 
framework of unused capacity that may be applicable to the discussion. 
 The objectives of this chapter are, first, to provide the reader with a brief history 
of continuing resolutions and to offer a basic understanding of the purpose, the type, 
and the frequency of usage of these appropriations.  The second objective is to show 
that the attendant literature can be thought of in two dimensions:  (1) a government-
wide perspective which addresses the effects of continuing resolutions on the Congress 
and the president, and (2) an agency-specific viewpoint which concerns the bearing of 
continuing appropriations on agency spending behavior.  The final objective is to show 
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that the agency-specific literature can be rearranged and regarded in such a way as to 
reveal patterns of spending which lend themselves to quantitative analysis.  
 Before continuing further, it is important to note that this chapter will not 
include a discussion of legislative anomalies.  As part of a recent study of continuing 
resolutions, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) compiled a list of standard 
provisions associated with such resolutions (see Appendix A).  Legislative anomalies can 
be thought of as exceptions to the resolution rules.  The president and congress may 
include these extraordinary legislative measures to accommodate exceptional 
circumstances or to avoid major problems which would arise with a uniform approach 
to funding.  Anomalies are quite rare and most agencies operate under the standard 
provisions of continuing resolutions (Brass, 2010; GAO, 2009b; Pulmonte, 2011). 
 The discussion of federal budgeting, in general, and of continuing appropriations, 
in specific, continues in the next section with essential background information such as 
the constitutional and statutory basis for continuing resolutions, the types of stopgap 
measures, and the frequency of usage.  The third segment of the chapter summarizes 
the literature as it relates to the institutions of the president and the Congress, and 
section four synthesizes the writings dedicated to the effects of continuing resolutions 
at the agency-level.  The fifth section explores the notion of re-categorizing the effects 
of continuing appropriations on agency-level organizations and re-approaching the issue 
by way of a standardized accounting classification system.  The final part of the chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion regarding the state of the field and a suggestion of 
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how empirical research might proceed in an area of study ripe for quantitative 
applications. 
 
The essentials of continuing resolutions 
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution requires the enactment of 
appropriations before money can be drawn from the U.S. Treasury.  In addition, the 
Antideficiency Act, under threat of criminal sanctions, fines, or removal from office, 
forbids obligations in excess of appropriations and largely prohibits agencies from 
operating in the absence of funding; only those activities involving the safety of human 
life or the protection of property are exempt from the ADA provision (Brass, 2010; GAO, 
2004e; Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b). 
 One outcome of these statutory provisions is the possibility of government 
shutdown.  If Congress does not approve funding by the first day of the fiscal year, a 
funding gap will ensue and agencies must begin an orderly shutdown of operations 
(Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b).  Alternatively known as a “lapse in appropriations” 
or “appropriations hiatus,” a funding gap occurs: (1) when regular appropriations have 
not been agreed upon by the start of the fiscal year and the president has not signed a 
continuing resolution into law (Pulmonte, 2011); (2) when a regular appropriation is 
exhausted before the end of the fiscal year (GAO, 2004e); or (3) when one continuing 
resolution expires and another is not enacted (Brass, 2010).  In other words, a funding 
gap refers to any period of time during the fiscal year which is not covered by an 
appropriation.  Incidentally, instances in which a continuing resolution is enacted the 
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day after the preceding short-term resolution expires are not considered to be funding 
gaps (Keith, 2008a; Tollestrup, 2011).  Prior to the government shutdown of Fiscal Year 
2014 (October 1 to October 16, 2013), no funding gaps had occurred since 1996 (Brass, 
2010; Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b). 
 To avoid funding gaps, Congress and the president employ continuing 
resolutions, which are the legislative mechanism that enables government programs to 
operate in the absence of regular appropriations.  More formally known as continuing 
appropriations acts, continuing resolutions are referred to as such because they are 
enacted in the form of joint resolutions between the House and Senate (Pulmonte, 
2011; Schick, 2007; Streeter, 2008b).  The resolutions allow the government to continue 
operating on a temporary basis until Congress and the president (or the chambers 
within Congress) reach an agreement on regular appropriations (Brass, 2010; Pulmonte, 
2011; Tollestrup, 2011). 
 Continuing resolutions have been in use since 1876 when Congress appropriated 
ten days of funding for select government accounts (Devins, 1988; Pulmonte, 2011; 
Streeter, 2008b).  With regard to modern times, Congress has passed at least one such 
resolution each year since 1952, and from 1961 to 1980, only 15 percent of annual 
appropriations were enacted on time.  (Brass, 2010; Devins, 1988; GAO, 2009b; 
Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b; Tollestrup, 2011; Joe White, 1988).  From 1952 to 
2010, Congress and the president enacted all regular appropriations acts in a timely 
fashion on only four occasions:  fiscal years 1977, 1989, 1995, and 1997.  During fiscal 
year 1977, however, a handful of appropriations were dropped from the regular 
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appropriations act and Congress enacted two continuing resolutions to fund the 
unauthorized programs.  Between fiscal years 1998 and 2010, Congress enacted 79 
continuing resolutions which averaged 18 days in duration and ranged in length from 21 
to 365 days.  During that period of time, agencies, on balance, spent the first four 
months of the fiscal year under the restrictions of a continuing appropriation 
(Tollestrup, 2011).  
Even though continuing appropriations are used frequently, the resolutions are 
not always applied in a blanket fashion.  Some agencies are fortunate enough to receive 
regular appropriations by the start of the fiscal year, while others must wait until the 
budget impasse is resolved.  Table 3.1 lists the number of appropriations acts approved 
by October 1 for fiscal years 1977-2010 along with the number of continuing resolutions 
enacted in each of those years (Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b).  A 2009 GAO study of 
the effect of continuing appropriations on federal agency operations finds no discernible 
pattern associated with the duration of resolutions enacted between fiscal years 1999-
2009.  However, Figure 3.1 shows that, over that same period of time, military- and 
security-type appropriations enjoyed shorter durations of restriction while 
appropriations related to Commerce, Justice, Labor, and Health and Human Services 
endured longer periods of austerity (GAO, 2009b; Pulmonte, 2011). 
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Table 3.1: Regular Appropriations Bills Enacted by the Start of the Fiscal Year and 
Continuing Resolutions, Fiscal Years 1977-2010 
Fiscal Year 
Appropriations acts approved 
by October 1 
Number of continuing 
resolutions enacted 
1977 13 2 
1978 9 3 
1979 5 1 
1980 3 2 
1981 1 3 
1982 0 4 
1985 4 5 
1986 0 5 
1987 0 5 
1988 0 5 
1989 13 0 
1990 1 3 
1991 0 5 
1992 3 4 
1993 1 1 
1994 2 3 
1995 13 0 
1996 0 13 
1997 13 0 
1998 1 6 
1999 1 6 
2000 4 7 
2001 2 21 
2002 0 8 
2003 0 8 
2004 3 5 
2005 1 3 
2006 2 3 
2007 1 4 
2008 0 4 
2009 3 2 
2010 1 2 
Source: adopted from Sandy Streeter’s Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL30343 titled 
Continuing Resolutions: FY2008 Action and Brief Overview of Recent Practices (Streeter, 2008b).  An 
updated version of the report was included in Closed: Government Shutdowns and Continuing Resolutions 
(Pulmonte, 2011). 
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Adopted from the GAO study titled Continuing Resolutions: Uncertainty Limited Management Options and 
Increased Workload in Selected Agencies (GAO, 2009b).  An updated version of the report was included in 
Closed: Government Shutdowns and Continuing Resolutions (Pulmonte, 2011).  
 
Concerning the timeline for adoption of continuing appropriations acts, it seems 
that Congress tends to wait until the close of the fiscal year before finalizing such 
actions.  Using the Government Printing Office’s Federal Digital System, queries for the 
initial continuing appropriations associated with fiscal years 2000-2012 showed that 
Congress and the president most often adopted continuing resolutions into public law 
on the final day of the fiscal year (see Table 3.2).  On three occasions, fiscal years 2001, 
2002, and 2008, the acts were passed into law one to two days early.  For Fiscal Year 
2010, the resolution was adopted into public law on the first day of the associated fiscal 
year, October 1, 2009. 
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Figure 3.1: Average Annual Duration of Continuing Resolutions by 
Appropriations Subcommittee, Fiscal Years 1999-2009 
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Table 3.2: Continuing Resolutions, Date of Adoption by Congress 
Fiscal Year Public Law Date Adopted by Congress 
2000 106-62 September 30, 1999 
2001 106-275 September 29, 2000 
2002 107-44 September 28, 2001 
2003 107-229 September 30, 2002 
2004 108-84 September 30, 2003 
2005 108-309 September 30, 2004 
2006 109-77 September 30, 2005 
2007 109-289 September 30, 2006 
2008 110-92 September 29, 2007 
2009 110-329 September 30, 2008 
2010 111-68 October 1, 2009 
2011 111-242 September 30, 2010 
2012 112-33 September 30, 2011 
Source: U.S. Government Printing Office, Federal Digital System located at the following URL: 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/home.action 
 
There are two types of continuing resolutions:  interim and full-year.  Brief in 
both duration and word-length, the most frequently applied of the two methods are 
interim continuing resolutions.  Also called traditional (Schick, 2007), partial-year 
(Tollestrup, 2011), or short-term  continuing resolutions (Brass, 2010), these temporary 
measures may be enacted for a few short days or they may span several months.  
Usually only a few pages long (Schick, 2007), interim resolutions are valid until a specific 
date, which is stated on the initial resolution, or until the enactment of the regular 
appropriations act, whichever comes first.  Most often, when a series of interim 
continuing resolutions are employed in a single fiscal year, subsequent resolutions will 
simply overwrite the expiration date of the preceding resolution (GAO, 2009b; 
Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b; Tollestrup, 2011).   
While regular appropriations acts can be very explicit in funding verbiage, 
interim continuing resolutions often provide for an attenuated level of operations by 
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way of various spending rates.  For example, Congress may restrict agencies to levels of 
execution commensurate with the previous fiscal year by mandating a pace of spending 
not to exceed the “current rate (Hartman, 1982; I. Rubin, 2007; Streeter, 2008a; 
Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004),” effectively providing for no increase in funding over the 
prior fiscal year.  By allowing only for an inflationary adjustment or an increase in the 
number of beneficiaries, legislators may also seek to govern spending at a rate that 
maintains existing program levels detailed in statute.  Lawmakers may also resort to 
versions of what Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988) refer to as the “Fenno Rule” after James 
Fenno’s (1966) explanation of the general provisions of continuing resolutions.  
According to the Fenno Rule, when an agency is subject to a continuing resolution, that 
agency’s spending authority is restricted to the minimum of the House version of an 
appropriations bill, the Senate version of the same appropriations bill, or the previous 
fiscal year’s regular appropriations act (Fenno, 1966; GAO, 2009b; Hartman, 1982; 
McCaffery & Mutty, 1999; Pulmonte, 2011; I. Rubin, 2007; Streeter, 2008b; Tollestrup, 
2011). 
In contrast to the brevity of partial-year measures, full-year continuing 
resolutions contain more text and are intended to sustain agency operations thru fiscal 
year-end.  Full-year resolutions generally enable agency operations by: (1) referencing 
the full text of the related regular appropriations act; (2) cross-referencing language 
from the latest stage of congressional action, such as the conference agreement; (3) 
mandating spending rates; or (4) some combination of the previous three methods 
(Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b).  Because full-year measures often include the full 
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text of regular appropriations, they tend to be several hundred pages in length (Schick, 
2007).  In essence, full-year continuing resolutions provide funding in place of regular 
appropriations and they expire at the end of the fiscal year (Pulmonte, 2011; Schick, 
2007; Streeter, 2008b).  Thus, full-year resolutions differ from regular appropriations 
only to the extent that the amount of funding provided may differ from what would 
have been included in the regular measures. 
It is also not unheard of for an agency to begin the fiscal year under a series of 
interim measures only to have a full-year continuing resolution adopted in the event of 
extended budget negotiations, as most recently happened in fiscal years 2007 and 2011 
("DoD & Full-Year Continuing Approprations Act, 2011," 2011; GAO, 2009b).  When this 
happens, Congress seems to be cognizant of the need to declare the implementation of 
full-year spending restrictions in a timely manner.  With regard to Fiscal Year 2007, 
three interim continuing resolutions were signed into law before a full-year resolution 
was finally implemented on February 15, 2007 thereby providing for operations through 
the end of the fiscal year (Pulmonte, 2011; "Revised Continuing Appropriations 
Resolution, 2007," 2007).  For Fiscal Year 2011, full-year continuing appropriations were 
implemented on April 15, 2011 (112th Congress, 2011).  Hence, in the same manner 
that Congress requires agencies to allow sufficient time in the fiscal year for prudent 
obligation of funding in the case of disapproved deferrals, Congress will grant agencies 
ample time to adjust to new funding paradigms brought about by full-year resolutions.  
Schick (2007) draws a temporal distinction between interim- and full-year 
appropriations by alluding to the former as “traditional” continuing resolutions and the 
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latter as “contemporary” continuing resolutions.  As Schick points out, traditional 
measures have been in use for decades and follow the interim procedures detailed 
above.  Contemporary continuing resolutions, on the other hand, are a combination of a 
full-year continuing appropriations act and an omnibus appropriations act to the extent 
that a full-year continuing resolution may serve as a legislative vehicle for several 
appropriations. 
A brief discussion of omnibus appropriations acts may be helpful here.  Congress 
usually evaluates and approves regular appropriation bills separately.  On several 
occasions, usually during the conference stage, legislators have combined two or more 
bills into one measure called an omnibus appropriations measure.  The packaging of 
regular appropriations bills facilitates legislative bargaining by enabling lawmakers to 
negotiate trade-offs among several bills.  This process is an efficient means of resolving 
budgetary differences.  Incidentally, there is not a consensus definition of an omnibus 
appropriations measure.  In fact, the term minibus appropriations measure identifies a 
measure containing a “few” regular appropriations bills; whereas, an omnibus 
appropriations measure contains “several” regular appropriations bills (Streeter, 2008a).  
To recap, continuing appropriations acts become necessary when conflict over 
the federal budget cannot be resolved by the start of the fiscal year.  On most occasions, 
interim or traditional continuing resolutions afford agencies the means to continue 
operations while Congress and the president negotiate budgetary differences.   If those 
differences cannot be reconciled, Congress may exercise the option of passing a full-
year continuing appropriations act to carry affected agencies through the remainder of 
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the fiscal year.  Another approach, and one that has been used regularly since 1997, 
involves packaging multiple uncompleted appropriations into an omnibus measure at 
the conference stage in an attempt to expedite the completion of the appropriations 
process by the start of the fiscal year (Pulmonte, 2011).  Doing so paves the way for 
lawmakers to: (1) engage in legislative logrolling; (2) avoid floor consideration of certain 
controversial floor amendments to regular appropriations bills; (3) reduce the number 
of votes required to pass the measure; and (4) reduce the number of opportunities for 
presidential veto (Aksoy, 2012; Pulmonte, 2011).  
 
Effects of continuing resolutions on the Congress and the President 
 As just mentioned, continuing resolutions have the intended effect of preventing 
a government shutdown while allowing Congress and the president time to resolve 
budgetary differences.  Yet, the extension of time is not without cost.  This section 
discusses the intense dislike among legislators for the passage of spending measures 
which have not been previously authorized, and the exclusionary tactics associated with 
continuing resolutions that seem to violate the norms of democratic processes.  
Notwithstanding budgetary discord, continuing appropriations keep the federal 
government running and the suboptimal budget environment provides motivation for 
political reconciliation. 
 Congress’s constitutional prerogative to withhold funding was intended to 
safeguard against executive overreach.  In order to control federal spending and debt 
levels after the First World War and to impose structure on the federal budget process, 
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Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, thereby giving the president 
the instruments necessary to exercise fiscal restraint over the executive branch.  In so 
doing, Congress attempted to assume the role of principal and to place the president on 
an agency footing by requiring the executive to submit an annual consolidated budget 
for the federal government (Schick, 1980, 1990, 1994, 2007; Shuman, 1992).   
In the early part of the twentieth century, however, Congress delegated many of 
its monetary authorities to other agencies and spending eventually began to outpace 
revenues.  In 1913, legislators transferred the power to coin and to regulate money to 
the Federal Reserve System.  The authority to pay debt and to borrow money went to 
the Treasury Department in 1917.  Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
and Johnson routinely used the budget to promote spending initiatives and to increase 
social programs.  During the Vietnam era, government spending increased, large deficits 
accrued, and entitlement programs expanded.  The erosion of public confidence in 
Congress’s ability to manage the nation’s finances and President Nixon’s impoundment 
strategy ultimately prompted Congress to reassert its pecuniary authority.  The 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 formally established a 
congressional budgetary apparatus and gave Congress the tools and expertise necessary 
to co-manage the nation’s purse and to engage adequately the president on spending 
matters (Dumbrell, 1980; Hartman, 1982; Hogan, 1985; Schick, 1990, 2007; Shuman, 
1992).   
Given a level budgetary playing field between Congress and the president, 
continuing resolutions not only allow Congress to assume a more aggressive posture 
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opposite the president on budgetary matters, but also imply greater accountability for 
the budget overall.  In their examination of the extent to which the presidential veto 
influences congressional decisions on appropriations, Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988) 
frame continuing resolutions as a best alternative to a negotiated agreement (R. Fisher 
& Ury, 2011).  The authors explain that under the Fenno Rule continuing resolutions 
become a de facto reversionary expenditure, a fallback position of sorts, comprised of a 
zero expenditure level or the previous year’s expenditure level.  This arrangement is 
designed to guard individual members of Congress and the president against committee 
threats to shut down the government in the event of budgetary impasse.   
Be that as it may, the idea that an agenda setter can present voters with a “take 
it or leave it” choice has direct relevance to a discussion of budgetary negotiations 
between Congress and the president.  Consider the notion that a monopolistic agenda 
setter may be a bureau that formulates a budget estimate for the coming fiscal year and 
which has a preference for the largest feasible expenditure.  Apropos of the Fenno Rule, 
affected voters to the budget are left with a binary choice between the proposed 
budget and a reversionary expenditure.  By Romer and Rosenthal’s estimates, the 
presence of a reversionary expenditure strongly affects the allocation of budgetary 
resources and is, therefore, integral to the outcome of the expenditure election (Romer 
& Rosenthal, 1978).  In the context of continuing resolutions, Congress, because of its 
power over the purse, assumes the role of monopolistic agenda setter, while the 
president assents to the role of affected voter (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1988). 
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Indeed, Wildavsky (2004) holds that continuing resolutions effectively “vitiate 
the veto power” while Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988) submit further that veto power 
only imparts the president the ability to reject spending levels, not to extract more 
appropriations than Congress prefers.  Schick (2007) adds that presidents must sign or 
veto the entire bill and this all-or-nothing aspect is most evident under divided 
government when Congress may load appropriations bills with provisions that run 
counter to the president’s policies.   
Presidents also seem to be at a particular disadvantage when bills are presented 
in omnibus fashion and displeasure over a few provisions does not merit a veto of the 
entire bill, or after the start of the fiscal year when failure to sign would result in a 
shutdown of government.  Yet, some presidents have used veto power effectively.  With 
public opinion on his side, President Clinton’s strategic use of veto power often 
compelled Congress to revise bills to gain executive support.  As another example, 
President George H.W. Bush was able to leverage the support of members of his own 
party in Congress to gain 30 consecutive victories in veto override votes (Schick, 2007). 
The combination of these institutional arrangements gives Congress the latitude 
to assume a more aggressive stance with the president in terms of budget offers 
(Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1988), while also implying that Congress, as an outcome of the 
1974 Budget Act, has primary responsibility for the budget (Devins, 1988). 
 Within Congress, however, continuing resolutions breed feelings of contempt 
between authorizers and appropriators because the measures tend to serve as an 
expeditious means of passing unauthorized appropriations.  For annual appropriations, 
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the authorization-appropriations process happens in sequence.  Recall from chapter two 
that authorization acts establish, continue, or modify agencies or programs.  Legislative 
committees, such as the House Committees on Agriculture and Homeland Security or 
the Senate Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary, have jurisdiction over 
authorization measures and are responsible for crafting substantive legislation and for 
the authorization of appropriations.  After authorization has been established, 
appropriation acts provide funding or budget authority for the authorized entities.  The 
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, which are not legislative committees 
and therefore do not have jurisdiction to establish, continue, or modify existing law, 
write the appropriations measures that provide budget authority for entities that have 
been previously authorized (Streeter, 2008a).    
Unauthorized appropriations are budget authority contained in an 
appropriations bill for entities whose authorization has not been enacted, has expired, 
or exceeds the authorized ceiling.  House Rules XXI, Clause 2, House Rules XXII, Clause 5, 
and Senate Rule XVI prohibit legislative provisions and unauthorized appropriations in 
general appropriations bills (Devins, 1988; House of Representatives Committee on 
Rules, 2013a, 2013b; Schick, 1980, 2007; Streeter, 2008a, 2008b).  
However, continuing resolutions are not deemed general appropriations; 
therefore, they are not subject to the House and Senate restrictions mentioned above 
and members often fill the resolutions with unfinished business without drawing a point 
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of order12 (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1988; Myers, Rumburg, & Johnson, 1989; Schick, 
2007).  That is to say, members cannot formally object to or question unauthorized 
appropriations written into continuing appropriations because it is not against the rules 
to include such provisions in continuing resolutions.  Unauthorized appropriations, if 
enacted, have the force of law and are available for obligation or expenditure (Streeter, 
2008a).  For this reason, authorizing committee members have long bristled at the 
notion that appropriators can circumvent the will of committee or subcommittee 
chairmen who opposed consideration of a bill (Joe White, 1988).  As an example, Schick 
(1980) cites Representative Walter Flowers’ immense and colorfully worded 
dissatisfaction  with the encroachment of the budget and appropriations processes on 
authorization committee territory, and Senator Walter Magnuson, Chair of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee in 1979, was quoted as saying, “When you cannot get 
anything through a legislative committee, you tack it on an appropriations bill (Devins, 
1988).”   
Thus, the use of continuing resolutions seems to undermine the notion of a 
deliberative and democratic legislative process.  While this “must pass” legislation 
(Brass, 2010; Devins, 1988) keeps the government running in the face of a government 
shutdown, the respite comes at the expense of the close examination and careful 
prioritization of spending proposals (I. Rubin, 2007).  Internal rules preclude the debate 
and amendment of the resolutions, and lawmakers-at-large are denied access to the 
final bill (Devins, 1988).  In the context of a separation of powers system, the act of 
12 A point of order is a query, raised during a formal debate or meeting, as to whether parliamentary 
procedures are being followed.   
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passing continuing resolutions comes across as a centralized process in which a few 
powerful legislators and their aides make secretive decisions for everyone else (Devins, 
1988; Joe White, 1988). 
 While some may view the use of continuing resolutions as “a bankruptcy of the 
budget system (Schick, 1980),” others see the measures as a lone conduit supplying 
money to the government in times of budget impasse (Joe White, 1988).  As Irene Rubin 
(1999) notes, “conflict is endemic to budgeting” and according to Schick (2007) the 
intense and sustained conflict over budget policy generates dysfunction within the 
regular appropriations process.  Conflict drives the negotiating parties from the 
bargaining table, while continuing resolutions are the suboptimal arrangement which 
provides incentive for the participants to seek accord (Brass, 2010; Pulmonte, 2011).  On 
balance, continuing resolutions seem to be the legislative adaptation to the demands 
which the process of budgeting levels upon a representative democracy (Joe White, 
1988).  
 
Effects of continuing resolutions on agency-level spending 
Associated research at the agency level tends to take the form of case study 
analysis, due in part to the difficulty of obtaining agency-level budget data (as the 
reader will see in chapter five).  What is more, because the field of budgeting is 
practitioner-oriented (Posner, 2009), the preponderance of research at the agency level 
is mostly anecdotal in nature.   
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Scholarly efforts are apt to find that continuing appropriations create an 
environment of uncertainty for program managers.  Hartman (1982) submits that 
operating under a continuing resolution is an unacceptable manner by which to conduct 
the public’s business.  Interim funding approaches tend to generate uncertainty 
regarding the availability of funding, and the lack of surety exacerbates managerial 
inefficiency (Hartman, 1982; McCaffery & Mutty, 1999).  Managers are apt to become 
overly cautious about committing funds and awarding contracts, and agency spending 
takes on unconventional patterns (Hartman, 1982).  Rubin (2007) submits that 
predictability suffers when agency managers lack certainty about budget levels from 
one timeframe to the next.  Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988) counter that, in the context 
of the Fenno Rule, continuing resolutions might actually offer a measure of 
predictability in so far as the budgetary outcome is predetermined if regular 
appropriations fail to pass. 
In a corresponding manner, practitioners find a similar relationship between the 
implementation of continuing resolutions and the manifestation of uncertainty.  At the 
behest of then Senator George Voinovich, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
attempted to investigate the effect of continuing resolutions on the operations of 
federal agencies.  Auditors analyzed the provisions of continuing resolutions from 1999-
2009, and conducted a series of case studies of six federal agencies from three cabinet-
level departments.13   
13 The six agencies included in the GAO case study were:  (1) Administration for Children and Families and 
(2) Food and Drug Administration, which fall under the Department of Health and Human Services; (3) 
Veterans Health Administration and (4) Veterans Benefit Administration under the Department of 
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The findings of the GAO study coincide with Hartman’s (1982) and Rubin’s (2007) 
empirical results.  While continuing resolutions enabled agencies to operate until the 
enactment of regular appropriations, the limitations engendered uncertainty about the 
timing and the levels of funding to come.  Specifically, the restrictions tended to 
increase administrative burdens; delay the hiring of personnel; compress application 
time for grants; and impede the award or renewal of contracts.  In addition, resolutions 
contributed to distortions in year-end spending for those agencies operating under 
restrictions for prolonged periods (GAO, 2009b).   
Still, GAO auditors were unable to isolate the effects because none of the 
agencies under study made a concerted effort to monitor and record the affected 
resources (GAO, 2009b).  The Congressional Research Service submits further that, aside 
from anecdotal accounts, the flexible nature of continuing resolutions, in conjunction 
with the disparate composition of agencies and programs, increases the difficulty of 
formulating general notions of the effects of such constraints on federal spending 
(Brass, 2010; Pulmonte, 2011).  Along those lines, White (1988) supposes that 
continuing resolutions exhibit only marginal effects on spending, while the absence of 
budget and allocation data render Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West (2007) unable to 
rule-out continuing resolutions as an explanation for expense shifting among U.S. Army 
hospitals.  
 
Veterans Affairs; and under the Department of Justice, (5) Bureau of Prisons and (6) Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (Pulmonte, 2011). 
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A path forward 
A recurring theme from the discussion above is managerial uncertainty with 
regard to the availability of future short-term funding, and one method of mitigating 
such uncertainty is to establish contingency funds.  Uncertainty over future income 
motivated Leland (1968) to model the precautionary demand for saving.  Zimmerman 
(1976) extended Leland’s research by analyzing the effects of budget uncertainty on the 
allocation decisions of nonprofit managers and found that budget and/or expenditure 
uncertainty will compel managers to establish contingency funds.  Awareness that 
allotted funding must last for the entire fiscal year will compel managers of federal 
organizations to pursue the prudent financial management strategy of holding a portion 
of funding in abeyance for unanticipated needs (McCaffery & Mutty, 1999; Schick, 
2007).  A portion of that contingency funding is often put aside, or “saved,” in the form 
of durable inventory which is reduced in the early stages of the next fiscal year, while 
unencumbered funding is spent on other factor inputs (Zimmerman, 1976).  
Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West (2007) confirm similar saving-dissaving behavior at 
U.S. Army Hospitals as administrators stockpiled pharmaceuticals and supplies at fiscal 
year-end and then consumed the stockpile as uncertainty abated in the succeeding 
fiscal year.   
Agency officials and resource managers spend funding on goods and services 
toward the accomplishment of organizational missions; thus, holding funds in abeyance 
amounts to unused capacity.  While the academic study of budgeting has been 
concerned largely with budget preparation (McCaffery & Mutty, 1999), the study of 
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excess capacity in the context of budget execution resides primarily in managerial 
accounting literature. 
 Ng and Lee (1999) explores the use of idle capacity as a strategic resource which 
helps service firms to reduce costs, enhance service quality, and increase customer 
loyalty. Balakrishnan and Sprinkle (2002) develop a framework which integrates profit 
variation analysis and capacity costing to help managers identify the cost of unused 
capacity.  They report that the overproduction of inventory in absorption costing 
systems facilitates the transfer of capacity costs across periods which, in turn, affects 
reported income.  Balanchandran, Li, and Radhakrishnan (2007) also develop a 
framework for reporting unused capacity costs.  The authors write that firms build-in 
excess capacity to plan for future growth of the organization as well as to accommodate 
uncertainty caused by fluctuating demand and variance in internal processing times.  
The framework disaggregates unused capacity from production costs and categorizes 
the capacity into five distinct categories. 
Cooper and Kaplan (1992) offers a simplified framework of unused capacity that 
is most applicable to the discussion at hand.  From an Activity Based Costing 
perspective, the insight that measurement of unused capacity links the cost of resources 
used to the cost of resources available leads the authors to develop the following 
framework: 
Activity Available = Activity Utilized + Unused Capacity 
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Modifying Cooper and Kaplan’s formula toward the spending concerns of federal 
agencies yields the following equation: 
Funding Allotment = Expenditures + Contingency Fund 
In this setup, the annual or quarterly funding allotment provides the parameters for 
available activities, expenditures signifies the utilization of activity, and contingency fund 
connotes unused capacity.   
In the same way that variations in Activity Utilized affect Unused Capacity, 
changes in agency expenditure patterns should influence an agency’s contingency fund.  
By examining how resource managers adjust obligation patterns to accommodate the 
implementation of spending restrictions, one may also gain insight to how agencies 
employ unused capacity.  An appreciation of both should foster an understanding of the 
effects of continuing appropriations acts on agency spending behavior. 
What is needed, then, is a standardized method of studying the expenditures of 
disparate federal agencies.  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) tracks federal 
government obligations by object class (Office of Management and Budget, 2012).  Since 
all federal agencies must record expenditures using the same accounting nomenclature, 
examining the results of other GAO performance audits through the lens of OMB 
classifications may provide a method toward isolating and quantifying the effects of 
continuing resolutions.  In other words, examining how agencies spend appropriations 
may provide insight to how organizations adjust operations to accommodate for 
spending restrictions associated with continuing resolutions. 
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OMB relies on four classification systems to track and analyze federal spending.  
The character classification or character class is used to aggregate and analyze budget 
authority, outlays, and offsetting receipts devoted to investment and non-investment 
activities.  Investments include those expenditures which yield future benefits such as 
the construction, purchase, or rehabilitation of physical assets; the emption of research 
and development; or the attainment of education and training.  Non-investment 
activities include certain grants to state and local governments or those outlays which 
are not otherwise classified as investments.  Functional class also captures budget 
authority, outlays, and offsetting receipts, and is a field of input to OMB’s Budget Data 
System which is used to collect and process information for the preparation of the 
budget.  Functional classifications are designed to inform OMB and the Congressional 
Budget Office of the major purpose served by a given expenditure such as national 
defense, health, or agriculture.  The program activity classification captures direct and 
reimbursable obligations incurred for specific activities or projects, such as The 
American Competitiveness Initiative or the Cooperative Extensions System, listed in the 
program and financing schedules of the president’s budget. (GAO, 2005a; Office of 
Management and Budget, 2012).  While these three methods of classification help to 
categorize federal spending, they do not provide a level of granularity sufficient to 
analyze unused capacity. 
Object class, on the other hand, also captures obligations but is a method of 
classification that provides very detailed information about agency expenditures.  
Federal agencies use object classes not only during budget preparation, but also as the 
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primary means of recording agency obligations.  In addition, object classifications inform 
the reader of the type of goods, services, or items purchased, such as supplies, rent, or 
equipment (see Appendix B for a list of object classes).  What is more, public law 31 
U.S.C 1104(b) mandates the presentation of expenditures by object class in the 
president’s budget submission ("Budget and Appropriations Authority of the President," 
2007; GAO, 2005a). 
Re-categorizing by object class, a previous sampling of GAO findings and 
associated agency remarks related to continuing resolutions reveals that the effects of 
spending constraints may tend to manifest most often in contractual services, personnel 
compensation, and acquisition of assets accounts14.  Brass (2010) reviews a 20-year 
sample of GAO performance audits which made mention of the effects of continuing 
resolutions on agency operations.  Brass evaluated and divided remarks made by agency 
officials about the effects of continuing resolutions into two categories: (1) effects 
attributed to the funding levels of continuing resolutions, and (2) effects attributed to 
funding uncertainty generated by continuing resolutions.  Unfortunately, categorizing 
the effects in such a non-standardized manner may introduce a degree of ambiguity to 
the taxonomy.  For example, in one instance agency officials working at the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) delayed a national training seminar because they 
were uncertain whether funding levels would be adequate when it came time to travel 
14 The four major categories of object class are personnel compensation and benefits; contractual services 
and supplies; acquisition of assets; and grants and fixed charges (refer to Appendix B for a table of 
subcategories). 
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to the seminar (GAO, 2004c).  Comments such as these could be classified in either or 
both of Brass’ categories.   
A less ambiguous method of classification would be to organize the effects of the 
spending restrictions by object class.  Using object classification to categorize the 
remarks of agency officials from the HHS example above enables one to assign the 
effects of spending restrictions to discrete categories of expenditure.  To illustrate, 
cancellation or rescheduling of travel arrangements would manifest in object class 21: 
Travel and transportation of persons, while obligations related to the amendment or 
cancellation of reservations for a training venue might manifest in object class 25.2: 
Other services from non-federal sources.  Assigning the remarks of agency officials to a 
discrete category of effect diminishes the levels of subjectivity in the classification 
process and may enable one to formulate suppositions regarding how agencies respond 
to spending constraints.   
Considering the GAO audits by way of this re-categorization, shows that, with 
regard to contractual services and supplies, continuing resolutions contributed to delays 
in contract deliverables (GAO, 2003b) and the award of contracts (GAO, 2009a); 
deferment of re-engineering/transformation of business operations (GAO, 2003a, 
2003d); postponement of employee training (GAO, 2004c, 2007a); and the under-
execution of agency funds (GAO, 1999, 2004a).   
In personnel compensation and benefits accounts, continuing resolutions made 
it difficult to keep pace with attrition and retirement rates (GAO, 2007a, 2007b) and 
impeded the hiring process by way of moratoriums on hiring (GAO, 2003e, 2006).  
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Agencies also experienced delays in the transfer of funds intended for hiring (GAO, 
2004b) or simply did not have time to bring the requisite number of personnel on-board 
after receiving regular appropriations late in the fiscal year (GAO, 2003c, 2004f). 
With regard to acquisition of assets accounts, continuing resolutions delayed 
military construction efforts associated with Base Realignment and Closure (GAO, 
2007c), prompted the internal reprogramming of agency funds to help cover expenses 
(GAO, 1998) and suspended the issuance of mortgage guarantees (GAO, 2005b, 2005c). 
Referring to Appendix B, one will readily see that each one of the remarks above 
falls into a discrete category of object class.  Obligations related to the hiring, furlough, 
and retirement of personnel, travel arrangements, the purchase of supplies and 
equipment, and the letting of contracts are all captured on a monthly basis by the 
budgeting and resource management offices in federal agencies.   
A temporal analysis of agency obligations, by object class, might then reveal 
patterns in agency spending that tend to coincide with the instances of continuing 
resolutions.  With regard to unused capacity, the purchase of supplies and materials is 
captured under object class 26.  If agency officials do engage in the transfer of costs 
across periods, such conventions of saving-dissaving should be evident through time-
series analysis of the supplies and materials object class.  Assuming, then, that resource 
managers do accumulate and transfer unused capacity in the form of stockpiled 
inventory, incorporating the instances of continuing resolutions into the quantitative 
analysis should reveal variations in the agency’s unused capacity.  In this fashion, not 
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only is quantitative investigation of the effects of continuing resolutions on federal 
spending possible, but also it would further the study of budget execution. 
 
Discussion 
Continuing resolutions are usually mentioned in the context of congressional 
budgetary procedures (Hartman, 1982) or as part of the appropriations process (Fenno, 
1966; Heniff, 2010; McCaffery & Mutty, 1999; Myers, et al., 1989; Schick, 1995, 2000, 
2007).  Occasionally, the focus turns to the influence of stopgap measures on 
managerial decision-making (GAO, 2009b; I. Rubin, 2007).  Much of the discussion 
revolves around a historical recounting of budgetary events (Schick, 1980) with the most 
critical work following closely on the heels of high-profile episodes such as President 
Reagan’s January 1988 State of the Union Address (Devins, 1988; Joe White, 1988) or 
the 1996 shutdown of the federal government (Streeter, 1996).   
Absent from the field of budget research are quantitative analyses of the effects 
of continuing appropriations on the spending behavior, the hiring practices, the letting 
of contracts, and the general day-to-day operations of federal agencies.  Given the 
discussion above, one might conclude that the amorphous nature of continuing 
resolutions and the differences among federal agencies preclude quantitative empirical 
study.  However, the writings of scholars and the testimony of agency officials would 
suggest otherwise.  No matter how one might view stopgap measures, all assessments 
seem to reach the common conclusion that continuing resolutions generate budget 
uncertainty.  Moreover, despite a variety of organizational missions, all agencies 
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encounter similar difficulties when it comes to the implementation of spending 
restrictions and all federal agencies classify expenditures in a standardized fashion.  
Thus, this chapter demonstrates that by reorganizing existing case study literature and 
peering through the lens of a standardized accounting classification system, one may 
gain insight as to where the effects of uncertainty engendered by continuing resolutions 
tend to manifest in federal spending patterns.  Such an approach not only facilitates 
quantitative research, but also links an output of the legislative branch to a related 
outcome in the executive branch. 
A manner by which to analyze the effects of stopgap measures on agency 
spending behavior might include event study methodologies.  Broadly, event studies 
explore whether a particular event influences some outcome (Wooldridge, 2009).  In 
researching market anticipation of common stock splits, Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll 
(1969) is widely viewed as a landmark study (Corrado, 2011) if not the seminal work on 
event study methodologies (J. J. Binder, 1998; Sandler & Sandler, 2012).  Since the work 
of Fama and colleagues, the techniques have been applied successfully across several 
fields.  From a federal policy perspective, Denison (2000) investigates the 1994 Orange 
County, California bankruptcy that ultimately resulted from an increase in the discount 
rate charged by the Federal Reserve Bank.  Rose (1985) investigates the effects of motor 
carrier deregulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission on the stock prices of 
publicly traded trucking companies.  Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) estimates the 
effects of the Food Stamp Program (FSP) on work incentives to reveal an absence of 
trends in outcome variables prior to introduction of the FSP and sharp changes in labor 
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supply after food stamps are introduced.  Another event study related to the 
introduction of the FSP finds benefits of increased birth weight and improvements in 
neonatal mortality (Almond, Hoynes, & Schanzenbach, 2010), while Hoynes, Page, and 
Stevens (2011) discovers similar increases in birth weight with the implementation of 
the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC).   
In the context of federal spending, event study methods should enable one to 
explore whether the implementation of continuing appropriations influences 
expenditure outcomes.  In other words, since continuing resolutions have a common 
implementation date (i.e., the first day of the fiscal year or thereabouts), one may be 
able to explore the likelihood that the federal resource management community, in 
anticipation of continuing resolutions, engages in expense shifting by stockpiling 
supplies at the end of the fiscal year or through early renewal of annual contracts.  Such 
is the focus of chapter five.  Before embarking upon quantitative analysis, though, the 
next chapter seeks to address questions pertaining to the modification of agency 
expenditure behavior when subject to the constraints of a continuing resolution. 
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Chapter Four 
Continuing Resolutions and Lump-Sum Appropriations:  An Arithmetic Notion of How 
Federal Agency Officials Might React to Interim Spending Restrictions 
 
Introduction 
 While continuing appropriations have been in use since the late 1800s, very little 
has been published in the way of theoretical frameworks regarding the effect of these 
measures on the expenditure behavior of agency officials.  Therefore, the material in 
this chapter reflects an attempt to address the manner by which bureaucratic agencies 
rely on contingency funds to mitigate the uncertainty that accompanies the 
implementation of continuing resolutions.   
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a theory regarding the modification of 
expenditure behavior of agency officials who are confronted with a continuing 
appropriations act.  Program managers in the federal resource management community 
often operate in an uncertain budgetary environment which requires the employment 
of contingency budgeting.  The analysis that follows theorizes that resource managers 
attempt to mitigate the uncertainty associated with continuing resolutions by using 
contingency funds to stockpile additional stores of inventories and contract services.  
Those additional stores are carried across fiscal year boundaries and subsequently used 
to afford the agency spending latitude while under the constraints of continuing 
appropriations.   
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The efforts below are an attempt to combine and build upon the works of Leland, 
Zimmerman, and Cooper and Kaplan by way of a theoretical model of ex ante and ex 
post reactions of federal agency officials to interim continuing resolutions in the context 
of single-year lump-sum appropriations.  The next section of the chapter summarizes 
the literature which is most relevant to the theory, and the third section presents the 
foundational assumptions upon which the theory is based.  The fourth section models 
agency spending in absence of continuing resolutions, while the fifth section introduces 
continuing resolutions and analyzes the modification of expenditure behavior.  The 
discussion section relaxes base assumptions one and two, and explores the limitations 
of the model in a line-item budget setting and under a multi-year lump sum 
appropriation. The final section concludes. 
 
Precautionary demand for saving and its link to contingency funding 
Hayne Leland (1968) pioneered the precautionary demand for saving; that is, the 
extra saving that occurs as a result of uncertainty in future income.  Using a two-period 
model of consumption, Leland showed that risk aversion alone is an insufficient 
condition to guarantee a level of saving above that which already occurs for the 
consumer who prefers to avoid simple risk.  To guarantee an increase in the consumer’s 
saving rate, uncertainty of second period income is the necessary element in the two-
period model.  By Leland’s account, a positive third derivative of the consumer’s strictly 
increasing and strictly concave utility function reflects a positive precautionary demand 
for saving. 
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Jerold Zimmerman (1976) applied Leland’s theory to the resource allocation 
decisions of a nonprofit organization in a fixed-budget setting.  Zimmerman’s work 
pertains to those bureaucratic organizations which: (1) are subject to a strict fiscal year 
budget constraint, and (2) impose loss functions to budget deficits and surpluses.  
Budget uncertainty and/or expenditure uncertainty impels risk-averse managers to 
defer expenditures to later periods in the fiscal year, thereby disrupting the prearranged 
sequencing of expenditures.  This type of postponement is commonly referred to as 
contingency budgeting and takes the following form: 
 𝜕𝐶𝑡∗(𝜑𝑡)
𝜕𝜎2�𝐵� |𝜑𝑡�
 < 0 (1) 
Where, 𝐶𝑡∗ signifies planned expenditures in period t; 𝜑𝑡 is the current information set 
regarding the budget; 𝐵�  is a random variable which represents the fiscal budget; and 
𝜎2�𝐵� |𝜑𝑡� indicates the conditional variance of the budget given the current information 
set (Zimmerman, 1976).   
Equation (1) exhibits decreasing utility of planned expenditures associated with 
increases in conditional variance of the budget.  In other words, as uncertainty 
increases, risk-averse bureau managers will cut back on expenditures to save money for 
unforeseen circumstances.  Zimmerman further stipulates that a portion of the deferred 
expenditures are used at year-end to purchase durable inventories, which are then 
stored and subsequently consumed during the first month of the next fiscal year.  Those 
funds in the new fiscal year, which become unencumbered as a result of the dissaving 
associated with the stores of durable inventories, are then applied to other factor inputs 
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(Zimmerman, 1976).  Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West analyze spending patterns at 
U.S. Army Hospitals and confirm Zimmerman’s saving-dissaving results. 
Recall that Schick (2007) dispels the notion that contingency budgeting is akin to 
wasteful government spending, referring to the practice, instead, as prudent financial 
management of limited resources.  Indeed, the establishment of contingency funds may 
be in the best interest of rational economic actors (Lowe & Shaw, 1968) because these 
reserves can have a stabilizing influence for the organization during downward trends 
(Cyert & March, 1963).  As such, contingency funding may be effectively set aside by 
understating revenues and overstating costs in the planning process (Douglas & Benson, 
2000); changing levels of efficiency or building slack into standards (Onsi, 1973); or 
through the establishment of withhold accounts that are visible to the division 
comptroller yet indiscernible at aggregate levels of the budget (Merchant, 1985; 
Resource Management Officer Interview, 2014). 
Because the monies that are set aside for unforeseen events will still be used at 
some point in the associated fiscal year to accomplish organizational goals and 
objectives, contingency funding may be understood also as idle capacity.  As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, Cooper and Kaplan’s (1992) activity-based costing framework of 
unused capacity portrays an additive relationship between utilized activity and unused 
capacity which has implications for the overall activities of the organization: 
 Activity Available = Activity Utilized + Unused Capacity. (2a) 
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Equation (2a) can easily be modified to suit the needs of federal agencies 
 Funding Allotment = Expenditures + Contingency Fund. (2b) 
 
The discussion that follows will examine how bureaucratic resource managers 
adjust agency expenditures to mitigate the additional uncertainty that accompanies the 
implementation of continuing appropriations acts.   
 
Base assumptions of the model 
The theoretical construct rests on three overarching assumptions which govern 
spending behavior of agency officials in federal organizations.  The three following 
assumptions are related to the fiscal operating capacity of the organization, the limited 
timeframe for budgetary execution to which the organization is confined, and the 
punitive element associated with a violation of budgetary constraints. 
First, assume the organization in question is a federal agency at the cabinet-level 
or below which, in aggregate, receives funding in the form of lump-sum appropriations 
from Congress.  To be clear, a lump-sum appropriation is a sum of money intended to 
cover a number of specific programs, projects, or items (GAO, 2004e).  Further, the 
agency has no means of revenue generation; instead, the agency ultimately receives 
funding by way of a series of apportionments and/or allotments distributed to the 
agency in equal amounts over the course of the fiscal year.   
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Assume also that the organization is unable to carryover unused funding into the 
next fiscal year.  Because of this single-year limitation on funding, unobligated resources 
will be an impetus for budgetary reductions in subsequent fiscal years.  Recall that 
annual appropriations lapse on the final day of the fiscal year so an organization must 
spend one hundred percent of allocated funding by year-end close-out (Schick, 2007; 
Zimmerman, 1976).  Unused funding, then, is perceived as a surplus resource which will 
revert back to the United States Treasury.  Accordingly, the funding agency to which the 
organization is subordinate may reduce organizational funding in subsequent fiscal 
years by the amount of the surplus (Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004; Zimmerman, 1976).   
Base assumptions one and two, together, narrow the field of funding possibilities 
to those lump-sum amounts that are appropriated by Congress and are intended to 
fund day-to-day activities over the course of a single fiscal year.15 
Finally, assume that the organization is strictly prohibited from exceeding 
obligation limits by way of statutory provisions and institutional mechanisms.  In 
addition to the statutory prohibitions of the Antideficiency Act, other mechanisms, such 
as congressional retribution through budgetary reduction or line-item restriction (GAO, 
2004e; Schick, 2007), negative personnel evaluations (Balakrishnan, et al., 2007), the 
threat of audit of budgetary procedures, and the loss of public confidence (Zimmerman, 
15 “Salaries and Expenses,” “Operating Expenses,” or “Operation and Maintenance” appropriations are 
examples of lump-sum appropriations which are valid for a single fiscal year only and are intended for 
day-to-day operations.  Further, the Governmental Accountability Office defines a lump-sum 
appropriation as “one that is made to cover a number of specific programs, projects, or items (GAO, 
2004e)”  The discussion section provides additional information on both lump-sum and line-item 
appropriations. 
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1976) provide strong incentives for managers to adhere to budgetary constraints even 
though it may not be economically optimal to do so.  To gauge the applicability of the 
model, base assumptions one and two will be relaxed in a subsequent section, but 
because base assumption three is a legal constraint it will not be relaxed. 
With these foundational assumptions in mind, the following theoretical 
discussion addresses the spending behavior of federal agency officials under two 
different budgetary scenarios.  Scenario one illustrates how an organization might 
operate over the course of three consecutive fiscal years in a relatively unrestricted, yet 
uncertain operating environment.  With that simplified budgetary backdrop in mind, 
scenario two introduces the implementation of an interim continuing appropriations act 
at the outset of the second fiscal year.  This approach enables a formulation of 
suppositions regarding ex ante and ex post reactions of agency officials to: (1) a one-
time occurrence of continuing resolutions, and (2) an environment of regularly occurring 
interim continuing resolutions. 
 
Scenario one: federal spending in absence of continuing resolutions 
Year one: lump-sum budget without spending restrictions 
Assume that on the first day of the first fiscal year, FY, agency officials have full 
knowledge of the organization’s total annual budget, BT.  BT can be thought of in terms 
of the final disposition of the organization’s budget where subscript T signifies the total 
number of time periods into which the fiscal year is divided.  While the fiscal year may 
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be divided into quarters, T is equal to 12 here to indicate the number of months in a 
given fiscal year and to facilitate exposition.  The notion that an organization might be 
fully informed of its total annual budget at the outset of the fiscal year refers to the 
signing into law of annual appropriations for FYj prior to the start of the fiscal year, say 
during the fourth quarter of FYj-1.  
The organization receives a share of annual appropriations in the form of 
monthly allotments from a headquarters-type agency.  Recall also that OMB apportions 
appropriations to federal agencies by periods within the fiscal year to prevent 
premature exhaustion of resources (GAO, 2004e; Schick, 2007).  Apportionments are 
then subdivided by a headquarters-type entity and distributed to subordinate 
organizations by way of a stream of budgetary allotments, At, where subscript t refers to 
an incremental timeframe.  Allotments in aggregate equal the total organizational 
budget such that 
 𝐴𝑡 =
𝐵𝑇
𝑇
 (3a) 
 
Alternatively,  
 
�𝐴𝑡 =  𝐵𝑇
12
𝑡=1
 (3b) 
 
The organization then uses At to purchase a vector of routine services, S, which 
enable the day-to-day operation of organizational activities.  These services may include 
expenses such as wages and benefits for personnel, official travel, minor transportation 
of goods (i.e., bills of lading), and payment of utilities.  Once purchased, utilization of 
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these services cannot be carried forward into subsequent periods and it is assumed that 
the organization fully consumes S during the month in which the services are purchased. 
The agency also uses At for the regular purchase of a broad vector of tangible 
goods, G, such as general office supplies, cleaning and toilet materials, copier paper, 
medical supplies (for hospital-type organizations, of course), motor oil and petroleum 
products (for organizations with motor pools), and incidental equipment purchases16.  
Once purchased, these assets can be utilized over the course of multiple periods.  For 
the purpose of the discussion in scenario one, however, assume that G is sufficiently 
depleted each period to the extent that the organization must restock G at the end of 
period t.   
In addition, the organization sets aside a portion of At for contingencies, C.  
Assume that the contingency fund is figured as a fixed nominal percentage of At, and is 
used to mitigate small emergencies and unforeseen events.  Following Leland (1968) 
and Zimmerman (1976), contingency funds constitute a cautionary demand for saving 
on behalf of the agency director or budget official.  Recall also that unused contingency 
funds may accumulate, over the course of the fiscal year, in non-interest bearing 
accounts which are internal to the agency’s accounting scheme.  During the final period 
of the fiscal year, unspent contingency balances are fully drawn-down through the 
purchase of additional S in the form of monetary bonuses and incentive/performance 
16 To clarify, the term tangible goods is used in this context to describe a set of assets, such as those listed 
above, which an agency might purchase for use within, say, one or two calendar years.  These tangible 
goods stand in contrast to conventional durable goods, such as construction equipment, which an agency 
might purchase with procurement funding.  Incidentally, Congress segregates procurement funding and 
salaries & expenses funding into separate appropriations (DFAS, 2012). 
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awards to employees or additional business travel, and/or via the purchase of additional 
G in the form of year-end expenditures on equipment such as additional desktop 
computers, or minor upgrades and repairs to the organization’s working environment17. 
Accordingly, utilization of the agency’s monthly budget allotment can be thought 
of in the fashion of a budget constraint similar to equation (4). 
 𝐴𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 (4) 
 
Rearranging terms in (4) so that expenditures, S and G, are on the right-hand 
side of the equation, as presented in (5a) and (5b), not only separates the contingency 
fund from budgetary obligations, but also creates a distinction between allotments and 
expenditures, E. 
 𝐴𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 (5a) 
 
 𝐸𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 (5b) 
 
To keep matters simple, equation (6a) embodies the assumption that agency 
officials engage in a uniform level of spending during the first eleven months of the first 
fiscal year.  Hence, budgetary allotments will exceed monthly expenditures by the 
amount of funding accrued in the contingency fund.  
 
�𝐴𝑡
11
𝑡=1
−�𝐶𝑡
11
𝑡=1
= �𝐸𝑡
11
𝑡=1
= �𝑆𝑡
11
𝑡=1
+ �𝐺𝑡
11
𝑡=1
 (6a) 
17 Federal personnel, to include Senior Executive Service (SES) members, may receive cash in the form of 
incentive and performance awards (DFAS, 2012) 
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�𝐴𝑡
11
𝑡=1
> �𝐸𝑡
11
𝑡=1
 (6b) 
 
Equation (7) shows that month 12 expenditures exceed the budgetary allotment 
in month 12 by the sum total of the amount accrued in the contingency fund.  In the 
absence of unforeseen events, officials will have continued to accrue contingency 
funding which, if unspent, will revert back to the U.S. Treasury.  To avoid losing these 
funds and risking budgetary reductions in subsequent fiscal years, agency officials will 
engage in year-end spending in order to fully deplete reserve funding (Balakrishnan, et 
al., 2007; McCaffery & Mutty, 1999; Zimmerman, 1976)18.  The agency does so by using 
the accrued contingency funds to purchase additional goods and services, as in equation 
(7) 
 
𝐴12 < 𝐸12 = 𝑆12 + 𝐺12 + �𝐶𝑡
11
𝑡=1
 
 
(7) 
where ∑ 𝐶𝑡11𝑡=1  would be divided among additional purchases of S and/or G at the 
discretion of agency officials.19  The concept of allocating contingency fund balances 
18 This effort to deplete reserve funding is the spike in expenditure rates referred to in the Obligation 
section of chapter 2, or the year-end “bulge” in expenditures that Schick (2007) refers to as the end result 
of prudent financial management on the part of the program managers.  
19 The assumption of uniform spending for the first 11 months of the fiscal year with year-end spending 
confined to month 12 is made to exemplify the model.  Agency officials may spread year-end purchases 
over a number of months but incorporating such an approach here would introduce unnecessary 
complications to the model.  What is more, McCaffery and Mutty (1999) and Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, 
and West (2007)  present evidence that the bulk of year-end purchases are made during the final month 
of the fiscal year.    
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across purchases of S and G will be integral to an appreciation of equations (10a), (10b), 
and (10c) below. 
On the final day of the fiscal year, the sum total of expenses must equal the sum 
total of budgetary allotments which, in turn, must also equal the agency’s total annual 
budget, as in equation (8). 
 
�𝐴𝑡
12
𝑡=1
= �𝐸𝑡
12
𝑡=1
= 𝐵𝑇 (8) 
 
 
Years two and three: lump-sum budget without spending restrictions 
With the timely approval of the annual appropriations act by Congress and the 
subsequent signing into law of appropriations by the president, the process will simply 
repeat itself during the second and third fiscal years, FYj+1 and FYj+2, respectively. 
 
Scenario two:  Implementation of a continuing resolution in the second fiscal year. 
Year one: ex ante reaction to continuing appropriations 
To consider the possible ex ante and ex post reactions of agency officials to the 
implementation of partial-year spending restrictions, assume agency officials learn of a 
pending budget impasse during the third quarter of FYj and are able to determine that 
the organization will open FYj+1 under the constraints of an interim continuing 
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appropriations act.  Officials will react to this development by devoting a portion of the 
agency’s contingency funding to purchase an additional stockpile of G.   
Similar to the setting in scenario one, the agency will use allotted funding to 
purchase routine levels of S and G, and accrue contingency funds as the fiscal year 
progresses.  Budget allotments will continue to exceed expenditures during, say, the 
first ten months of FYj.20 
 
�𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
10
𝑡=1
−�𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
10
𝑡=1
= �𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
10
𝑡=1
= �𝑆𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
10
𝑡=1
+ �𝐺𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
10
𝑡=1
 (9a) 
 
 
�𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
10
𝑡=1
> �𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
10
𝑡=1
 (9b) 
 
 
Upon learning of the impending continuing resolution, organization officials will 
begin to stockpile additional levels of G.  To help distinguish between that portion of G 
purchased for routine business operations from that fraction of G intended for stockpile, 
the former segment will continue to be referred to as G, while the latter will be denoted 
using R, for reserve.21  To acquire R, the agency must forego the accrual of C11, FYj to 
20 The 10-month timeframe used in equations (9a) and (9b) is an arbitrary figure.  Agency officials would, 
of course, begin to stockpile sundries at any time after making a determination regarding continuing 
resolutions.  The discussion herein assumes normal and uniform operations during the first 10 months of 
the fiscal year; discretely assigns a lump-sum purchase of reserves to month 11; and confines year-end 
purchases to month 12 to help illustrate the concept.   
21 Agency officials would not typically partition supplies and the like into discrete bundles labeled 
“routine” and “stockpile.”  That convention is employed here, again, to facilitate explanation. 
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purchase R11, FYj, with the underlying assumption that C11, FYj = R11, FYj. Month 11 
expenditures, then, will equal month 11 allotments as portrayed in equation (10a).   
 𝐴11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝐸11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝑆11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + �𝐺11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝑅11,𝐹𝑌𝑗� (10a) 
 
Alternately, if agency officials feel compelled to accumulate an even larger 
stockpile of tangible goods, they may do so by drawing-down contingency funding by 
discretionary amounts, CѲ, as shown in equations (10b) and (10c). 
 𝐴11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 < 𝐸11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝑆11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + �𝐺11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝑅′11,𝐹𝑌𝑗� (10b) 
 
Where 
 
𝑅′11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = �𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
11
𝑡=1
− � 𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
11
𝑡=1
− �𝐶11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝐶𝜃,𝐹𝑌𝑗�� 
(10c) 
 
It is important to recall that unused contingency funds are drawn down in the final 
month of the fiscal year through the purchase of additional S as well as additional G; 
therefore, to purchase a stockpile of R and R’, agency officials must forego the purchase 
of some level of additional S at the end of the fiscal year. 
Similar to equation (7), equation (11) shows that month 12 expenditures will 
again exceed budgetary allotments by the sum total of the contingency funds remaining 
as agency officials take up year-end spending. 
 
𝐴12,𝐹𝑌𝑗 < 𝐸12,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝑆12,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝐺12,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + ��𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 − 𝑅11,𝐹𝑌𝑗
11
𝑡=1
� (11) 
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 The notion that agency officials might stockpile additional tangible goods, in 
anticipation of a continuing resolution, leads to the first testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: When a continuing resolution is on the horizon for the coming fiscal 
year, the rate of spending on tangible goods during the final quarter of the 
terminating fiscal year will exceed the rate of spending on tangible goods for the 
corresponding timeframe when a continuing resolution will not be in effect in the 
coming fiscal year. 
 
On the final day of FYj, the sum total of allotments, expenses, and total agency 
budget would equate to each other, as can be seen in equation (12). 
 
�𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
12
𝑡=1
= �𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
12
𝑡=1
= 𝐵𝑇,𝐹𝑌𝑗  (12) 
 
 
Year two: implementation of interim continuing appropriations and ex post reaction. 
The agency will begin FYj+1 under the restrictions of an interim continuing 
resolution and must restrict spending to prior year levels.  Interim continuing 
resolutions provide for an attenuated level of operations until a specific date or until 
regular appropriations are passed.  Agencies may be instructed to limit spending to the 
lesser of the House- or Senate-approved versions of the applicable appropriations bill, 
or the previous year’s rate of spending (Pulmonte, 2011; I. Rubin, 2007; Streeter, 2008b; 
Tollestrup, 2011).  In keeping with previous findings (Hartman, 1982; Lee, et al., 2008; I. 
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Rubin, 2007; Schick, 2007; Streeter, 2008a; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004), the discussion 
will move forward under the assumption that the agency is restricted to the previous 
year’s rate of spending.  Using the agency’s prior year obligation rate, in lieu of House or 
Senate figures, simply provides a reference point for the model.  As such, month 1 
expenditures in the new fiscal year will equal the month 1 expenditures from the prior 
fiscal year, as displayed in equation (13). 
 𝐸1,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = 𝐸1,𝐹𝑌𝑗 =  𝑆1,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝐺1,𝐹𝑌𝑗  (13) 
  
The idea that agency spending, while under an interim continuing resolution, is 
tied to the previous fiscal year’s rate of spending informs the second testable 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2:  While under a continuing resolution, the rate of spending on 
tangible goods will be less than or equal to the rate of spending on tangible 
goods during corresponding periods in the fiscal year void of continuing 
resolutions. 
 
While under the constraints of an interim continuing resolution, the stockpile 
provides agency officials with a degree of spending latitude.  The spending restrictions 
allow the agency to perform at routine levels of operation but without the benefit of a 
contingency fund to offset unforeseen events.  Because of the stockpile of R11, FYj, 
however, agency officials have the flexibility to forego the purchase of G1, FYj+1 to the 
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extent that R11, FYj would offset the need for G.22  In other words, the fungible nature of 
lump-sum funding allows agency officials to shift monies previously dedicated to the 
purchase of G1, FYj+1 over to the purchase of additional S1, FYj+1, or to mitigate a minor 
emergency, while still consuming routine levels of G from the stockpile.23  If the need for 
additional S does not become pressing enough to drawdown R11, FYj, the agency would 
simply maintain R11,FYj until after Congress and the president provide regular 
appropriations. 
Assume, then, that the president signs the associated appropriations act into law 
at the end of the first month of FYj+1 and the agency is allowed to resume normal 
operations for the remainder of the fiscal year.  In keeping with a simplified discussion, 
assume further that the agency does not receive an increase in appropriations over FYj 
levels.  That is to say, the current year’s budget is equal to the prior year’s budget, as in 
equation (14). 
 𝐵𝑇,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝐵𝑇,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1  (14) 
 
The FYj+1 monthly budget allotment, for the remainder of the fiscal year, will 
increase by the amount withheld from the agency while under the restrictions of the 
continuing resolution.  Referring to equation (3a), the monthly budget allotment under 
22 Unexecuted single-year funding cannot be carried across fiscal year boundaries, but executed funding in 
the form of supply inventories can be.  Zimmerman (1976) discusses transfers between fiscal years and 
submits that “excess funds can only be ‘saved’ in the form of durable goods [and an] implication is that 
spending in the first month of the next fiscal year is curtailed since the group can maintain operations by 
consuming the durable inventories acquired in the previous year.” 
23 The shifting of expenditures mentioned above should not be confused with transfers.  The transfer of 
funds refers to the shifting of funds between appropriations which is prohibited without statutory 
authority (GAO, 2004e).  Closely related to the discussion above is the practice of reprogramming, which 
the GAO defines as a shifting of funds from one object to another within an appropriation (GAO, 2004e). 
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scenario one was computed by dividing the total agency budget by the total number of 
applicable time periods.  A similar computation applies to scenario two, but the 
aggregate FYj+1 allotment is now reduced by the amount of expenditures accrued while 
under continuing resolutions and then spread evenly across a fewer number of time 
periods, as figured in equation (15). 
 
𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 =
𝐵𝑇 − ∑ 𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
 𝐶𝑅
𝑡=1  
𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅
 (15) 
 
Where CR signifies the total number of months spent under the continuing 
resolution.   
Thus, by virtue of equation (15), the FYj+1 monthly budgetary allotment will be 
marginally higher than the FYj monthly budgetary allotment. 
 𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 > 𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 (16) 
 
In the second month of FYj+1, the allotment will continue to exceed expenditures, 
but the agency will purchase higher levels of S by curtailing the purchase of G, thereby 
making-up for services foregone in the previous fiscal year; will deplete R through 
dissaving; and will resume the accrual of C at a marginally higher level.  One may arrive 
at this notion by holding the purchase of S, in equation (4) constant at FYj levels and by 
figuring C as a deterministic percentage of At.  In so doing, one may contemplate the 
behavior of agency officials with regard to the purchase of additional amounts of S, vis-
à-vis the curtailment of G.   
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With the passage of the appropriations act, uncertainty about BT will dissipate 
and agency personnel will consume the balance of R through dissaving  which would 
preclude the need to purchase some or all of G2, FYj+1 (Balakrishnan, et al., 2007; 
Zimmerman, 1976).  Thus, funding intended for the purchase of G2, FYj+1 will then be 
diverted to either additional C2, FYj+1 or S2, FYj+1.  Using the funds to accrue additional C 
would ensure that the agency is that much more prepared to weather an unforeseen 
event.  However, the purchase of additional S presents agency officials with two 
advantages.  First, in the short-term, the consumption of additional levels of S will help 
meet operational needs of the agency through the provision of, say, additional official 
travel or employee training.  Second, in the long-term, S2, FYj+1 expenditures will be 
higher by the amount of G2, FYj+1 diverted to S2, FYj+1, and this diversion will help to 
maintain month two buying power in the event of continuing appropriations in FYj+2.   
The argument is restated below in more arithmetic terms. 
First, recall equation (4) 
 𝐴𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 (4) 
 
Assume the agency receives month two allotment, A2, FYj+1, which will be 
marginally higher than A1, FYj, subject to equations (13) and (14) 
 𝐴2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = 𝑆2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 + 𝐺2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 + 𝐶2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 (17a) 
Assuming: 
 𝑆2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = 𝑆2,𝐹𝑌𝑗 (17b) 
 𝐺2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = 0, as the agency depletes 𝑅11,𝐹𝑌𝑗through dissaving. (17c) 
 𝐶2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1= a fixed nominal percentage of 𝐴2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1  (17d) 
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Agency officials must now determine how best to use the funds originally 
intended for the purchase of G2, FYj+1.  Accruing additional levels of C places the 
organization in a much better position to mitigate minor emergencies.  However, 
referring to equation (5b), additional accrual of C will cause E2, FYj to exceed E2, FYj+1.  
Should the agency be subject to continuing resolutions in FYj+2, organizational 
expenditures will be limited to the E2, FYj+1 level.  Therefore, it benefits the agency to 
purchase additional S2, FYj+1 using the unencumbered G2, FYj+1 funding.  It follows, then, 
that S2, FYj+1 expenditures will be approximately equal to the sum total of S2, FYj and G2, FYj, 
as in equation (17e). 
 𝑆2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 ≈ 𝑆2,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝐺2,𝐹𝑌𝑗  (17e) 
 
This line of reasoning leads to two hypotheses that are inversely related. 
Hypothesis 3a: The average rate of spending on service-type activities during the 
period immediately following the termination of a continuing resolution will 
exceed the average rate of spending on service-type activities goods during a 
corresponding period of a fiscal year void of continuing resolutions.  
Hypothesis 3b: The average rate of spending on tangible goods during the period 
immediately following the termination of a continuing resolution will be less than 
the average rate of spending on tangible goods during a corresponding period of 
a fiscal year void of continuing resolutions.  
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Having depleted R11, FYj, agency officials will resume routine spending patterns.  
Assuming the FYj+2 appropriations are approved in a timely manner, spending in months 
three through eleven, represented by equations (18a) and (18b) will closely resemble 
spending in equations (9a) and (9b). 
 
�𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
11
𝑡=3
−�𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
11
𝑡=3
= �𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
11
𝑡=3
= �𝑆𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
11
𝑡=3
+ �𝐺𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
11
𝑡=3
 (18a) 
 
 
�𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
11
𝑡=3
> �𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
11
𝑡=3
 (18b) 
 
Similar to equation (11), expenditures in the final month of FYj+1 will exceed 
budgetary allotments as the organization attends to year-end spending, as in equation 
(19). 
 
𝐴12,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 < 𝐸12,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = 𝑆12,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 + 𝐺12,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 + ��𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 − 𝑅11,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
11
𝑡=1
� (19) 
 
As in equation (12), the agency will have fully executed its total annual budget by 
the final day of the fiscal year, and allotments and expenditures should equal the 
agency’s total budget per equation (20).   
 
�𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
12
𝑡=1
= �𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
12
𝑡=1
= 𝐵𝑇,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1  (20) 
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Year three: routine occurrence of interim continuing appropriations. 
Between 1952 and 2010, Congress and the president enacted all regular 
appropriations on only four occasions: 1977, 1989, 1995, and 1997.  While continuing 
resolutions are not applied in a blanket fashion, federal agencies ordinarily spend the 
first four months of the fiscal year under the restrictions of a continuing resolution 
(Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b; Tollestrup, 2011).  Thus, it is highly likely that a 
federal agency will, at some point, endure consecutive fiscal years under the restraints 
of a continuing appropriations act.  For this reason, it is necessary to widen the temporal 
scope by one more fiscal year to improve the relevance of the model. 
As before, assume that agency officials learn of a budget impasse during the 
third quarter of the fiscal year.  Once again, they ascertain that the organization will 
open the fiscal year, this time FYj+2, under a continuing resolution.  Depending on their 
preferences for risk, officials might pursue one of two courses of action.  Those 
managers who are risk averse might choose, once more, to stockpile a reserve of 
tangible goods to offset the uncertainty inherent with continuing appropriations.  Under 
this approach, ceteris paribus, equations (9a) through (20) would apply, ad infinitum. 
On the other hand, those managers who are risk neutral or risk seeking, viewing 
FYj+1 in retrospect, may come to the conclusion that the practice of stockpiling a reserve 
of tangible goods presents little, if any, benefit to the organization.  While the purchase 
of R11,FYj had the effect of shifting expenses from one fiscal year to another, the strategy 
merely delayed the consumption of tangible goods for a brief time and forced agency 
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officials to defer service-type expenditures.  According to this line of thought, the end 
result for the organization is a zero-sum gain and, holding all else equal, equations (6a) 
through (8) would eventually prevail. 
 
Discussion 
The applicability of the model hinges on the fungible nature of the organization’s 
resources.  In other words, the model is applicable to the extent that an organization is 
able to substitute one type of funding for another.  Base assumption one presumes that 
the organization is funded with a lump-sum appropriation.  It follows that discretion 
regarding the use of organizational funding lies with agency officials.  The lump-sum 
assumption, then, begs the degree to which the federal government is funded in this 
fashion. 
Lump-sum appropriations 
Over time, the need for lump-sum appropriations has evolved to the point at 
which most discretionary federal expenditures are, indeed, carried-out using lump-sum 
appropriations.  Up until the twentieth century, it was quite common for the House 
Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committees to rely upon line-item 
appropriations to mandate explicitly how agencies were to spend federal dollars.  As the 
government grew in size and complexity, Congress began to group individual items into 
broader classifications of execution; in consequence, lump-sum appropriations arose 
out of necessity.  Presently, the majority of appropriation accounts in the federal budget 
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are funded via lump-sum appropriations.24  In fact, the federal budget is comprised of 
more than 1,000 appropriation accounts, 200 of which account for more than 90 
percent of discretionary federal expenditures (GAO, 2004e; Schick, 2007).   
In this way, Congress recognizes the organizational need for both money and 
administrative discretion to carry-out daily operations.  As alluded to in footnote 6, 
many federal agencies are appropriated a single Supplies and Expenses account which is 
often labeled Operating Expenses or Operation and Maintenance and is to be used for 
daily operating expenses (GAO, 2004e; Schick, 2007).  Furthermore, as the steward of 
the nation’s purse, Congress purposefully accords executive agencies a measure of 
flexibility with regard to budget execution.  The following excerpt from a 1975 
Comptroller General decision regarding the U.S. Navy’s use of Defense Appropriations 
and the Navy’s interpretation of the associated conference report, exemplifies the 
Government Accountability Office position concerning the legal parameters of lump-
sum appropriations (GAO, 2004e). 
“Congress has recognized that in most instances it is desirable to 
maintain flexibility to shift around funds within a particular lump-sum 
appropriation account so that agencies can make necessary adjustments 
for ‘unforeseen developments, changing requirements, … and legislation 
enacted subsequent to appropriations’ (GAO, 2004e).” 
24 An appropriation account such as the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation account is the 
basic unit of an appropriation (i.e., the Operation and Maintenance Appropriation or the Salaries and 
Expenses Appropriation).  In general, an appropriation reflects each unnumbered paragraph in an 
appropriation act which is the document signed into law by the president (GAO, 2005a). 
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By that same token, the Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of detailed 
statutory language, decisions related to the allocation of funding within a lump-sum 
appropriation are a matter of agency discretion.  The case of Lincoln v. Vigil concerned 
the Indian Health Service’s discontinuation of a program of clinical services for 
handicapped children in the Southwest in order to establish a nationwide treatment 
program.  The Court was called upon to decide whether the agency was legally 
permitted to discontinue the program without seeking judicial review.  In its ruling, the 
Court noted that, 
“The very point of a lump-sum appropriation is to give an agency the 
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet its statutory 
responsibilities in what it sees as the most effective or desirable way 
(GAO, 2004e; U.S. Supreme Court, 1993).” 
 
Therefore, base assumption one is a very realistic and feasible assumption which 
need not be relaxed in order for the model to remain applicable.  From the argument 
above, it is apparent that lump-sum appropriations represent a significant portion of the 
federal budget.  Moreover, the legislature not only recognizes the need for agency 
discretion but also condones administrative flexibility by structuring appropriations in 
such a way as to facilitate the fungibility of resources.  In addition, the Supreme Court 
added legal precedence to the notion that agency officials are perfectly within legal 
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parameters when exercising administrative discretion over the use of lump-sum 
appropriations. 
Line-item appropriations 
Still, one may realistically relax base assumption one by introducing line-item 
appropriations. While lump-sum appropriations cover a broad number of programs, 
projects, or items, line-item appropriations are available only for the specific item 
described in the appropriation act (GAO, 2004e).  To the extent that legislators desire to 
restrict funding or seek to minimize agency discretion with regard to the execution of 
federal monies, Congress can and will issue line-item appropriations.  The Comptroller 
General’s 1975 opinion cited previously also includes a sentiment about Congress’s 
prerogative to regulate agency spending. 
“When Congress does not intend to permit agency flexibility, but intends 
to impose a legally binding restriction on an agency’s use of funds, it does 
so by means of explicit statutory language (GAO, 2004e).” 
 
In addition to line-item restrictions, Congress may also delimit spending by way 
of provisions in authorization acts or via reference instructions found in conference 
reports (GAO, 2004e).  Correspondingly, the model above is expected to break down to 
the extent that agency officials are unable to exercise administrative discretion.  
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Earmarks 
A less binding type of restriction that may have similar effects on the model is a 
congressional earmark.  Before going forward, however, it may be helpful to make a 
distinction between line-item appropriations and earmarks.  While the terms earmark 
and line-item are often used synonymously, the two designations are conceptually 
different when used in the context of appropriations.  Recall that a line-item 
appropriation is a distinct sum of money dedicated toward a specific purpose.  An 
earmark, however, is an amount of funding within a lump-sum appropriation (GAO, 
2004e, 2005a); a specific spending item which will benefit constituents, written into the 
bill at the request of a member(s) of Congress (Lazarus & Steigerwalt, 2009).  The former 
is an appropriation in and of itself, while the latter is a subunit of a lump-sum 
appropriation.   
Congress may wish to designate part of a lump-sum appropriation for a 
particular purpose.  Using earmarks, the legislature may specify maximum and/or 
minimum levels of spending with regard to certain objects.  In relation to the model, 
Congress could stipulate that within the Salaries and Expenses appropriation the agency 
may spend “not more than” a given dollar amount on office supplies.  Referring to 
equation (10), a ceiling-type earmark would limit the ability of agency officials to 
stockpile semi-durable goods which would cause the model to fail.   
It is important to note, however, that a maximum earmark does not imply that 
funding must be spent on the object in question.  That is to say, funding not used for the 
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express purpose stated in the earmark may be applied elsewhere within the 
appropriation (GAO, 2004e).  In the hypothetical example given, if the funding is not 
used for the purchase of office supplies it may be used to purchase small equipment. 
Multi-year appropriations 
 Not all lump-sum appropriations are limited to a single-year of availability; in 
fact, there are several types of lump-sum appropriations which operate under multi-
year budget authority.  Research and development funds are available for two fiscal 
years, procurement funding is available for three, and construction and shipbuilding 
monies are available for five years (Schick, 2007).   
Base assumption two refers to the lapsing of budgets and the inability of 
agencies to carry unobligated funding across fiscal year boundaries.  By considering the 
possible effects of an interim continuing resolution on the obligation behavior of agency 
officials managing a multi-year appropriation, it is possible to explore what might 
happen with the easing of base assumption two.  
  Some agencies have reported that having multiyear budget authority helps to 
mitigate the effects of continuing resolutions on agency spending behavior.  GAO 
(2009b) conducted a case study of six federal agencies to evaluate the effects of 
continuing appropriations on federal agencies.25  When queried, managers of multi-year 
appropriations noted that the ability to carry unspent funding across fiscal year 
25 The six agencies included in the GAO case study were:  (1) Administration for Children and Families and 
(2) Food and Drug Administration, which fall under the Department of Health and Human Services; (3) 
Veterans Health Administration and (4) Veterans Benefit Administration under the Department of 
Veterans Affairs; and under the Department of Justice, (5) Bureau of Prisons and (6) Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (GAO, 2009b; Pulmonte, 2011). 
105 
 
                                                     
boundaries alleviated the need to obligate funding before year-end, and provided less of 
an incentive to acquire lower priority items which could be obtained quickly.   
To illustrate the point, imagine a continuing appropriations act which lasts for 
five months (i.e., October thru February).  Such a resolution would leave an agency 
funded with a single-year appropriation with only seven months remaining in the fiscal 
year (i.e., April to September) to execute the remainder of its budget.  In contrast, an 
agency funded with a two-year appropriation, subject to the same CR, would have 
another 19 months before the end of its fiscal cycle (i.e., April to September, plus the 
whole of the second fiscal year).  In essence, multi-year appropriations may help to 
reduce distortions in year-end spending which are brought about by a compressed fiscal 
timeframe. 
To determine if a multi-year appropriation would produce similar benefits or 
disadvantages in the context of the model requires asking whether: (1) an extended 
fiscal cycle would preclude the need to stockpile additional tangible goods in light of an 
impending interim continuing resolution; (2) a multi-year appropriation would mitigate 
spending restrictions in a manner that would relieve agency officials of having to abide 
by the previous fiscal year’s obligation rate; and (3) agency personnel would refrain 
from consuming a superfluous stockpile of tangible goods on account of multi-year 
appropriations.  One can explore each of these questions, in turn, through a comparison 
of the spending behavior of a single-year- and a multi-year agency over the course of 
four fiscal years. 
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 Assume that Congress funds Agency A with a single-year lump-sum 
appropriation and Agency B via a two-year lump-sum appropriation; that is, Agency A’s 
funding is valid for 12 months and Agency B’s funding is valid for 24 months.  Assume 
further that the first and second fiscal years, FYj and FYj+1, pass without the occurrence 
of a continuing appropriations act.  Now, suppose that Congress implements a 
continuing resolution at the outset of FYj+2.  Since the close-out of FYj+1 signals the end 
of the fiscal cycle for both agencies, officials in both organizations would be subject to 
spending restrictions in FYj+2.  Consequently, the model predicts that officials in both 
agencies would engage in stockpiling of tangible goods; therefore, hypothesis one is 
expected to hold. 
 To address the notion of obligation rate restrictions, imagine that the continuing 
resolution lasts for six months.  While under the constraint of continuing appropriations, 
agencies would be instructed to obligate funding at a rate no greater than the previous 
fiscal year.  Aside from an extended fiscal cycle, there is nothing inherently special about 
multi-year appropriations which would exempt Agency B from having to abide by the 
spending limitations.  Indeed, the substance of the GAO report cited above suggests that 
officials responsible for multi-year appropriations were held to the same restrictive 
standard as those officials managing single-year appropriations.  While both agencies 
are under the restrictions of a continuing resolution, the obligation rates for both 
agencies should not differ from the organizational mean by a statistically significant 
amount; therefore, hypothesis two is predicted to hold. 
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 Assume the Congress and the president come to final agreement on the FYj+2 
budget, and the continuing resolution is lifted on the final day of March in FYj+2, leaving 
6 months for Agency A to execute its budget and Agency B with eighteen months to 
execute appropriations.  Assuming no crises happen that would compel either agency to 
consume stockpile balances during the period under continuing resolution, there is 
nothing to suggest that agency officials would not follow the spending behavior detailed 
in equations (17a-e).  One would expect to find a curtailment of spending on tangible 
goods consistent with Zimmerman (1976) and Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West 
(2007); therefore, hypothesis three is predicted to hold. 
 Finally, if a continuing resolution is passed in FYj+3, Agency A would be subject to 
spending restrictions, whereas Agency B would be in the second year of its fiscal cycle 
operating under an already approved budget.  The cycle for both agencies would begin 
anew with the arrival of FYj+4.  Because multi-year appropriations are only subject to the 
restrictions of a continuing resolution during the transition to a new budget cycle, 
continuing appropriations should have an effect only when the transition to a new fiscal 
year coincides with the passage of a continuing appropriations act. 
Conclusion 
Leland (1968) pioneered the notion of precautionary demand for saving.  
Zimmerman (1976) applied Leland’s ideas in a nonprofit setting to find that budget 
and/or expenditure uncertainty led to the establishment of contingency funds and the 
saving of durable inventory as a means of transferring organizational resources across 
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fiscal year boundaries.  The approach in this chapter seeks to build on Zimmerman’s 
efforts through a theoretical discussion of ex ante and ex post modifications in 
expenditure behavior of federal agency officials faced with the uncertainty of spending 
restrictions. 
 A simplified arithmetic model of agency spending behavior illustrates that 
officials managing federal agencies, which are funded via lump-sum appropriations, will 
stockpile additional levels of tangible goods in anticipation of the spending restrictions 
that come with interim continuing resolutions.  The additional stockpiling of tangible 
goods will be used to offset the uncertainty that accompanies continuing resolutions 
and will afford agency officials a measure of spending latitude while the agency is under 
restraint during the first part of a new fiscal year.  After the federal budget passes and 
the continuing resolution terminates, agency officials will consume the stockpile while 
applying unencumbered funding to other needs of the organization. 
 An extended discussion regarding the applicability of the model suggests that 
the model may be suitable not only to single-year lump-sum appropriations but also to 
those lump-sum appropriations with multi-year availability.  However, the model seems 
to fail when Congress seeks to govern discretion of agency officials by way of line-item 
restrictions, provisos, or earmarks.  Notwithstanding that limitation, the majority of 
discretionary federal expenditures are carried-out using lump-sum appropriations so the 
model may still prove useful in a federal setting. 
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 Given the preceding theoretical exploration of modifications in expenditure 
behavior, the discussion will now turn toward quantitative analyses of federal budget 
data.   The next two chapters reflect an attempt to determine: (1) which factors account 
for the modifications in organizational expenditure behavior as agency officials 
compensate for restrictions on federal spending, and (2) which econometric methods 
might one use to reveal the expenditure behavior of agency officials under said 
spending constraints. 
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Chapter Five 
Continuing Resolutions:  Evidence of Expense Shifting in Federal Contract and Supply 
Spending 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore quantitatively the influence of 
continuing resolutions on monthly federal spending patterns at the agency level.  More 
specifically, the analysis involves the application of event study methods to a subset of 
federal obligations to demonstrate how federal agency officials adjust monthly 
expenditure behavior to compensate for the uncertainty that accompanies continuing 
appropriations.  This study provides not only another example of the applicability of 
broadly applied event study methods but also a quantitative measure of the ability of 
the federal budget and resource management community to adjust to new information.   
 Findings reveal evidence of ex ante and ex post modifications to spending 
behavior as a result of the implementation of continuing resolutions.  When stopgap 
measures are on the horizon for the coming fiscal year, federal organizations increase 
the purchase rates on contract services and supplies three months prior to the end of 
the terminating fiscal year, beyond the levels normally purchased when continuing 
resolutions are not a concern.  Further, while short-term spending restrictions are in 
effect, agencies do not deviate from normal monthly expenditure patterns in a 
statistically significant fashion.  After the budget is passed and continuing resolutions 
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are lifted, however, it takes approximately two months for obligation rates to return to 
a normal state.   
The results highlight: (1) the ability of the federal resource management 
community to adjust to new information; (2) the continued used of baseline budgeting 
techniques; and (3) the presence of signaling mechanisms between higher echelons of 
the federal government and subordinate agencies.  The findings also raise concerns 
about expense shifting vis-à-vis federal appropriations law and the bona fide needs rule. 
The next section offers a brief discussion of event study methods and the 
attendant hypotheses, followed by a description of the data.  Afterward comes 
presentation of the econometric model of choice and event study estimation methods.  
The results section houses estimation and post-estimation findings, and the chapter 
closes with implications and conclusions.  
 
Event studies 
Recall from the discussion section of chapter three that event studies seek to 
determine whether a particular event influences a subsequent outcome (Wooldridge, 
2009).  Since Fama and colleagues’ (1969) seminal work on the connection between 
stock prices and anticipated stock splits, event study methods have been applied 
broadly to topics such as motor carrier deregulation by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (Rose, 1985); municipal bankruptcy in Orange County, California (Denison, 
2000); effects of the Food Stamp Program on work incentives (H. W. Hoynes & 
112 
 
Schanzenbach, 2012); birth weight improvements in neonatal mortality (Almond, et al., 
2010); and implementation of the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, 
and Children (H. Hoynes, et al., 2011). 
 In the context of this chapter, event study methods are used to explore the link 
between the implementation of a continuing resolution and the modification of agency 
expenditure behavior.  In the same way the investment community anticipates stock 
splits, the federal government’s resource management community may be able to 
anticipate the likelihood of continuing resolutions.  Federal budget process literature 
suggests two points in the congressional budget process which associated agency 
personnel may monitor for signals regarding the implementation of continuing 
appropriations acts: (1) the congressional budget resolution, and (2) the hearings of the 
appropriations committees.  
 Regarding the first point, Congress establishes budgetary boundaries by 
allocating budget authority and outlays among House and Senate committees via the 
congressional budget resolution.  The current congressional budget process prescribes a 
date of April 15 for adoption of the congressional budget resolution, but the reader will 
recall from Table 2.5 that the resolution rarely passes by that date.  Thus, the amount of 
delay in the adoption of the resolution may be an indicator of the level of budgetary 
conflict (Schick, 2007) and a sign of impending continuing resolutions. 
 With respect to the second point, appropriations move through Congress in a 
structured manner as a result of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.  The House is 
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scheduled to begin consideration of appropriations bills early in June and the Senate 
soon thereafter; sometimes consideration happens concurrently.  The bills may pass the 
House and Senate by the end of June and may be deliberated upon by conference 
committees as early as July.  Federal agencies and the Office of Management and 
Budget maintain close tabs on appropriations committees and the progress of 
appropriations bills, and often are informed of committee intentions prior to the filing 
of the committee report.  In fact, agencies may appeal to Senate Appropriations 
Committees before the House completes its work (Schick, 1980, 2007).  Aside from the 
congressional budgetary process and any established lines of communication between 
Congress, OMB, and the departments, the committees on appropriations for both the 
House and the Senate maintain websites updating the general public on the progress 
and status of appropriations legislation (U.S. House of Representatives, 2012; U.S. 
Senate, 2012).   
It stands to reason that agency officials with access to such information may seek 
ways to generate supplemental spending latitude for themselves in the event of 
expenditure restrictions in the coming fiscal year.  By purchasing additional supplies and 
contract services during the final months of the terminating fiscal year, agency officials 
free-up funding in the coming fiscal year when stopgap measures will impose an upper 
limit on expenditures.  Thus, dollars that would have been used for the purchase of 
supplies and contracts in the new fiscal year can be applied toward other factors of 
input, if necessary. (Appendix A provides a list of expenditure categories.) 
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To be clear, the increase in contract service purchases and supply expenditures is 
not to be confused with the normal year-end rush to spend unobligated funding.  
Rather, the associated increase is reflective of a shift between expenditure categories.  
This practice amounts to a concerted effort to forego certain expenditures in favor of 
stockpiling additional supplies and the like during the terminating fiscal year as a way to 
free-up funding in the approaching fiscal year.  For example, in any given fiscal year 
agency personnel might devote X-amount to contract services and supplies and Y-
amount to all other expenditures at the end of the fiscal year.  When a continuing 
resolution is on the fiscal horizon, agency personnel would then purchase X+ε of 
contract services and supplies and Y-ε in all other goods and services.  By increasing 
stockpiles of contract services and supplies, agency personnel effectively shift expenses 
from the upcoming fiscal year to the terminating fiscal year, thereby unencumbering 
future monies and providing the agency with additional spending latitude while under 
the constraints of a continuing resolution.  The following hypothesis is suggestive of that 
approach: 
Hypothesis 1: When a continuing resolution is on the fiscal horizon for the coming 
fiscal year, the rate of spending on contract services and supplies during the final 
quarter of the terminating fiscal year will exceed the rate of spending on contract 
services and supplies for the corresponding timeframe when a continuing 
resolution will not be in effect in the coming fiscal year. 
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While the standard provisions of continuing resolutions and the Antideficiency 
Act are designed to constrain spending, associated funding should be sufficient to 
enable operations at mildly attenuated levels.  Organizations are most often instructed 
to maintain a rate of operations less than or equal to that of the prior fiscal year (GAO, 
2009b; Schick, 2007; Streeter, 2008a; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004) and continuing 
resolutions provide a commensurate level of funding to ensure such restrictions.  In 
addition, continuing appropriations cannot be used to fund new initiatives and this “no 
new starts” criterion prohibits agencies from entering into new contractual 
arrangements or from funding projects that were not being executed in the prior fiscal 
year.  Even agencies that spend at higher rates under normal operating conditions are 
prohibited from doing so under a continuing resolution.  At the same time, the 
Antideficiency Act generally prohibits federal employees from incurring obligations or 
making outlays in excess of appropriations (GAO, 2004e; Pulmonte, 2011).  This line of 
thought leads to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:  While under a continuing resolution, the rate of spending on 
contract services and supplies will be less than or equal to the rate of spending on 
contract services and supplies during corresponding periods in the fiscal year void 
of continuing resolutions. 
   
Contradictory reasoning makes it difficult to determine, a priori, agency 
expenditure behavior immediately after a continuing resolution is lifted.  On one hand, 
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agencies emerging from spending restrictions may have fallen behind budgetary 
schedules and may try to catch up to spending plans by increasing obligation rates.  
Such an approach would yield a positive sign on coefficients associated with ex post 
expenditure activity.  On the other hand, ex post coefficients may assume a negative 
sign if organizations delay obligations to allow sufficient time for appropriations to filter 
through bureaucratic channels, or if expenditure patterns follow a saving-dissaving 
model similar to Zimmerman (1976) and Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West (2007).  
The third hypothesis proposes dissaving behavior after budget approval: 
Hypothesis 3: The average rate of spending on contract services and supplies 
during the period immediately following the termination of a continuing 
resolution will be less than the average rate of spending on contract services and 
supplies during a corresponding period of a fiscal year void of continuing 
resolutions. 
 
The Data 
 The data consist of an unbalanced panel of 3,768 monthly obligations from the 
Department of the Army and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).  
The data span eight fiscal years and are combined with continuing resolution 
information contained in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, and the 
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act under which the NARA is 
classified as an Independent Agency. 
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With regard to Department of the Army obligation data, Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) requests went unanswered initially.  Fortunately, Army data were provided 
upon informal request from an Army resource management office and pertain to the 
Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation account which provides 
operational funding for the U.S. Army to organize, equip, and train its forces.   
Several other FOIA requests for data were made using the online resources 
available at www.FOIA.gov.  Thus far, requests have been sent to seven federal 
agencies:  (1) Department of Commerce, (2) Department of Treasury, (3) Environmental 
Protection Agency and related regional offices, (4) Federal Labor Relations Authority, (5) 
Merit Systems Protection Board, (6) National Archives and Records Administration, and 
(7) Office of Management and Budget.  
Of the seven agencies queried, only the National Archives and Records 
Administration provided useful data in a timely fashion.  NARA provided seven years of 
budgetary obligation data pertaining to fiscal years 2006-2012 in Microsoft Excel format.  
The expenditure data included fiscal year, month, object class, dollar amount obligated, 
and number of full-time equivalent personnel employed per annum.  Accordingly, this 
data will be used to verify the validity of the proposed model and estimation methods. 
The Environmental Protection Agency also responded affirmatively to the FOIA 
request.  The Agency agreed to provide the requested data after receiving assurance of 
payment for the requested dataset, and personnel in the EPA’s Office of the Chief 
118 
 
Financial Officer are assisting in the matter; however, as of the date of this dissertation, 
the data were still being compiled. 
Two other agencies answered the FOIA requests with aggregated data which 
does not provide sufficient detail for analysis.  The Merit Systems Protection Board 
referenced its Fiscal Year 2012 Congressional Budget Justification and the Federal Labor 
Relations Authority offered its Performance Budget Submission to Congress for fiscal 
years 2012, 2013, and 2014.  On both accounts, the references offered were press 
release documents containing aggregate figures which are of insufficient detail for this 
research project.  Both agencies recommended using the FOIA appeals process if the 
data provided did not meet expectations. 
 The NARA obligation data pertain to NARA’s Salaries and Expenses (S&E) 
appropriation.  Congress commonly provides federal agencies funding for general 
operating expenses by way of S&E appropriations and it is important to note that the 
funding contained in the OMA appropriation account is equivalent to the funding 
contained in the lump-sum S&E appropriation (GAO, 2004d, 2004e; Schick, 2007).   
Presently, the majority of appropriation accounts in the discretionary federal 
budget are funded via lump-sum appropriations.26  In fact, the federal budget is 
comprised of more than 1,000 appropriation accounts, 200 of which account for more 
than 90 percent of discretionary federal expenditures (GAO, 2004e; Schick, 2007).  
26 An appropriation account such as the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation account is the 
basic unit of an appropriation (i.e., the Operation and Maintenance Appropriation).  In general, an 
appropriation reflects each unnumbered paragraph in an appropriation act which is the document signed 
into law by the president (GAO, 2005a). 
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Accordingly, expenditure patterns associated with the OMA and NARA S&E 
appropriation account may be representative of expenditure patterns contained in the 
Salaries and Expense appropriations of other federal agencies. 
The obligations cover contract services and supply spending from fiscal years 
2005 to 2012 and are related to eight spending categories which fall under the heading 
of contract services and supplies:  (1) travel of persons; (2) transportation of things; (3) 
rents, communications, and utilities; (4) printing and reproduction; (5) contract services; 
(6) supplies and materials; (7) service charges; and (8) contract personnel and indirect 
hire foreign nationals (DFAS, 2012).  Appendix A provides a categorical list of 
expenditure categories as compiled by the OMB.  
 With regard to the structure of the data, the Army obligations data are less 
aggregated than the NARA data.   While the NARA monthly data are aggregated at the 
agency level, the Army data are more granular in nature thus contributing another 
organizational level of detail known as Subactivity Group or SAG (Appendix B provides a 
detailed listing of U.S. Army Operation and Maintenance Subactivity Groups).  In the 
same fashion that Maneuver Units (SAG 111) or Central Supply Activities (SAG 422) are 
subactivity groups of the Department of the Army, the National Archives and Records 
Administration can be thought of as a subactivity group of Independent Agencies 
subsumed within the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations.  For 
this reason, NARA obligations were assigned a pseudo-SAG (SAG 500) to ensure 
consistency within the dataset.   
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Further, for time series analysis Wooldridge (2009) recommends converting 
nominal dollars to real dollars by way of an index such as the Index of Industrial 
Production (IIP) used in the Economic Report of the President.  Accordingly, obligations 
herein are measured in millions and were converted to real 2007 dollars using the 
Consumer Price Index. 
 As displayed in Table 5.1, the average monthly contract service and supply 
obligation was $111.8 million positively skewed with a median value of $16.9 million.  
However, the data are distorted by $21.5 billion of obligations during the month of 
September 2007 in the SAG labeled “Additional Activities.”  This year-end spending 
spike coincides with the 2007 troop surge associated with the war in Iraq and is 
associated with supplemental funding provided by Congress for the war effort (Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller: Army 
Budget, 2007).  Without the obligations in the Additional Activities SAG, the data 
remains positively skewed with a median of $15.9 million but with a much lower mean 
of $52.5 million (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
Table 5.1:  Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Contract Services & 
Supplies (in millions) $111.8 $16.9 $523.8 -$199.3 $19,940.4 
Total Contract Services & 
Supplies (less: Addit’l Activities) $52.5 $15.9 $106.1 -$199.3 $1,375.6 
Personnel 11,627 2,680 29,890 23 189,749 
Number of observations: 3,768 
 
One may also take notice of the minimum obligation of -$199.3 million (refer to 
Table 5.1).  An obligation is a legal requirement to pay for some good or service, while 
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disbursements involve the outlay of funds (Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller), 2011).  Since an obligation can signify a promise to pay at a future date, 
they are often recorded and then adjusted for various reasons; adjustments can be 
made because the actual disbursement of funds has not yet taken place.  For instance, 
an erroneously recorded obligation may be reversed in a subsequent month and then 
properly documented elsewhere.  Consequently, 170 negative observations drop from 
the estimation on account of the application of the log-linear model introduced later in 
the chapter. 
 While NARA included personnel figures with agency obligation data, U.S. Army 
personnel data were retrieved from the OMA [budget] Justification Books available on 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA 
FM&C) website.  Since the Justification Books maintained on the ASA FM&C website are 
preliminary budget estimates subject to Department of Defense markup and revision, 
the figures pertaining to the corresponding fiscal year are only estimates.  To obtain 
actual figures for a given fiscal year, one must refer to the Budget Estimate two years 
hence.  For example, the actual fiscal year 2011 obligations are contained in the fiscal 
year 2013 Budget Estimate Submission (BES).  The personnel totals include both military 
end-strength and civilian full-time equivalents (Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Financial Management and Comptroller: Army Budget, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
122 
 
 Continuing resolution data originated with Congressional Research Service 
reports detailing the occurrence of stopgap measures and were reconciled with 
appropriations acts associated with each of the fiscal years included in the analysis.  
Streeter (2008b) and Pulmonte (2011) provide a general timeline of continuing 
resolutions from 1977-2010, while appropriations acts provide the actual dates upon 
which the president signed the acts into law.   
During the period of analysis, the DoD was under the constraint of interim 
continuing appropriations on four occasions:  the first two months of fiscal year 2006 
(i.e., October and November of 2005); the first two months of fiscal year 2008 (October 
and November of 2007); the first three months of fiscal year 2010 (October, November, 
and December of 2009); and the first seven months of fiscal year 2011 (October 2010-
April 2011) ("DoD Appropriations Act, 2009," 2009; "DoD & Full-Year Continuing 
Approprations Act, 2011," 2011; "DoD Appropriations Act," 2005; "DoD Appropriations 
Act," 2007; "DoD Appropriations Act, 2008," 2008; "DoD Appropriations Act, 2010," 
2010; "Military QoL & VA Appropriations Act," 2006).  
By contrast, NARA was subject to either interim- or full-year continuing 
resolutions during each year of the analysis.  The agency was under the constraints of 
interim resolutions during the first two months of fiscal year 2006; the first three 
months of fiscal year 2008; the first six months of fiscal year 2009; and the first three 
months of fiscal years 2010 and 2012.  The agency was also under the constraints of a 
full-year continuing resolution in fiscal years 2007 and 2011.  
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 Fama and colleagues (1969) event study market model controls for the 
relationship between an individual stock and the market at large by incorporating the 
returns of a broad market portfolio (J. J. Binder, 1998).  To control for a similar 
relationship between the agencies under study and the federal government at large, the 
estimation relies on the monthly outlays of the federal government as reported in the 
Monthly Treasury Statement compiled by the Financial Management Service Bureau of 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Financial Management Service, 2013). 
 
Econometric models & estimation methods 
 Because of the temporal ordering of the data, time series methods of analysis 
and estimation are necessary.  More precisely, event study methodologies serve to 
isolate the effects of continuing resolutions on spending behavior.  Having already 
indexed the data, a few pre-estimation procedures help to ensure accurate estimation.   
First, Figure 5.1 reveals a stationary time series process with a sharp change in 
spending behavior in fiscal year 2007.  A stationary process refers to the temporal 
stability of the data such that the joint probability distribution of the data remains 
unchanged as the data move forward through time (Wooldridge, 2009); the data still 
appear stationary without the September 2007 year-end obligation data (see Figure 
5.2).  Indeed, a Fisher-type unit root test with the Phillips-Perron option confirms a 
stationary process, so one may rule out the presence of a time trend in the data; in 
other words, contract services and supply obligations do not seem to have grown over 
time. 
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Next, monthly time series data often exhibit seasonal patterns and NARA and 
OMA spending tends to abide by those expectations.  For instance, McCaffery and 
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Mutty (1999) find that all three branches of the U.S. Military (i.e., the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force) and the Department of Defense exhibit cyclical spending patterns that 
coincide with the advent of the new fiscal year, year-end close-out, and the receipt of 
quarterly funding allotments from the Office of Management and Budget.  They find 
that over the course of the fiscal year, obligations are highest during the months of 
October and September.  The letting of new contracts is the impetus for elevated 
expenditures at the beginning of the fiscal year, while the rush to spend unobligated 
funds before year-end drives September obligation rates.  In addition, obligation rates 
also tend to increase in January, April, and July when funding allotments arrive.  With 
regard to expenditure patterns at U.S. Army Hospitals, Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and 
West (2007) also find a year-end peak in spending patterns but they find the lowest 
obligation rate in October.   
Correspondingly, a cycle plot of the contract services and supply obligations by 
month shows the routine increase in spending at the end of the fiscal year (see Figure 
5.3).  Removing the obligations associated with supplemental funding uncovers higher 
spending during the first and fourth quarters of the fiscal year (Figure 5.4).  Dummy 
variables are, therefore, incorporated to control for seasonality and October serves as 
the base month. 
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Because the current period’s budget and obligation rate may be a linear function 
of budgets and obligation rates from previous periods, a lagged dependent variable is 
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necessary for an accurate specification of the model.  The use of lagged dependent 
variables, however, may lead to inconsistent estimators if the error term follows a 
stable autoregressive model.  For that reason, one must also test for the presence of 
serial correlation between the error term and the regressors.  A Bruesch-Godfrey test 
for AR(q) serial correlation, which regresses ordinary least squares residuals on the 
general regressors, reveals the presence of fourth-order serial correlation. 
Using a lagged dependent variable also introduces endogeneity to the equation, 
so instrumental variables are compulsory for proper estimation.  Since the correct 
methods call for estimation of a large-N panel, autocorrelation within individual SAGs 
but not between them, and explanatory variables that are not strictly exogenous, the 
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data approach should be 
appropriate for estimating the following log-linear model: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔�𝐶𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠� � = ∝0+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑅𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠)𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝐿𝑜𝑔�
𝐶𝑆𝑆
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠� �𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 +
−30
𝑗=−1
2
𝑗=−3
𝛿𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝑢𝑡  
Where: 
CSS = Contract services & supplies obligations per SAG by month 
Pers = Annual number of personnel per SAG, to include civilian full-time 
equivalents and military end-strength. 
 (CSS/Pers) = The ratio of contract services and supplies obligations per SAG to 
associated personnel (i.e., contract services and supply expenditures per 
employee) expressed in logarithmic form. 
The dependent variable is also lagged for 30 periods.  This structure controls for 
autocorrelation during the first four periods and provides for correct 
specification of the model as determined in post estimation. 
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CR = Indicator variable for continuing resolutions equal to 1 if there is a 
continuing resolution in effect and zero otherwise.   
The CR variable is lagged by three periods and led by two periods to detect ex 
ante and ex post effects of spending restrictions. 
Outlays = Monthly outlays of the U.S. Treasury expressed in logarithmic form 
Month = Indicator variable corresponding to the applicable fiscal month thereby 
controlling for seasonality; October is the base month. 
 ut  = Autocorrelated error term of the form:  𝑢 =  𝜐𝑡−1 + 𝜐𝑡−2 + 𝜐𝑡−3 + 𝜐𝑡−4 +
𝜖𝑡 
 
Results 
 Referring to Table 5.2, estimation of the model assuming a generalized method 
of moments approach reveals abnormal spending behavior before and after the 
implementation of a continuing resolution.  First, on average and holding all else equal, 
the main effect of the implementation of interim continuing resolutions on contract 
services and supplies expenditures is an increase of 22.8 percent in the third month 
prior to the implementation of stopgap measures (i.e., July of the terminating fiscal 
year).  This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and underscores the notion that 
agencies monitor closely aspects of the congressional budget process.  If a continuing 
resolution seems imminent, agency officials will begin to stockpile supplies and to 
increase contract-related expenditures at a rate higher than that which would normally 
occur with the receipt of fourth quarter allotment.  What is more, average contract and 
supply obligation rates show mild attenuation during the months of August and 
September but do not seem to be affected in a statistically significant manner by an 
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impending resolution.  This pattern suggests that the July purchases are one-time or 
bulk expenditures. 
Second, while continuing appropriations are in effect they have virtually no 
influence on obligation rates.  This finding is in agreement with Hypothesis 2 and 
suggests that continuing resolutions provide sufficient means for agencies to operate 
while under expenditure restrictions. 
Third, obligation rates tend to fall by 23.7 percent, ceteris paribus, two months 
after the President signs the budget into law.  This finding is in accord with Hypothesis 3 
and hints that agency officials spend-down stockpiles of supplies as uncertainty 
associated with interim resolutions dissipates.  In agreement with Zimmerman (1976), 
agency officials may devote unencumbered funding to other factor inputs.  Since this 
dataset only applies to contract services and supply purchases, however, such behavior 
is not estimable here.  At the same time, the two-month delay in effect may imply that 
organizations allow sufficient time for appropriations to filter through bureaucratic 
channels before spending-down excess stores of supplies and the like.   
Results are also in line with Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West (2007) findings 
that support the expense-shifting hypotheses.  Their analysis of pharmaceutical supply 
purchases at U.S. Army Hospitals shows that increases in saving expenditures carried-
out at the end of the terminating fiscal year tend to be smaller in magnitude than the 
dissaving practices at the beginning of the subsequent fiscal year.  Said another way, 
managers at U.S. Army Hospitals tend to build-up supply reserves at the end of the fiscal 
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year to help mitigate budgetary uncertainty and then spend down those reserves over 
the course of the next fiscal year, but managers do so in a tightly controlled manner.   
Balakrishnan and colleagues (2007) focus exclusively on supply purchases at U.S. Army 
Hospitals, but were unable to rule out budget uncertainty in general, and continuing 
resolutions in particular, as a contributing factor for expense shifting.  The analysis in 
this chapter extends the Balakrishnan and colleagues findings by encompassing contract 
and supply spending across two federal agencies, but presents evidence of expense 
shifting as a result of continuing resolutions. 
Post-estimation 
A post estimation Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions suggests that the 
model is correctly specified.  To say that a model is overidentified means that 
instrumental variables outnumber endogenous variables.  Thus, the idea behind 
overidentifying restrictions is that there are more instruments than necessary to 
estimate parameters consistently.  Referring to Table 5.3, the estimation technique 
above applies 751 instruments to 49 parameters yielding a chi-square statistic of 
731.6684 with 702 degrees of freedom and a p-value equal to 0.2123.  Therefore, with 
reasonable assurance, one fails to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test that 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. 
 Estimation of the model under assumptions of heteroscedasticity and 
compensation for robust standard errors does not overturn any of the results from the 
GMM approach, but doing so enables the application of another post-estimation test to 
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ensure correct specification of the model.  An Arellano-Bond post estimation test 
presents the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation in the first-differenced 
errors (see Table 5.3).  Rejecting the null hypothesis at order one does not imply that 
the model is misspecified, because first-differencing to eliminate fixed effects creates 
first order autocorrelation, whereas rejection at higher orders (i.e., order two and 
higher) suggests invalidity of the moment conditions, because autocorrelated 
disturbances in the original model would be implied.  The output of the Arellano-Bond 
post-estimation test does not present evidence that the model is misspecified.  
Moreover, removing the obligations associated with Additional Activities from the 
estimation does not change the results of the estimation in a significant manner in 
either of the models. 
Lags of the dependent variable 
Also of note are the levels of correlation with previous years’ obligation rates.  
The four-month lag of the dependent variable controls for autocorrelation in the first 
four periods immediately preceding the current period of execution, and brings to light 
the level of statistical significance associated with the 11th, 12th, 22nd, 24th, and 25th lags 
of the dependent variable.  Correlation between the current time period and lags of 
approximately one and two years earlier highlights the importance of the previous 
year’s budget and obligation rates to the current year’s budget and obligation rates.  
This finding is further evidence of the incremental nature of budgeting (Joseph White, 
1994; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004) and the continued use of baseline budgeting 
techniques (Schick, 1994).   
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Along with the positive correlation, the model finds statistically significant 
negative correlation at the 14th, 21st, 26th, and 28th lags.  These patterns of correlation 
may represent an interaction of continuing resolutions with the recursive nature of 
budget formulation.  Negative correlations could possibly point to bulk purchases made 
in one fiscal year but not in the next.  For example, July/August of Fiscal Year 02 occurs 
14 or 15 months after the July/August of FY00 timeframe.  If a bulk purchase of 
additional supplies were made in anticipation of an interim continuing resolution in July 
or August of FY00 but not in July/August of FY01, the corresponding obligation rates 
should be negatively correlated.  
The model also displays an affinity for the 30th lag of the dependent variable 
during estimation trials.  Estimating the GMM model with less than 27 lags of the 
dependent variable results in rejection of the null hypothesis under the Sargan test.  
Once the 27th lag of the dependent variable is introduced as an endogenous variable, 
the estimation becomes viable.  More importantly, the statistical significance of the CR 
variable begins to manifest with the introduction of the 30th lag.  The leap in viability of 
the model may be due to white noise but likely results from the minimum number of 
periods necessary to conduct an event study.  Fama and colleagues (1969) use a 29 time 
period lag prior to a stock split to conduct the original event study, and Binder (1998) 
echoes those methods in his review of event study methodologies. 
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Table 5.2: Regression Results 
 
GMM Estimator 
 
Robust Estimator 
Log(CSS/Pers) Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Endogenous Variables 
        1-Month Lag (of Dep. Var.)      0.123*** (0.0322)     0.123** (0.0527) 
   2-Month Lag      0.108*** (0.0340)      0.108* (0.0558) 
   3-Month Lag      0.132*** (0.0391)      0.132*** (0.0488) 
   4-Month Lag      0.065* (0.0391)      0.065 (0.0564) 
   5-Month Lag     -0.037 (0.0384)     -0.037 (0.0534) 
   6-Month Lag     -0.003 (0.0371)     -0.003 (0.0562) 
   7-Month Lag      0.005 (0.0371)      0.005 (0.0463) 
   8-Month Lag      0.024 (0.0383)      0.024 (0.0353) 
   9-Month Lag      0.023 (0.0367)      0.023 (0.0532) 
 10-Month Lag     -0.041 (0.0364)     -0.041 (0.0398) 
 11-Month Lag      0.107*** (0.0369)      0.107** (0.0521) 
 12-Month Lag      0.205*** (0.0374)      0.205*** (0.0378) 
 13-Month Lag     -0.015 (0.0381)     -0.015 (0.0542) 
 14-Month Lag     -0.085** (0.0382)     -0.085* (0.0502) 
 15-Month Lag     -0.047 (0.0390)     -0.047 (0.0374) 
 16-Month Lag      0.045 (0.0392)      0.045 (0.0470) 
 17-Month Lag     -0.015 (0.0386)     -0.015 (0.0469) 
 18-Month Lag     -0.024 (0.0373)     -0.024 (0.0497) 
 19-Month Lag      0.030 (0.0361)      0.030 (0.0395) 
 20-Month Lag      0.014 (0.0359)      0.014 (0.0567) 
 21-Month Lag     -0.128*** (0.0356)     -0.128** (0.0562) 
 22-Month Lag      0.091** (0.0358)      0.091** (0.0411) 
 23-Month Lag     -0.013 (0.0364)     -0.013 (0.0392) 
 24-Month Lag      0.119*** (0.0363)      0.119* (0.0626) 
 25-Month Lag      0.090** (0.0365)      0.090 (0.0652) 
 26-Month Lag     -0.093** (0.0375)     -0.093* (0.0509) 
 27-Month Lag      0.015 (0.0365)      0.015 (0.0355) 
 28-Month Lag     -0.091** (0.0360)     -0.091* (0.0476) 
 29-Month Lag     -0.015 (0.0354)     -0.015 (0.0416) 
 30-Month Lag      0.078** (0.0364)      0.078 (0.0609) 
      Observations 741 
  
741 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.2: Continued 
 
GMM Estimator 
 
Robust Estimator 
Log(CSS/Pers) Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Exogenous Variables 
     Continuing Resolution (CR) 
        3-Month Lag      0.228** (0.111) 
 
    0.228** (0.0996) 
   2-Month Lag     -0.006 (0.126) 
 
   -0.006 (0.131) 
   1-Month Lag     -0.052 (0.124) 
 
   -0.052 (0.133) 
   CR in effect     -0.089 (0.121) 
 
   -0.089 (0.119) 
   1-Month Lead      0.012 (0.116) 
 
    0.012 (0.157) 
   2-Month Lead     -0.237** (0.102)    -0.237* (0.140) 
      Control Variable 
     Log(Outlays)     -0.043 (0.155) 
 
   -0.043 (0.175) 
      Dummy Variables 
        November      0.222 (0.160) 
 
    0.222 (0.182) 
   December      0.077 (0.176) 
 
    0.077 (0.226) 
   January      0.117 (0.175) 
 
    0.117 (0.204) 
   February     -0.015 (0.160) 
 
   -0.015 (0.147) 
   March      0.098 (0.153) 
 
    0.098 (0.131) 
   April      0.165 (0.136) 
 
    0.165 (0.158) 
   May      0.179 (0.144) 
 
    0.179 (0.162) 
   June      0.361** (0.141) 
 
    0.361** (0.174) 
   July      0.208 (0.144) 
 
    0.208 (0.162) 
   August      0.241 (0.164) 
 
    0.241 (0.232) 
   September      0.939*** (0.161) 
 
    0.939*** (0.214) 
  
    Constant term      3.228 (1.988) 
 
    3.228 (2.230) 
      Observations      741 
  
    741 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.3: Post-estimation Tests 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
H0: Overidentifying restrictions are valid 
   
Chi-square statistic    731.6684   
Degrees of freedom    702  
Prob > Chi2        0.2123  
   
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors 
H0: No autocorrelation 
   
Order z    Prob > z 
1    -4.1912      0.0000 
2    -1.2292      0.2190 
3     0.7264      0.4676 
4    -0.7989      0.4244 
 
 
Table 5.4: Isolating the Effect of the 30th Lag While Controlling for Autocorrelation 
During Periods Immediately Preceding Implementation of a Continuing Resolution 
 
 
 Coefficient Standard Errors 
    
 1-Month Lag (Dep. Var.) 0.295*** (0.0337) 
2-Month Lag 0.224*** (0.0351) 
3-Month Lag 0.157*** (0.0352) 
4-Month Lag 0.129*** (0.0343) 
   
29-Month Lag 0.049* (0.0291) 
30-Month Lag 0.116*** (0.0290) 
31-Month Lag 0.016 (0.0288) 
   
Constant term 0.178 (0.1200) 
   Observations 967 
 R-squared 
 
    0.855 
 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Implications and Conclusion 
Thus, the model finds evidence of expense shifting as a result of the 
implementation of continuing resolutions.  To quantify the effects, organizations within 
federal agencies increase spending on contract services and supply purchases by an 
average of $11.970 million or $1,029.54 per employee when there is a possibility of 
continuing appropriations in the coming fiscal year.  Incidentally, this increase in 
spending does not seem to take place during the final month of the fiscal year when the 
typical year-end spending takes place nor even the month prior to that.  Instead, the 
surge in spending happens a full three months before the end of the fiscal year.  
Controlling for the regular receipt of fourth quarter funding allotment, the surge in 
expenditures coincides with the appropriations committee schedule, thereby implying a 
high degree of anticipation within the resource management community regarding the 
implementation of spending constraints.  The spike in expenditures is suggestive of the 
presence of signaling mechanisms between higher echelons of the federal government 
and the agency in question; this relationship is the focus of the next chapter. 
 Further, federal agencies seem to be unaffected by the actual application of 
expenditure constraints as obligation rates continue unabated while continuing 
resolutions are in effect.  Once the president signs the associated appropriation act into 
law, however, obligation rates tend to fall below normal levels by approximately 
$12.443 million or $1,070.18 per employee in the second month after the budget 
passes.  The overall pattern may confirm a savings-dissaving approach with regard to 
contractual and supply obligations. 
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 The model also highlights the incremental nature of budgeting and importance 
of simple baseline budgeting techniques to the federal budget cycle.  Obligation rates 
one- and two-years prior to the current period of spending display the highest level of 
statistical significance among the lagged dependent variables; thus, the best predictor of 
the current year’s spending rate is the previous year’s spending rate.  
Expense shifting vis-à-vis bona fide needs 
In a normative sense, continuing resolutions are not necessarily a bad policy; in 
fact, they provide a feasible alternative to shutting down the federal government in the 
event of protracted disagreements over the budget.  Still, qualitative research suggests 
that stopgap measures generate budgetary uncertainty and distortions in year-end 
spending.  One manifestation of these distortions is the shifting of expenditures 
between fiscal years.  Indeed, the federal budget and resource management community 
seem to have adapted to stopgap measures by way of saving-dissaving practices that 
straddle fiscal years.   
At issue, then, would be whether agencies have violated the bona fide needs rule 
through the purchase of additional supplies and contract services.  The rule, which is 
based in statutes such as the Antideficiency Act and the Adequacy of Appropriations 
Act, and various rulings of the Comptroller General, holds that an appropriation is 
available only for the needs of the current fiscal year, not those of a future fiscal year.  
Therefore, agencies should be earnest in purchasing only what they need to make it 
through the current fiscal year (GAO, 2004d).   
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To that end, the GAO offers the following example for consideration: 
“… suppose that, as the end of a fiscal year approaches, an agency 
purchases a truckload of pencils when it is clear that, based on current 
usage, it already has in stock enough pencils to last several years into the 
future. It would seem apparent that the agency was merely trying to use 
up its appropriation before it expired, and the purchase would violate the 
bona fide needs rule.” 
With that example in mind, the Federal Appropriations Law handbook is careful 
to point out that the spirit of the rule is not to prevent the maintenance of 
legitimate levels of inventories which are purchased to avoid a disruption of 
operations.  Instead, a violation of the rule would occur when the magnitude of 
purchases evolves from reasonable to excessive, the determination of which 
depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case at hand (GAO, 
2004d).   
 In a broad sense, continuing appropriations acts may present agency 
officials with the prospect of walking a policy tightrope.  Federal resource 
managers must balance their desire to offset the budgetary uncertainty that 
comes with continuing resolutions with their obligation to abide by federal fiscal 
law, and overcompensation in either direction could spell misfortune for both 
the agency and the individual. 
Copyright © Thomas Alexander Jacobs 2014 
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Chapter Six 
Budgetary Signals: Organizational Learning, Agenda Setting, and Federal Bureaucracies 
 
Introduction 
 The findings in the previous chapter demonstrate that federal agencies are able 
to anticipate the enactment of continuing appropriations acts.  In response to the 
implementation of stopgap measures, federal agencies tend to increase spending on 
contract services and supply purchases, beyond normal seasonal levels, during the final 
quarter of the terminating fiscal year.  Through the accrual of additional stockpiles of 
supplies and the shifting of contract expenditures between fiscal years, agency 
personnel afford themselves an added degree of spending latitude while under the fiscal 
constraints of a continuing resolution.  In other words, the federal budget and resource 
management community seem to have adapted to stopgap measures by way of saving-
dissaving behavior that straddles fiscal years. 
In light of the finding that federal agencies engage in expense shifting in 
response to pending enactment of continuing resolutions, we are left with a puzzle.  
How is it that agencies know that they should alter spending well in advance of the 
failure to adopt an appropriations act?  The purpose of this chapter is to explore 
budgetary signaling mechanisms between the highest echelons of the federal 
government and subordinate federal agencies.  Explicitly stated, this research seeks to 
determine which factors in the federal budget process act as signaling mechanisms 
between the president, Congress, and executive agencies.  In seeking to answer this 
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research question, this chapter explores the concept of organizational learning and 
suggests a theoretical framework of agenda setting in which federal organizations 
monitor germane sources of information, compile implicit indices of indicators, and then 
process that information to reach decisions. 
  The notion of organizational learning first emerged in the early 1960s.  While it 
has since expanded and evolved, the concept has been applied sparingly to the public 
sector.  Thus, this study aims to expand the knowledge of organizational learning as it 
relates to the federal bureaucracy.  The results show that federal agencies have learned 
to monitor particular sources in the federal budget process to gain insight about the 
likelihood of continuing appropriations acts being passed.  Moreover, decision-makers 
may also be able to determine which budgetary signals are most relevant to a given 
problem in the congressional budgetary scheme.  These findings contribute to the field 
of public budgeting by providing a link between theories of organizational learning and 
agenda setting by way of the information processing aspect of the Implicit Index 
Approach.   
This chapter is organized in the following manner.  The next section provides a 
brief review of the organizational learning literature with an emphasis on the research 
related to information processing.  This topic carries-over into the theory section, which 
discusses a framework of information processing within the field of agenda setting.  A 
brief discussion of a priori theoretical expectations precedes a description of the data, 
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while the fifth section discusses the econometric model of choice and the associated 
estimation methods.  Results of the analysis follow and the final section concludes. 
 
The Organizational Learning Literature 
 As a formal theory, the notion of organizational learning goes as far back as 1963 
when Cyert and March conceptualized the term as the process by which an organization 
adapts to its environment and the associated external shocks in a rational and 
systematic manner, given the internal decision rules of the organization (Cyert & March, 
1963).  Since that seminal work, the definition has evolved as the concept of 
organizational learning has spread to multiple disciplines.  Scholars in fields, such as 
organizational theory, economics, information management, business management, 
marketing, and psychology (Dodgson, 1993; Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2011) have set-out 
to capture the essence of the term and the resulting definitions represent a panoply of 
thought. 
As it is perceived currently, organizational learning may occur at the individual 
(Dodgson, 1993) or system level (Cyert & March, 1963; Dixon, 1992) and the term may 
refer to the study of learning processes of and within organizations (Easterby-Smith & 
Lyles, 2011).  The phenomenon can be thought of as the development of insights, 
knowledge, and associations between past, present, and future organizational activities 
(Fiol & Lyles, 1985).  Sinkula (1994) characterizes it as the method by which knowledge 
is maintained such that it benefits future organizational users, while Rashman, Withers, 
and Hartley (2009) survey the literature and describes organizational learning as the 
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sharing of thoughts and actions, in an organizational context, with cognitive (Shipton & 
Defillippi, 2011), social (Gherardi, Nicolini, & Odella, 1998), behavioral (Cyert & March, 
1963; Huber, 1991), and technical implications (Huber, 1991).  
 As learning takes place, the organization is thought to change over time.  Further 
elaboration on the concept of organizational learning holds that as organizations learn 
to make sense of their environment, members of the organization will encode historical 
inferences into the organizational norms, training programs, policies, strategies, and 
culture of the organization (Levitt & March, 1988; Sinkula, 1994).  These shared 
assumptions, beliefs, and norms form an organizational memory which serves to guide 
individual and organizational actions (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Huber, 1991; Walsh & 
Ungson, 1991).  Thus, enhanced knowledge and understanding of “how things are done 
(Argyris & Schön, 1978)“ lead to improved actions (Fiol & Lyles, 1985) and fundamental 
changes to the structural elements and outcomes of the organization (Herbert 
Alexander Simon, 1969).  
In the same way that the definition of organizational learning has expanded, the 
field of study has become very diverse and nuanced.  For instance, Huber (1991) and 
Dixon (1992) articulate a number of constructs related to organizational learning such 
as: (1) knowledge acquisition, which concerns the processes by which organizations 
acquire or obtain information, (2) the sharing of knowledge via information distribution; 
(3) information interpretation, or the process by which information is assigned meaning; 
and (4) and the storage and retrieval of information which is referred to as 
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organizational memory.  As another example, Easterby-Smith and Lyles (2011) map the 
field of study into four topics: (1) organizational learning, which, as mentioned above, 
refers to the study of learning processes of and within organizations; (2) the learning 
organization, which is seen as an organizational ideal; (3) organizational knowledge, 
which is concerned with the nature of knowledge within the organization; and (4) 
knowledge management, which addresses the storage, measurement, dissemination, 
and leverage of knowledge by the organization. 
 Because the literature is expansive and multi-faceted, review articles abound 
(Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Dixon, 1992; Dodgson, 1993; Friedman, Lipshitz, & 
Popper, 2005; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988; Miner & Mezias, 1996; Rashman, et 
al., 2009; Shipton, 2006).  Among these reviews, Shipton (2006) serves as a particularly 
helpful resource for identifying literature which is related to the processing of 
information by the organization.  To compare different elements of the organizational 
learning literature, Professor Shipton uses a two-by-two matrix with the 
prescriptive/normative and descriptive/explanatory literature arrayed along a vertical 
continuum, while the individual/organizational literature is ordered along the horizontal 
axis.  From an explanatory perspective, organizational learning depends, in part, on 
whether organizations use a behaviorist or cognitive approach to process information. 
Organizations that rely on a behaviorist approach process information by way of 
routines and standard operating procedures.  Organizational learning, then, is a method 
of skill-building based on repeated execution of routines and procedures (Argote, 2012; 
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Zollo & Winter, 2002).  Organizational routines are the result of trial and error learning 
and they reflect a concerted effort to select and retain past behaviors (Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2000).  Routines are essentially procedural memories (M. D. Cohen & 
Bacdayan, 1994) and they serve as repositories of learning (Shipton, 2006).  Indeed, 
Levitt and March (1988) find that members of organizations may use routines that guide 
behavior (e.g., forms, rules, and paradigms) as a means of storing and retrieving 
experiences.  This practice offers individuals within the organization access to the 
substance of historical lessons and enables these encodings to withstand personnel 
turnover and the passage of time.  
 From a cognitive perspective, the processing of information enhances the 
organization’s potential for changed behavior.  This style of organizational learning 
brings about changes that are not readily apparent, but which develop the 
organizational knowledge base favorably to afford the organization flexibility in times of 
perceived need (Nonaka, Takeuchi, & Takeuchi, 1995; Shipton, 2006; Shrivastava, 1983).  
Exposure to variegated circumstances, experiences, and points of view may increase the 
propensity for individuals within the organization to question the adequacy and 
effectiveness of current routines and procedures (Shipton, 2006).  Thus, in turbulent 
environments when conventional routines and procedures become obsolete, the ability 
of an organization not only to recognize the value of new information, but also to 
assimilate and apply it may ensure that the organization is able to adjust accordingly (W. 
M. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Huber, 1991; Lichtenthaler, 2009). 
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 Incidentally, organizational learning research tends to focus on private sector 
entities over public sector organizations.  Although the field of organizational learning 
has grown significantly since the early 1990s, multiple authors agree that little of the 
research pertains to public and non-profit agencies (Bate & Robert, 2002; Easterby-
Smith & Lyles, 2011; Kelman, 2005).  A systematic review of the organizational learning 
and knowledge literature by Rashman, Withers, and Hartley (2009) suggests an over-
reliance on the private sector with regard to theoretical and empirical endeavors.  Their 
survey of literature includes research efforts pertaining to organizational learning, inter-
organizational learning, and organizational knowledge and excludes papers that are 
normative or purely descriptive in nature.  Of the 131 papers analyzed, 61 focused on 
the private sector while only 29 focused exclusively on public sector entities (the 
remaining 41 papers addressed multiple sectors or did not specify a sector).  Rashman 
and colleagues find the organizational learning literature, as it relates to public 
organizations, to be thin and fragmented.  While the associated research addresses a 
wide range of institutions and extends across a number of disciplines and journals, the 
limited number of articles addressing public sector issues amounts to an under-
representation in the literature that may hold implications for the generalizability of 
current theories of organizational learning and knowledge (Rashman, et al., 2009).  
Thus, organizational learning, as it relates to public sector entities, is a subject that is in 
need of further exploration. 
Fortunately, there is an avenue of approach toward this endeavor in the 
policymaking literature.  Jones and Baumgartner (2005) explore, theoretically and 
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empirically, the manner by which government institutions and policymakers process 
information.  The authors develop a theory of disproportionate information processing 
which relies, in part, on a micro-theory of information processing called the Implicit 
Index Approach.  Using behavioral models, Jones and Baumgartner explore boundedly 
rational decision making from an individual viewpoint and from a collective frame of 
reference.  In so doing, they are able to draw similarities between individual and 
organizational decision-making perspectives.  This approach serves as a viable 
theoretical framework to help explain organizational learning as it relates to the public 
sector in general and federal agencies in specific.  Below is a brief description of Jones 
and Baumgartner’s idea of agenda setting and their Implicit Index Model in which 
organizations monitor their respective environments for signals which may inform 
leadership decisions. 
 
A Micro-theory of Information Processing 
 Unlike individuals, organizations are able to process large amounts of 
information by delegating responsibility to organizational sub-units.  Because individuals 
are boundedly rational, they process information in seriatim.  On balance, time 
constraints and limited cognitive abilities make it so that individuals must focus their 
own attention on one issue at a time when making decisions (Herbert A. Simon, 1991).  
To a certain extent, division of labor enables organizational leaders to augment 
cognitive abilities to allow for simultaneous management of multiple issues.  By creating 
specialized sub-units, agencies are able to delegate the responsibility for disparate 
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issues to units which are organizationally structured to suit a particular field.  Thus, 
organizations are much more adept at managing a litany of multidimensional issues 
than are individual persons (B. D. Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). 
 There are myriad examples of this type of delegation of responsibility at the 
federal level.  From a fiscal perspective, Congress uses the committee system to 
delegate consideration of budget policy to House and Senate Budget Committees, which 
then formulate budgetary legislation for the approval of the full Congress.  Likewise, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) bears the responsibility for formulating, 
compiling, and submitting the president’s annual budget submission to Congress.  
Similarly, each cabinet-level department has a budget office that formulates and 
submits an annual budget to the OMB.  For instance, the Office of Management within 
the Treasury Department compiles the Congressional Justification of Appropriations for 
the Department of the Treasury, while the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
compiles similar documentation for the Department of Defense. 
 Yet, even organizations as large as the federal government suffer cognitive 
limitations which force them, at some point, to switch from parallel- to serial processing, 
which further implies issue prioritization.  The use of a single point of adjudication will 
force a decision-making body to prioritize issues, thereby creating a logjam of sorts in 
the processing of information.  Furthermore, increasing the number of decision-makers 
does not alleviate the bottleneck; even with 535 members, Congress can vote on only 
one issue at a time.  At the individual level, issue prioritization is known as attention-
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shifting because one must focus one’s attention on a single matter while ignoring all 
other issues.  At the organizational-level, issue prioritization is called agenda setting (B. 
D. Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). 
 In an organizational context, specialized units, such as the ones mentioned 
previously, work to detect signals in the environment during the agenda setting stage of 
decision-making.  These signals come from a variety of origins and they help to inform 
the decision-making process.  While some of those sources are highly dependable, some 
of them are irrelevant, others are redundant, and there are far too many for a single 
agency to monitor and evaluate effectively.  Therefore, agencies select only the most 
relevant of sources to monitor and those who rely on the information derive indices 
comprised of only the most germane indicators.  Incidentally, these indices are not 
explicitly published like the Consumer Price Index or the Standard and Poor’s 500.  
Instead, they are internal to the agency and are more akin to organizational norms that 
evolve over time (B. D. Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). 
 Jones and Baumgartner (2005) refer to this practice of cataloguing information 
as the Implicit Index Approach.  With regard to any given problem which an organization 
may face and as illustrated in Figure 6.1, a variety of sources produce indicators which 
yield information about the state of the world.  Decision-makers rely on this information 
to inform their decision calculus.  Random errors, distortion, or noise enters the 
equation when decision-makers interpret information from sources toward the 
construction of indicators, and again as decision-makers combine indicators into an 
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index which informs their ultimate decision.  In summary, decision-makers, upon 
recognition of a problem, select a series of what they perceive to be the most pertinent 
and reliable sources of information about that problem.  Then, taking biases into 
account, they assimilate the information, determine a course of action, and make a final 
decision (B. D. Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At this point, principal-agent theory may also play a role in the organizational 
learning process.  Agency theory postulates that the relationship between elected 
officials and nonelected bureaucrats is hierarchical, and that differences between 
bureaucratic agents and democratic principals will result in bureaucratic agents pursuing 
interests of the agency over those of the principal (Nicholson & Snyder, 2012; Wilson, 
2000).  It follows then that if federal agencies, acting as bureaucratic agents, are seeking 
 
Figure 6.1: The Implicit Index Model: Combining Information from Diverse Sources 
Source: Jones, B. D., & Baumgartner, F. R. (2005). The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p 59. 
Source 1 
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to monitor the most relevant sources of information in their environment, they will 
monitor the actions of democratic principals for indicators that inform the 
organization’s decision-making process and ultimately influence organizational learning. 
In fact, research on political control of the bureaucracy demonstrates the 
feasibility of this line of thought.  As Wood and Waterman (1991) explain, congressional 
control over the resources of federal agencies compels agency decision-makers to keep 
close tabs on the rewards and sanctions that legislators distribute.  However, 
bureaucratic agents often have multiple principals (Wilson, 2000) and, with respect to 
budgetary resources, federal organizations are also subject to the control of the 
president via the OMB (Wood & Waterman, 1991).  At a minimum, federal organizations 
must monitor Congress and the president when processing information about 
continuing resolutions.  Thus, examining certain aspects of these two sources, one may 
be able to determine which factors of the federal budgetary process act as signaling 
mechanisms or indicators for bureaucratic agencies in the processing of information 
related to continuing resolutions. 
   
Expectations 
Bearing in mind that bureaucratic agencies monitor Congress and the president 
for budget-related signals, one might formulate a series of a priori expectations 
regarding the association and influence of certain factors on the implementation of 
continuing resolutions.  In keeping with the Implicit Index Model, federal agencies might 
view the president and Congress as relevant sources of information.  In turn, certain 
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elements associated with those two entities may serve as indicators which are compiled 
into an index that informs the decision-making process. 
Presidential factors 
 Concerning the president, there are several factors which may act as signaling 
mechanisms to the bureaucracy.  First, the party of the president is an obvious element 
of consideration but one for which the influence is difficult to predict a priori.  On one 
hand, a president from the Republican Party may favor budget reductions toward a 
smaller federal government, while a president from the Democratic Party may favor 
budget increases in support of more robust social programs.  Either of these scenarios is 
likely to generate budgetary discord and may ultimately lead to delays in the 
appropriation of funding.  Thus, the relationship between the party of the president and 
the enactment of continuing resolutions is predicted to be a positive one. 
Second, the length of a president’s tenure may also influence the incidence of 
continuing resolutions.  Stimson (1976) shows that presidential approval ratings tend to 
decline in the second term and Schick (2007) submits that budgetary successes are more 
difficult to come by later in one’s presidency.  Hence, the relationship between 
presidential tenure and the implementation of continuing resolutions is thought to be a 
positive one.  As the length of a president’s tenure increases, instances of continuing 
resolutions should increase as well. 
Third, the dynamic between the president and members of Congress is sure to 
influence budgetary dialogue.  Recall from chapter three that veto negotiations over the 
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federal budget are most prevalent under conditions of divided government.  Indeed, 
Edwards and colleagues (1997) find that presidents are more apt to oppose significant 
legislation when the government is divided and that important legislation fails to pass 
more often under divided government.  Coleman (1999), however, found that unified 
government leads to greater production of significant legislation, while other studies 
have shown that legislative gridlock can occur equally under circumstances of divided 
and unified government and that legislative production has little to do with whether the 
government is divided (Fiorina, 1996; Krehbiel, 1996; Mayhew, 1991).  Assuming the 
status of the government exhibits statistical significance in this study, a priori 
expectations are toward a positive relationship between divided government and the 
occurrence of continuing appropriations.   
Congressional polarization factors 
Polarization in the U.S. Congress, as measured by the distance between party 
means, tends to vary across time.  At times, the average ideological views of political 
parties differ greatly from each other, at other times the differences are less 
pronounced.  Since 1975, the distance between party means has grown wider and 
several scholars (Beckmann & McGann, 2008; Cummins, 2012; D. R. Jones, 2001, 2010) 
find polarization to be a contributing factor to legislative gridlock.  Apropos of the 
budget discussion, Cummins (2012) examines gridlock in the context of delayed budget 
adoption at the state level and finds party polarization to be a key factor for California’s 
inability to pass a state budget in a timely manner.  Assuming an increase in polarization 
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leads to an increase in legislative gridlock, then one might expect an increase in 
polarization to yield an increase in the likelihood of continuing resolutions. 
Factors related to the congressional budget resolution 
There are also a number of factors associated with the congressional budget 
resolution that may help predict the implementation of continuing appropriations acts.  
First, recall from chapter two that the congressional budget resolution is rarely 
approved in a timely fashion.  Recall also that intense and sustained conflict over budget 
policy engenders dysfunction within the regular appropriations process, and delay in 
adoption of the congressional budget resolution is a prime indicator of dissonance over 
budgetary matters (Schick, 2007).  It follows that delay in the adoption of the 
congressional budget resolution should increase the likelihood of continuing resolutions. 
Two additional factors which may be relevant are the number of changes made 
to the budget resolution and the number of members who object to the adoption of the 
resolution.  Naturally, changes to the budget resolution, in the form of amendments or 
reserve funds (discussed further below), take time to negotiate, and the resolution 
cannot pass without an adequate number of supporting votes.  Thus, one might 
anticipate a positive relationship between these factors and the implementation of 
continuing resolutions.  As the number of changes considered to the budget resolution 
increases, so too should the likelihood of continuing resolutions.  Similarly, as the 
number of nay votes pertaining to the adoption of the budget resolution increases, the 
probability of continuing resolutions being implemented should increase as well. 
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Another factor might be the views that members of Congress have toward the 
substance of the budget resolution.  Members of Congress will often make public 
statements about pending legislation that may have bearing on the implementation of 
stopgap measures.  For instance, either or both chambers of Congress can formally 
articulate their opinions regarding matters of national interest by way of “sense of the 
House,” “sense of the Senate,” or “sense of the Congress” provisions.  Such provisions 
have no formal effect on policy, but foreign governments and domestic agencies attend 
to them as early signals of policy intent (Davis, 2013; Rundquist, 2003).  However, 
“sense of” provisions can be used to express both positive and negative views of policy 
and legislation (Davis, 2013); therefore, the relationship between continuing resolutions 
and formal expressions of opinion is thought to be ambiguous. 
Factors related to the appropriation hearings 
Finally, certain aspects of the appropriations hearings may also act as indicators 
for decision-makers.  Recall from the discussions of the annual appropriations process 
that the House begins consideration and mark-up of annual appropriations in May with 
the Senate following suit soon thereafter, and that agencies monitor the legislative 
actions of appropriations committees.  The appropriations for which the associated 
hearings have not concluded by the end of the fiscal year must suffer continuing 
resolutions.  Thus, the amount of time it takes for appropriations hearings to conclude 
may be an indicator of pending continuing appropriations and the relationship is 
thought to be a positive one.  As the duration in time of appropriations hearings 
increases, the implementation of continuing resolutions should also increase. 
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Data  
The data for the analysis consists of an unbalanced panel of 4,067 observations 
related to the passage of annual appropriations of 15 cabinet-level departments.  
Temporally, the data span a period of thirty-four federal fiscal years, from 1976 to 2010, 
and includes elements pertaining to divided government, polarization, congressional 
budget resolutions, and appropriations hearings. 
The dependent variable 
The basic unit of analysis is continuing resolutions.  To be more specific, the 
analysis relates to the odds of the implementation of a continuing resolution given the 
influence of certain presidential and congressional factors in the federal budget process.  
Data having to do with continuing resolutions were retrieved from the Proquest 
Congressional database.  The annual Appropriations Acts for the Departments of 
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, 
Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, State, 
Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs were queried for each fiscal year 
between 1976 and 2010.  Those appropriations which were signed into public law on or 
before the first day of October of each fiscal year are assumed to have passed without 
being subject to a continuing resolution or any other restrictions on spending, such as a 
funding gap.  For those appropriations signed into public law after the first day of 
October, it is assumed that a continuing resolution or the like was incorporated.  
Continuing resolutions is a dichotomized binary variable coded 1 if continuing 
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appropriations are present or coded 0 to represent the timely passage of an annual 
budget. 
 Table 6.1 shows the number of times, between Fiscal Years 1976 and 2010, that 
the 15 annual Appropriations Acts mentioned above were signed into law on or before 
the first day of the federal fiscal year.  Each fiscal year in which the budget for those 
agencies was passed in a timely manner is denoted with an “X.”  Conversely, those times 
during which budgets were delayed beyond the first day of the fiscal year signifies the 
presence of continuing resolutions for the respective agency; such instances are 
identified with a dash.  Further, four agencies were not designated as cabinet-level 
department until after 1976, and a null sign is used to designate the fiscal years during 
which these agencies were not yet in existence.  Finally, the party of the president 
residing in office is identified in the second column; “D” represents a president from the 
Democratic Party, while “R” represents a Republican. 
 
This space was left blank intentionally. 
Table 6.1 follows on the next page. 
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Table 6.1: Instances of Continuing Appropriations Acts by Department by Fiscal Year  
(1976 – 2010) 
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1976 R - - - - Ø Ø Ø - - - - - - - Ø 
1977 D X X X X Ø Ø Ø X X X X X X X Ø 
1978 D X X X - Ø Ø Ø  X X - X X X Ø 
1979 D - - - - Ø Ø Ø X - - - - - X Ø 
1980 D - X - - X - Ø - - X - X X - Ø 
1981 R - - - - X - Ø - - - - - - - Ø 
1982 R - - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - Ø 
1983 R - - - - - - Ø X - - - - - - Ø 
1984 R - - - - X - Ø X - - - - - X Ø 
1985 R - X - - - - Ø X - X - X - - Ø 
1986 R - - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - Ø 
1987 R - - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - Ø 
1988 R - - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - Ø 
1989 R X X X X X X Ø X X X X X X X - 
1990 R - - - - X - Ø - - - - - - - - 
1991 R - - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - - 
1992 R - - - - X - Ø - - - - - - - - 
1993 D X - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - - 
1994 D - - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - - 
1995 D X X X X X X Ø X X X X X X X X 
1996 D - - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - - 
1997 D X X X X X X Ø X X X X X X X X 
1998 D - - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - - 
1999 D - - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - - 
2000 D - - - - X - Ø - - - - - X - - 
2001 R - - X - - - Ø - - - - - - - - 
2002 R - - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - - 
2003 R - - - - - - Ø - - - - - - - - 
2004 R - - X - - - X - - - - - - - - 
2005 R - - X - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2006 R - - - - - - - - X - - - - - - 
2007 R - - X - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2008 R - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2009 D - - X - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2010 D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 -  denotes implementation of a continuing resolution 
X denotes timely passage of annual appropriations 
Ø denotes periods during which the agency was not a cabinet-level organization 
D represents a Democratic president 
R represents a Republican president 
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Independent variables 
Beyond the federal agencies themselves, two key entities are involved in the 
overall formulation of the federal budget: the president and Congress.  Thus, the 
analysis will employ 19 independent variables related to the president, congressional 
polarization, the congressional budget resolution, and the appropriations committees.  
A description of the explanatory variables follows this paragraph.  To help summarize 
this information, Table 6.3 contains summary statistics and Table 6.4 lists abbreviated 
descriptions of each variable and the expected sign of the coefficient upon estimation.  
 Data for divided government and the presidential came from the Database of 
Political Institutions 2012 (Norwegian Social Science Data Services, 2012).  Compiled by 
the Development Research Group of the World Bank, and most recently updated in 
January 2013, this database contains information on 180 countries and is used for 
comparative studies of political economy and political institutions.  Beck (2001) presents 
the database and examines the effect of divided government on public debt.  Three 
categorical variables pertaining to divided government and the party of the U.S. 
president were chosen from the database: (1) Democratic president is an indicator 
variable coded 1 if a Democratic president is in office or coded 0 otherwise, (2) Years in 
office signifies the number of years that the president has been in office, and (3) Unified 
government is an indicator variable which is coded 1 if the party of the executive 
controls all houses of the government or coded 0 otherwise. 
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Following the efforts of Binder (1999) on legislative gridlock and Woon and 
Anderson (2012) on the timing of congressional appropriations, political polarization 
scores were also used as explanatory variables.  House and Senate polarization data 
pertaining to the liberal-conservative aspect of party polarization were retrieved from 
Voteview.com, which was established by Howard Rosenthal and Keith Poole and which 
is currently affiliated with the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Georgia (Keith T. Poole & Rosenthal, 2014).  An average of the polarization figures for 
the House and Senate was computed and labeled Average polarization.  Multiple 
regression was used to determine the level of residual polarization attributable to either 
chamber and labeled as Residual polarization (House) and Residual polarization 
(Senate).  
Several explanatory variables came from a Congressional Research Service report 
titled Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical Information (Heniff & Murray, 2013).  
The report includes a comprehensive list of the resolutions and accompanying measures 
adopted and rejected by Congress since implementation of the Budget Resolution Act in 
1974.  The first variable chosen from this report pertains to the amount of delay in 
adoption of the congressional budget resolution.  The congressional calendar plans for 
adoption of the resolution by April 15 (May 15 prior to 1987).  However, as Table 6.2 
shows, Congress rarely adopts the budget resolution in a timely manner and delays are 
often perceived as an indication of budgetary conflict (Schick, 2007).  Thus, the variable 
Deadline, represents the number of days by which adoption of the budget resolution 
exceeds the target adoption date. 
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For this analysis, it is important to take notice of the instances during which 
Congress did not formally adopt a budget resolution.  Since the passage of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Congress has failed, on six occasions, to complete 
action on an annual budget resolution: (1) in 1998 for Fiscal Year (FY) 1999; (2) in 2002 
for FY2003; (3) in 2004 for FY2005; (4) in 2006 for FY2007; (5) in 2010 for FY2011; and 
(6) in 2011 for FY2012 (Heniff & Murray, 2013).  The accompanying dataset encompass 
four of these fiscal years. 
In the absence of a formal budget resolution, Congress may rely on a deeming 
resolution to address the issue in an ad hoc manner.  While the term deeming resolution 
does not have an official definition or any specific rule which governs its use, members 
of Congress use the legislation as an annual budget resolution to establish enforceable 
budget levels for a budget cycle.  In addition to providing revised spending allocations to 
the appropriations committees, deeming resolutions may also adjust aggregate budget 
levels and spending allocations to other House and Senate committees  (Lynch, 2010). 
 Instead of leaving the Deadline data field open-ended, marking it as missing, or 
assigning an arbitrary date when Congress failed to pass a formal budget resolution, the 
date which the House adopted the associated deeming resolution was used instead.  For 
Fiscal Year 1999, January 6, 1999 was used, which was 266 days past the April 15 target 
adoption date.  For Fiscal Year 2003, March 20, 2002 was used.  This date occurs prior to 
the deadline, so the data field was zero-filled.  For Fiscal Year 2005, the House adopted 
the deeming resolution on May 19, 2004, which was 34 days past deadline, and for 
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Fiscal Year 2007, May 18, 2006 was used, which was 33 days past deadline (Lynch, 
2010).  Accordingly, an indicator variable labeled Deeming resolution was coded 1 to 
signify the application of a deeming resolution, and coded 0 otherwise. 
 
This space was left blank intentionally. 
Table 6.2 follows on the next page. 
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Table 6.2: Budget Resolution Adoption Dates, Fiscal Years 1976 – 2010 
Fiscal Year Date adopted Days after deadline 
 (Target date: 15 May)  
1976 14 – May – 1975 0 
1977 13 – May – 1976 0 
1978 17 – May – 1977 2 
1979 17 – May – 1978 2 
1980 24 – May – 1979 9 
1981 12 – Jun – 1980 28 
1982 21 – May – 1981 6 
1983 23 – Jun – 1982 39 
1984 23 – Jun – 1983 39 
1985 1 – Oct – 1984 139 
1986 1 – Aug – 1985 78 
 (Target date: 15 April)27  
1987 27 – Jun – 1986 73 
1988 24 – Jun – 1987 70 
1989 6 – Jun – 1988 52 
1990 18 – May – 1989 33 
1991 9 – Oct – 1990 176 
1992 22 – May – 1991 37 
1993 21 – May – 1992 36 
1994 1 – Apr – 1993 0 
1995 12 – May – 1994 27 
1996 29 – Jun – 1995 75 
1997 13 – Jun – 1996 59 
1998 5 – Jun – 1997 51 
1999 Adopted deeming resolution 266 
2000 15 – Apr – 1999 0 
2001 13 – Apr – 2000 0 
2002 10 – May – 2001 25 
2003 Adopted deeming resolution 0 
2004 11 – Apr – 2003 0 
2005 Adopted deeming resolution 34 
2006 28 – Apr – 2005 13 
2007 Adopted deeming resolution 33 
2008 17 – May – 2007 32 
2009 5 – Jun – 2008 51 
2010 29 – Apr – 2009 14 
Source: Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical Information, CRS 
Report RL30297, Table 12, p. 28-29. 
 
27 As originally enacted, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 required that Congress adopt two budget 
resolutions each year: (1) an advisory resolution by May 15 and (2) and a binding resolution by September 
15.  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 eliminated the requirement for a 
second resolution and set April 15 as the target adoption date (Heniff & Murray, 2008). 
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To capture the amount of disagreement and compromise associated with 
adoption of the congressional budget resolution, “Nay” votes and amendments were 
also chosen as explanatory variables.  If delay in adoption of the resolution is a 
barometer of budgetary discord (Schick, 2007), then the number of amendments 
considered while crafting the resolution and the number of members voting against 
adoption of the resolution should also help to gauge levels of budgetary conflict.  Hence, 
four variables are devoted to the number of amendments accepted and rejected by 
both houses of congress: Amendments accepted (House), Amendments rejected (House), 
Amendments accepted (Senate), and Amendments rejected (Senate).  In addition, 
another four variables capture the number of Nay votes cast, in the House and Senate, 
during the vote on initial passage of the resolution and the again during the vote on 
adoption of the conference reports: Nay votes initial passage (House), Nay votes 
conference (House), Nay votes initial passage (Senate), and Nay votes conference 
(Senate). 
 A component of the budget resolution which relates to revisions in spending and 
revenue generation may also point to delays in preparation of the budget resolution.  To 
formulate the resolution, committees are given a budget for the legislation in their 
jurisdiction and committee members are instructed not to generate spending that will 
exceed the committee’s allocated budget (Schick, 2007).  In a similar manner, tax 
committees are instructed to meet revenue floors.  Incidentally, if a committee were to 
report legislation that increases federal spending beyond committee allocations or 
reduces revenue below budget resolution floors, the legislation would be subject to a 
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Budget Act point of order28.  So long as the legislation does not increase the budget 
deficit, reserve funds enable the Chairman of the Budget Committee to adjust 
committee allocations and budget resolution aggregates to reflect the attendant 
legislative changes.  In essence, reserve funds provide congressional committees the 
flexibility to consider spending and/or revenue legislation that would normally be 
subject to procedural objections (Heniff & Murray, 2013; Horney, 2009a, 2009b).  
Hence, the presence of a reserve fund(s) in the budget resolution signifies the need to 
compromise and to make budgetary adjustments, which may lead to an extension of the 
budgetary timeline and an increase in the likelihood of continuing resolutions.  This 
variable is named, creatively enough, Reserve funds. 
Another important component of the budget resolution relates to the desire for 
one or both chambers of Congress to express an opinion on a budgetary matter in a 
formal setting.  Declaratory statements are non-binding proclamations that allow the 
relevant chamber, or the Congress as a whole, to make a public statement without 
formally affecting public policy.  Accordingly, domestic agencies tend to view these 
“sense of” provisions as an early indication that Congress may alter established laws 
(Davis, 2013).  Over time, the number of declaratory statements included in the budget 
resolution has increased.  The first 18 resolutions included an average of 2.5 declaratory 
statements, while the last 10 have averaged 24 such declarations (Heniff & Murray, 
2013; Heniff, Raiter, & Murray, 2008).  Because members of Congress seek to broadcast 
28 A point of order is a query, raised during a formal debate or meeting, as to whether parliamentary 
procedures are being followed.  Point-of-order provisions included in the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974 permit any member in either congressional chamber to prevent the consideration of legislation that 
would violate budget resolution policies (Lynch, 2010). 
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their sentiments on the budget and because agencies actively monitor those 
sentiments, the variable Declaratory statements represents declaratory statements that 
may portend the implementation of continuing resolutions. 
Schick (1980, 2007) suggests that federal organizations monitor closely the 
actions of appropriations committees. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 structured the congressional calendar such that bills often pass the 
House and Senate by the end of June and move to conference as early as July.  
Accordingly, agencies, such as the Office of Management and Budget, maintain tabs on 
appropriations committees and review proposed legislation and testimony in hopes of 
influencing congressional budget decisions prior to the beginning of the associated fiscal 
year.  Hence, data on congressional hearings was obtained to analyze the relationship 
between appropriations hearings and the implementation of continuing appropriations. 
The congressional hearings data were retrieved from the Policy Agendas Project 
website (www.policyagendas.org).  The Policy Agendas Project, currently located at the 
Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin, was initiated in 1993 to 
facilitate the study of policy changes across time (Department of Government at the 
University of Texas, 2014).  The Agendas Project Hearings Data Set contains information 
on all congressional hearings conducted between 1947 and 2014 (B. D. Jones & 
Baumgartner, 2013).  Two data fields were chosen with the notion that the longer it 
takes for hearings to conclude, the greater the likelihood of continuing appropriations: 
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(1) Sessions represent the number of sessions within a hearing and (2) Days signifies the 
duration of the hearings, expressed in days. 
Variables conspicuously absent from the data 
Appropriations committee roll call votes were excluded from the dataset.  
Whereas the roll call votes associated with the initial passage and subsequent adoption 
of the congressional budget resolutions were reported in Congressional Budget 
Resolutions: Historical Information, roll call votes pertaining to the appropriations 
committees hearings were not available in a format such that they could be merged 
consistently across all years with the data used in this analysis.  What is more, some 
appropriations committee roll call votes do not take place in a timely manner.  While 
appropriations committee hearings are scheduled to begin as early as June of the 
terminating fiscal year (Schick, 1980, 2007), the associated roll call votes may not take 
place until after the terminating fiscal year has passed and the new fiscal year has 
begun.  When this occurs, those particular votes would cease to be a factor that affects 
the year-end spending decisions of federal agencies. 
Finally, budget reconciliation directives were not included in the data either.  
When spending, revenue, and debt-limit levels set forth in the congressional budget 
resolution require changes to existing laws, the budget resolution will instruct affected 
committees to report legislation incorporating such statutory changes (Committee on 
the Budget: U.S. House of Representatives, 2013b; Heniff & Murray, 2013; Schick, 2007).  
However, budget reconciliation occurs with such frequency that, within this dataset, 
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they are almost collinear with the dependent variable.  Including budget reconciliation 
directives as a variable results in endogeneity by construction; therefore, instances of 
budget reconciliation were also excluded from the data. 
Table 6.3: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Continuing resolution (CR) 0.796 0.403 0 1 
Democratic president 0.321 0.467 0 1 
Years in office 3.815 2.247 1 8 
Unified government 0.297 0.475 0 1 
Average polarization  0.689 0.137 0.514 0.919 
Deadline 40.419 52.073 0 266 
Deeming resolutions 0.120 0.325 0 1 
Nay votes initial passage (House) 185.717 27.418 99 214 
Nay votes conference (House) 167.026 61.961 0 213 
Amendments accepted (House) 1.454 2.994 0 12 
Amendments rejected (House) 6.265 7.250 0 34 
Nay votes initial passage (Senate) 37.705 13.886 20 100 
Nay votes conference (Senate) 32.547 14.856 0 50 
Amendments accepted (Senate) 23.931 24.273 0 101 
Amendments rejected (Senate) 15.994 12.745 0 48 
Reserve funds 4.561 7.702 0 37 
Declaratory statements 7.904 11.166 0 44 
Days 3.440 2.653 0 31 
Sessions 6.114 5.573 0 41 
 
Number of observations: 4,067 
 
 
Econometric Model and Estimation Methods 
Because of (1) the reliance on a limited dependent variable, (2) the use of 
predicted values in subsequent analysis, and (3) the structure of the error terms, binary 
logistic regression is preferred as an estimation method over the use of linear 
probability models.     
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The unit of analysis, continuing resolutions, is a binary-outcome variable that is 
coded 1 to signify the implementation of spending restrictions and coded 0 when annual 
appropriations are passed in a timely manner.  Binary-outcome variables have an upper- 
and lower limit of one and zero, respectively.  Using a linear probability model may 
result in fitted probabilities of greater than unity or less than zero, which presents 
problems if the predicted values are going to be used in subsequent analysis.  In 
addition, summary statistics show that the mean for continuing resolutions is 0.796, 
which is to say that continuing appropriations are implemented, on average, during 79.6 
percent of the fiscal years within the data.  This statistic is in line with prior findings in 
the literature that 75 percent of all spending bills between 1976 and 2009 were not 
passed before the beginning of the fiscal year (Woon & Anderson, 2012).  When such 
probabilities are closer to unity, logistic regression is the preferred method of 
estimation (Acock, 2012).  
The non-normal and heteroscedastic structure of the error terms also rules-out 
the use of linear probability models.  Figure 6.1 provides a graphical display of the kernel 
density estimate of the residuals in relation to a normal distribution, and a Shapiro-
Francia test for normality confirms that the residuals are not normally distributed 
(p<0.0001).  Two tests for heteroscedasticity confirm non-uniform variance in the error 
terms.  White’s general test for heteroscedasticity reports chi-square(94) = 1283.94, 
p<0.001 and a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisbert test for heteroscedasticity reports chi-
square(1) = 389.24, p<0.001; thus, one must accept the alternative hypothesis that the 
variance of the error terms is not homogeneous. 
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Hence, logit regression was used to estimate the following log-linear model: 
ln�𝑃(𝐶𝑅) (1 − 𝑃(𝐶𝑅))� � =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝜷𝒊(𝑷) + 𝜷𝒊(𝑪) + 𝜷𝒊(𝑩𝑹) + 𝜷𝒊(𝑨) + 𝜇𝑖 
Where the dependent variable is the natural log of the odds ratio that Congress will pass 
a continuing appropriations act in the absence of annual appropriations.  P is a vector of 
three variables associated with the president, C represents is a vector of congressional 
polarization variables, BR is a vector of twelve variables associated with the 
congressional budget resolution, A is a vector of two variables associated with the 
hearings of appropriations committees, and β are the associated coefficients.  α is the 
constant term, 𝜇 is the disturbance term, and the subscript i denotes the ith observation 
from the sample of size N.  Table 6.4 includes a summary of all variables along with the 
expected sign of the coefficients. 
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Table 6.4: Determinants of Continuing Resolutions 
Variable Description 
Expected sign 
of coefficient 
Dependent variable 
  𝑙𝑛 �Pr (𝐶𝑅) (1 − Pr (𝐶𝑅))� � 
- Natural log of the odds ratio that Congress will 
pass continuing appropriations in lieu of annual 
appropriations 
 
 
Independent variables 
   
Presidential variables   
Democratic president - Indicator variable for U.S. President, equal to 1 
if a Democratic president is in office and equal 
to zero otherwise. 
+ 
Years in office - Number of years the president has been in 
office. 
+  
Unified government - Indicator variable equal to 1 if the party of the 
president is in control of both chambers of 
Congress and equal to zero otherwise. 
- 
   
Congressional polarization factors  
Average polarization - Average polarization, on the liberal-
conservative spectrum, of the House and 
Senate. 
+ 
Residual polarization 
(House) 
- Residual polarization in the House + 
Residual polarization 
(Senate) 
- Residual polarization in the Senate + 
   
Factors related to the congressional budget resolution  
Deadline - Number of days past the target date of 
adoption for the budget resolution. 
+ 
Deeming resolution - Indicator variable equal to 1 if House adopted a 
deeming resolution and equal to zero otherwise. 
+ or - 
Nay votes initial passage 
(House) 
- Number of nay votes regarding initial passage 
of the budget resolution in the House. 
+ 
Nay votes conference 
(House) 
- Number of nay votes regarding adoption of the 
budget resolution conference report in the 
House. 
+ 
Amendments accepted 
(House) 
- Number of amendments to the budget 
resolution accepted in the House. 
+ 
Amendments rejected 
(House) 
- Number of amendments to the budget 
resolution rejected in the House. 
+ 
Nay votes initial passage 
(Senate) 
- Number of nay votes on initial passage of the 
budget resolution in the Senate. 
+ 
Nay votes conference 
(Senate) 
- Number of nay votes on adoption of the 
budget resolution conference report in the 
Senate. 
+ 
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 Table 6.4: Continued  
Amendments accepted 
(Senate) 
- Number of amendments to the budget 
resolution accepted in the Senate. 
+ 
Amendments rejected 
(Senate) 
- Number of amendments to the budget 
resolution rejected in the Senate. 
+ 
Reserve funds - Number of reserve funds included in the 
budget resolution 
+ 
Declaratory statements - Number of declaratory statements included in 
the budget resolution. 
+ or - 
   
Factors related to the appropriations hearings  
Days - Duration of hearings, expressed in days. + 
Sessions - Number of sessions within a hearing. + 
 
Results 
Table 6.5 reports the maximum likelihood logit regression coefficients along with 
standard errors.  The model was run twice using the same covariates but the first 
iteration (1) includes estimates of the effect of residual polarization in the House, while 
the second iteration (2) includes estimates of the effect of residual polarization in the 
Senate.  For the overall model, Stata reports a likelihood ratio chi-squared(19) = 925.76, 
p < 0.001; as a whole, the model is statistically significant.  When forecasting the 
occurrence of continuing appropriations, the model is correct 84.60 percent of the time, 
and when predicting the timely passage of annual appropriations, the model is accurate 
93.51 percent of the time.  In general, the model accurately predicts 85.17 percent of 
cases, and when the model errs it is most likely to predict a continuing resolution. 
172 
 
Table 6.5: Results of Binary Logistic Regression 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Presidential factors     
  Democratic president -2.010*** (0.159) -2.010*** (0.159) 
  Years in office 0.324*** (0.030) 0.324*** (0.030) 
  Unified government 1.000*** (0.197) 1.000*** (0.197) 
     
Congressional polarization factors     
  Average polarization   -2.629*  (1.496)  -2.435 (1.482) 
  Residual polarization (House) 7.510*** (2.869)   
  Residual polarization (Senate)   -14.600*** (5.578) 
     
Budget resolution factors     
  Deadline 0.009*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002) 
  Deeming resolution -3.019*** (0.668) -3.019*** (0.668) 
  Nay votes initial passage (House) 0.036*** (0.003) 0.036*** (0.003) 
  Nay votes conference (House) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) 
  Amendments accepted (House) 0.150*** (0.043) 0.150*** (0.043) 
  Amendments rejected (House) -0.110*** (0.018) -0.110*** (0.018) 
  Nay votes initial passage (Senate) -0.032*** (0.008) -0.032*** (0.008) 
  Nay votes conference (Senate) -0.027*** (0.010) -0.027*** (0.010) 
  Amendments accepted (Senate) -0.022*** (0.006) -0.022*** (0.006) 
  Amendments rejected (Senate) 0.028*** (0.005) 0.028*** (0.005) 
  Reserve funds 0.135*** (0.016) 0.135*** (0.016) 
  Declaratory statements   0.020*** (0.007)   0.020*** (0.007) 
     
Appropriations hearings factors     
  Days    0.023 (0.025)    0.023 (0.025) 
  Sessions    0.009 (0.012)    0.009 (0.012) 
     
Constant  -0.092 (0.869)  -0.226 (0.850) 
     
Observations    4,067     4,067  
Positive predictive value   84.60%     84.60%  
Negative predictive value   93.51%     93.51%  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Odds ratios can be computed by exponentiating the coefficient.  For example, the coefficient for 
Democratic president is -2.010179.  Exponentiating the coefficient (i.e., e(-2.010179) ) yields an odds ratio of 
0.133968.  Subtracting 1 from this number and multiplying by 100 yields -86.60353 percent. 
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Presidential factors 
All three of the coefficients related to the president are highly statistically 
significant.  The negative coefficient on the Democratic president variable indicates that, 
on average, the election of a Democratic president decreases the odds of a continuing 
resolution being implemented by 86.6 percent (refer to the note to Table 6.5 for odds 
ratio calculations and percentage conversions).  Said another way, the odds of a 
continuing resolution are 2.01 times less likely under a Democratic president than under 
a Republican president.  Yet the positive coefficient on Years on office shows that, on 
balance, for each additional year that a president holds office, the odds of a continuing 
resolution being enacted increase some 38.3 percent, holding all other independent 
variables constant.  What is more, the Unified government coefficient indicates that if 
the party of the president controls all houses of the government, the probability of 
continuing appropriations increases.  In other words, the odds of a continuing resolution 
are almost 172 percent greater under conditions of unified government than they are 
under divided government.   
The unified government finding runs counter to expectations and seems 
counterintuitive, but literature on divided and unified government does offer 
explanations.  Skowronek (1993) submits that presidents, such as Carter and Hoover, 
have been known to be legislatively unsuccessful under unified government if the 
broader policy regime is in decline.  Woon and Anderson (2012) and Schick (2007) add 
that internal party conflict is a major cause of delay in the passage of congressional 
appropriations, while Quirk and Nesmith (1995) propose that incidental factors like the 
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budget deficit and issue complexity during the George H. W. Bush Administration had 
more of an influence over legislative gridlock than did divided government (government 
was divided during Bush’s presidency).  To underscore Quirk and Nesmith’s suggestion, 
President Clinton operated under a unified government during the 103rd Congress 
(1993-1994) but Democrats did not hold a strong majority and the Clinton deficit 
reduction plan passed the House by only two votes, 218-214 (Eaton & Tumulty, 1993; 
Rosenbaum, 1993).  That same year, 13 of the 14 cabinet-level departments listed in 
Table 6.1 were subject to continuing resolutions.  President George W. Bush also 
operated under a unified government during the 108th (2003-2004) and 109th (2005-
2006) Congresses but, similar to the Clinton example, a majority of cabinet-level 
departments experienced continuing appropriations during that time.  Hence, over the 
timeframe under study and within this particular dataset, unified government is 
associated with an increase in continuing resolutions. 
Congressional polarization factors 
 Also over this 34-year period in this data set, average polarization exhibits a 
negative influence on the incidence of continuing appropriations; however, average 
polarization exhibits statistical significance in the House iteration of the model only.  
Controlling for polarization in the House, a one standard deviation increase in Average 
polarization leads to a 30.2 percent decrease in odds of continuing resolutions being 
enacted.  Average polarization does not exhibit statistical significance in the Senate 
iteration of the model. 
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 The residual effects of party polarization present a more nuanced story.  
Controlling for average polarization, residual polarization in the House tends to increase 
the likelihood of stopgap measures.  On average and ceteris paribus, an increase of one 
standard deviation in Residual polarization (House) increases the odds of continuing 
resolutions by some 20.9 percent.  Conversely, a one standard deviation increase in 
Residual polarization (Senate) reduces the odds of continuing appropriations by 17.3 
percent.  Thus, on balance, continuing resolutions are more likely to be a result of 
polarization in the House than in the Senate. 
Budget resolution factors 
 All of the budget resolution factors are highly statistically significant.  Other 
things equal, the positive Deadline coefficient illustrates that the more tardy Congress is 
at adopting a budget resolution, the more likely continuing appropriations are to be 
implemented; by and large, the odds increase by 0.9 percent with each day that 
legislators miss the target adoption date.  On four occasions, the House adopted a 
deeming resolution in place of a budget resolution and when such an occurrence takes 
place, continuing resolutions are 3.02 times less likely to be implemented.  The Reserve 
funds coefficient shows that revisions to spending- and revenue legislation also tend to 
increase the likelihood of continuing resolutions, which is consistent with a priori 
expectations.  On average, the addition of one more reserve fund to the budget 
resolution will increase the odds of a stopgap measure by 14.4 percent.  The Declaratory 
statements variable is also statistically significant and the sign of the coefficient is in the 
expected direction.  Thus, adding a declaratory statement to the congressional budget 
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resolution tends to increase the chances that stopgap measures will be implemented by 
approximately 2 percent. 
While each of the voting and amendment variables displayed statistical 
significance, the signs of the coefficients generally exhibited an alternating pattern.  
With regard to actions in the House, a vote against initial passage of the resolution 
typically increases the odds of a stopgap measure by 3.6 percent, while a vote against 
adoption of the conference report will decrease the odds of a continuing resolution by 
1.2 percent.  For each amendment to the budget resolution accepted, odds of a 
continuing resolution increase by 16.2 percent, while the rejection of an amendment 
will likely decrease the odds by 10.4 percent, ceteris paribus.  In the Senate, holding all 
covariates constant, negative votes for initial passage of the resolution will, ordinarily, 
decrease the odds of a continuing resolution by 3.1 percent.  Likewise, nay votes for 
adoption of the conference report portend a decrease in the odds of stopgap measures 
by 2.7 percent.  Each amendment to the resolution accepted by members of the Senate 
usually decreases the odds of continuing appropriations by 2.1 percent, while each 
rejected amendment increases the odds by 2.8 percent.   
One may notice that the signs of the coefficients tend to be opposite of each 
other, both within and between the chambers; some run counter to expectations, 
others agree with the anticipated influence.  There seems to be a game at play between 
legislators with regard to initial passage of the resolution and the conference report, 
and again between the number of amendments accepted and rejected.  However, it is 
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impossible to tease out the reasons for this vacillation in signs using only the variables in 
this data set.  While outside the immediate scope of this study, the roll call voting 
literature (K. T. Poole & Rosenthal, 1991; Snyder & Groseclose, 2000) suggests party 
influence over congressional voting behavior is most prevalent in substantive matters, 
such as budget resolutions, taxation, and welfare policy.  Thus, an opportunity for future 
research may exist in the incorporation of party divisions into the data to help reveal 
nuances of congressional voting behavior. 
The change in signs may also be an artefact of the role that each chamber of 
Congress is expected to assume.  Wildavsky (1979) refers to these roles as “expectations 
of behavior attached to institutional positions.”  For instance, the House Appropriations 
Committee acts as guardian of the Treasury, while the Senate Appropriations 
Committee serves as an appeals court (Wildavsky, 1979).  With the polarization results 
in mind, one might imagine the House as a first mover in the appropriations game, 
responsible for setting budget policy which may contribute, incidentally, to continuing 
resolutions.  The Senate, as second mover and court of appeals, may revise the budget 
policy thereby contributing to a reduction in the likelihood of continuing appropriations. 
This alternating pattern also lends weight to an observation made by Jones and 
Baumgartner regarding the selection of indicators when constructing indices.  Coupled 
with the notion that decision-makers cannot be sure of the relevance of the indicators 
to the decision at hand, computational errors may be systematic and biased or they may 
be the result of random noise.  Therefore, decision-makers tend to rely on a 
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combination of several biased indicators in the hopes that misleading information from 
one direction will counterbalance inaccuracies elsewhere (B. D. Jones & Baumgartner, 
2005). 
Appropriations hearings factors 
 Finally, neither of the appropriations hearings factors is statistically significant.  
Either the length of Congressional consideration is irrelevant, or the relevant factors are 
better measured by other variables. 
 
Conclusions 
 The findings demonstrate the importance of the president and Congress as 
sources of information for federal agencies seeking to gain insight to the likelihood of 
continuing resolutions being enacted.  Previous research demonstrates the significance 
of congressional and presidential control over the budgetary resources of bureaucratic 
agencies.  Taken together with the findings that agencies engage in expense shifting in 
response to the pending enactment of continuing appropriations acts, the findings in 
this chapter suggest that bureaucratic agencies have learned to monitor particular 
aspects of the federal budget process.   
Moreover, the differentiation among indicators in the congressional budget 
process underscores the notion of organizational learning.  Earlier studies suggest a 
positive relationship between budgeting conflict and delay in the adoption of the 
congressional budget resolution, as well as agency monitoring of the actions of 
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appropriations committees.  Results here suggest that implicit indices pertaining to the 
enactment of continuing resolutions might include indicators such as the party of the 
president and the tenure in office; party polarization; the delay in adoption of the 
congressional budget resolution; the number of reserve funds established; the sense of 
the Congress; and possibly the roll call votes from initial passage and conference 
reports.  Conversely, decision-makers may not lend much weight to the amount of time 
it takes for appropriations committees to conclude their business.   
Thus, this study has provided a link between organizational learning and agenda 
setting by way of the information processing aspect of the Implicit Index Approach.  The 
field of organizational learning has been concerned mostly with entities in the private 
sector, leaving the topic, as it pertains to the public sector, largely unexplored.  At the 
same time, there is a robust literature on agenda setting which is just one aspect of how 
government entities prioritize and process information. It seems natural enough, then, 
to think of the concepts of organizational learning and agenda setting as being two sides 
of the same coin; indeed, the Implicit Index Approach illustrates the close relationship 
between the two topics.  The research in this chapter has demonstrated the ability of 
bureaucratic agencies to learn and to prioritize and process information while also 
contributing to the overall field of knowledge of public budgeting. 
 
 
Copyright © Thomas Alexander Jacobs 2014 
180 
 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
 
Contributions to the field of budgeting 
For almost 140 years Congress has been using continuing resolutions to help 
govern federal spending, yet the attendant literature is surprisingly thin on empirical 
studies that isolate and quantify the behavioral effects of stopgap measures.  Classifying 
the attendant literature into government-wide and agency-specific segments reveals an 
abundance of empirical case studies which conclude that continuing appropriations 
generate uncertainty for federal agencies.  Theoretical work by Leland and Zimmerman 
informs the field of budgeting that uncertainty combined with risk aversion leads to 
precautionary saving behavior which may take the form of contingency funding and 
saving-dissaving strategies.  Indeed, Balakrishnan and colleagues confirm expense-
shifting behavior at U.S. Army hospitals but are unable to attribute the behavior to the 
implementation of continuing appropriations.  Quantitative analysis of the effects of 
continuing resolutions on federal spending behavior has been all but nonexistent.  This 
circumstance is due in part to the notion that agency personnel do not track explicitly 
the effects of continuing resolutions, and federal organizations are very reluctant to 
divulge budget and expenditure data to outside parties. 
 One of the main contributions of this dissertation is the presentation of 
quantitative evidence of expense shifting between fiscal years in response to the 
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implementation of continuing resolutions.  By monitoring certain facets of the federal 
budget process, resource managers seem able to anticipate the use of stopgap 
measures to the extent that these resource managers engage in the strategic purchase 
and consumption of additional inventories and contract services.  In so doing, managers 
shift expenditures between fiscal years while affording themselves additional spending 
latitude in the face of spending constraints.  Thus, the research presented verifies the 
influence of continuing appropriations acts on federal spending behavior. 
 This research also builds on the expense-shifting findings by exploring the 
signaling mechanisms between higher echelons of the federal government and 
subordinate agencies, and agencies’ capacity to interpret those signals.  When it comes 
to budgetary discord, not only do organizations keep a watchful eye on the president 
but also on the amount of disagreement surrounding the congressional budget 
resolution.  When combined with theoretical work on organizational learning and 
agenda setting, the findings in this study suggest that federal agencies have learned to 
rely on an implicit index of signals coming from the president and Congress to help 
inform expenditure decisions. 
 Thus, continuing resolutions provide a feasible alternative to shuttering the 
federal government while the president and Congress are at loggerheads over 
budgetary differences, but enactment of continuing appropriations leaves federal 
organizations uneasy about availability of future resources.  In response to this 
uncertainty, the federal resource management community has learned to shift 
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expenditures to help prevent a disruption of operations, but they do so at the risk of 
violating federal law and the bona fide needs rule.  The findings of this research 
illustrate both the ability of public sector organizations to learn from their environment, 
and the difficulty of abiding by policy while ensuring the prudent use of federal funding. 
 
Future research 
With regard to future research on continuing appropriations, two questions 
readily come to mind as a result of this dissertation.  First, do spending restrictions have 
the same effect at the state level as at the federal level?  Currently, only nine U.S. states 
use stopgap measures similar to continuing appropriations (Grooters & Eckl, 1998; 
Kousser & Phillips, 2009).  In addition to conducting a similar event study and agenda 
setting approach as has been conducted in this dissertation, one might also compare 
and contrast those states that use stopgap measures to those states which do not. 
One might also question the effect that polarization has on the occurrence and 
duration of continuing resolutions.  Polarization in the U.S. Congress, as measured by 
the distance between party means, tends to vary over time.  Since 1975, the distance 
between party means has grown wider thereby impeding the enactment of proposals 
on the legislative agenda and leading to the notion that polarization increases legislative 
gridlock (D. R. Jones, 2001, 2010).  In addition, conflict is inherent to the budgeting 
process and interim continuing appropriations are the legislative mechanism used to 
keep the government operating while the president and Congress reconcile budgetary 
differences.  Interim continuing appropriations, then, might be thought of as one 
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manifestation of legislative gridlock. If polarization increases gridlock and interim 
continuing resolutions are a manifestation of gridlock, it follows that as party 
polarization grows the duration of interim continuing resolutions should increase in a 
corresponding manner.  One might rely on the party polarization hypothesis (D. R. 
Jones, 2001) in estimating the relationship between the increase in polarization and the 
duration of interim continuing resolutions. 
Thus, the subject of continuing resolutions provides ample opportunity for 
scholarly research.  Congress has used continuing resolutions since the mid-1800s and 
much has been written about these stopgap measures, yet there are still prospects for 
quantitative efforts.  What is more, the combination of the federal fiscal cycle and 
persistent budgetary conflict almost guarantees that the subject of continuing 
appropriations and government shutdowns remains in the foreground of federal budget 
discussions. 
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Appendix A:  Table of Standard Continuing Resolution Provisions 
Provision Government Accountability Office (GAO) Description 
Rate for operations - Appropriates amounts necessary to continue projects and 
activities that were conducted in the prior fiscal year at a specific 
rate for operations. 
Extent and manner - Incorporates restrictions from prior year’s appropriations acts or 
the acts currently under consideration. 
No new starts - Amounts appropriated under a continuing resolution are not 
available to initiate or resume projects or activities for which 
appropriations, funds, or authority were not available during the 
prior fiscal year. 
Coverage of continuing 
resolution obligations 
- Appropriations made available under the continuing resolution 
shall remain available to cover all properly incurred obligations 
and expenditures during the continuing resolution period. 
Adjustment of accounts - Expenditures made during the continuing resolution period are to 
be charged against applicable appropriations acts one they are 
finally enacted. 
Apportionment timing - Apportionment time requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 1513 are 
suspended during the continuing resolution period but 
appropriations provided under a continuing resolution must still 
be apportioned to comply with the Antideficiency Act and other 
federal laws. 
High rate of operations - Programs/activities with high rates of obligation or complete 
distribution of appropriations at beginning of prior fiscal year shall 
not follow the same pattern of obligation nor should obligations 
be made that would impinge upon final funding prerogatives. 
Limited funding actions - Agencies are directed to implement only the most limited funding 
action to continue operations at the enacted rate. 
Appropriated 
entitlements 
- Authorizes entitlements and other mandatory payments whose 
budget authority was provided in the prior year appropriations 
acts to continue at a rate to maintain program levels under 
current law (or to operate at present levels).  Amounts available 
for payments due on or about the first of each month after 
October are to continue to be made 30 days after the termination 
date of the continuing resolution. 
Furlough restriction - Authorizes the Office of Management and Budget and other 
authorized government officials to apportion up to the full 
amount of the rate for operations to avoid a furlough of civilian 
employees.  This authority may not be used until after an agency 
has taken all necessary action to defer or reduce non-personnel 
related administrative expenses. 
Termination date - Date on which continuing resolution expires.  Based on earlier of 
specific date or enactment of annual appropriations acts. 
Reproduced from an edited version of GAO Report number GAO-09-879, Continuing Resolutions: 
Uncertainty Limited Management Options and Increased Workload in Selected Agencies (Pulmonte, 2011). 
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Appendix B:  OMB Table of Object Classifications 
Object Class Category 
10 Personnel compensation and benefits 
11.0      Personnel compensation 
11.1           Full-time permanent 
11.3           Other than full-time permanent 
11.5           Other personnel compensation 
11.6           Military personnel – basic allowance for housing 
11.7           Military personnel 
11.8           Special personnel services payments 
11.9           Total personnel compensation 
12      Personnel benefits 
12.1           Civilian personnel benefits 
12.2           Military personnel benefits 
13      Benefits for former personnel 
20 Contractual services and supplies 
21      Travel and transportation of persons 
22      Transportation of things 
23      Rents, communications, and utilities 
23.1           Rental payments to General Services Administration 
23.2           Rental payments to others 
23.3           Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges 
24      Printing and reproduction 
25      Other contractual services 
25.1           Advisory and assistance 
25.2           Other services from non-federal sources 
25.3           Other goods and services from federal sources 
25.4           Operation and maintenance of facilities 
25.5           Research and development contracts 
25.6           Medical care 
25.7           Operation and maintenance of equipment 
25.8           Subsistence and support of persons 
26      Supplies and materials 
30 Acquisition of assets 
31      Equipment 
32      Land and structures 
33      Investments and loans 
40 Grants and fixed charges 
41      Grants, subsidies, and contributions 
42      Insurance claims and indemnities 
43      Interest and dividends 
44      Refunds 
90 Other 
91      Unvouchered 
92      Undistributed 
94      Financial transfers 
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Appendix B: Continued 
99      Subtotal, obligations 
Adopted from OMB Circular A-11(Office of Management and Budget, 2012)
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Appendix C: Table of U.S. Army Operation and Maintenance Subactivity Groups 
SAG Activity 
Operating Forces (Budget Activity 01) 
111 Maneuver Units 
112 Modular Support Brigades 
113 Echelons Above Brigade 
114 Theater-level Assets 
115 Land Forces Operations Support 
116 Aviation Assets 
121 Force Readiness Operations Support 
122 Land Forces Systems Readiness 
123 Land Forces Depot Maintenance 
131 Base Operations Support 
132 Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization 
133 Management and Operational Headquarters 
134 Combatant Commands Core Operations 
135 Additional Activities 
138 Combatant Commands Direct Mission Support 
Mobilization (Budget Activity 02) 
211 Strategic Mobility 
212 Army Prepositioned Stocks 
213 Industrial Preparedness 
Training and Recruiting (Budget Activity 03) 
311 Officer Acquisition 
312 Recruit Training 
313 One Station Unit Training 
314 Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps 
321 Specialized Skill Training 
322 Flight Training 
323 Professional Development Education 
324 Training Support 
331 Recruiting and Advertising 
332 Examining 
333 Off-duty and Voluntary Education 
334 Civilian Education and Training 
335 Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps 
Administration and Service-wide Activities (Budget Activity 04) 
411 Security Programs 
421 Service-wide Transportation 
422 Central Supply Activities 
423 Logistic Support Activities 
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Appendix C: Continued 
424 Ammunition Management 
431 Administration 
432 Service-wide Communications 
433 Manpower Management 
434 Other Personnel Support 
435 Other Service Support 
436 Army Claims 
437 Other Construction Support and Real Estate Management 
438 Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 
441 International Military Headquarters 
442 Miscellaneous Support of Other Nations 
Adapted from Department of the Army Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Estimates Justification Book (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller: Army Budget, 2012). 
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